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Introduction
The Background of the Project
The HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile Warfare
(hereinafter the HPCR Manual) was adopted in 2009 by a Group of Experts and
launched the following year with a Commentary.1 The manual served as the basis for
a series of courses—the AMPLE program—which for three years was funded by the
Swiss Government and for one additional year by the Norwegian Government.2
Instructors were largely drawn from the drafting committee of the HPCR Manual.
After sixteen courses, the AMPLE team of instructors summarized their experi-
ences and concluded that the HPCR Manual was in need of updating for three main
reasons. The first was that certain topics had been left out altogether, such as space
warfare and autonomous weapons. The second was that, in some sections (for
instance, protection of the natural environment), the consensus compromise reached
by the Group of Experts was deemed unsatisfactory. The third was that events after
the adoption of the manual showed that certain issues (e.g., protection of civilian
airliners in conflict areas) deserved closer attention.
The AMPLE team of instructors approached the Norwegian Ministry of Defence
(MoD) with a proposal for a research grant leading to a new manual on a list of
selected topics. The Norwegian MoD was prepared to support the project on a
limited basis. This meant that it would not be possible to gather all the experts
involved in the HPCR Manual process. Instead of working on an update of that
manual, it was decided to prepare a separate and independent document. It was also
decided to go beyond air and missile warfare (including outer space), notably by
including some sections on underwater operations. In still other sections, the focus
was shifted from air and missile warfare to a more general approach.
1HPCR stands for the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard
University.
2AMPLE stands for Air and Missile warfare Program of Legal Education.
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The work on the new project took place exclusively in Oslo, and it was decided to
name the final product the Oslo Manual on Select Problems of the Law of Armed
Conflict (hereinafter the Oslo Manual). The Oslo Manual uses both the HPCR
Manual and the 1994 San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to
Armed Conflicts at Sea as models. Like them, the Oslo Manualmust not be confused
with a draft treaty intended to be used by a future diplomatic conference. The goal is
rather to present a methodical restatement of existing international law on the
selected topics, based on the general practice of States and treaties in force. No
attempt has been made to be innovative or to come up with a lex ferenda (however
desirable this may appear to be): the sole aim has been to systematically capture in
the text the lex lata as we see it.
The views expressed in the Oslo Manual are the sole responsibility of the Group
of Experts involved in the project and, notwithstanding the funding from the
Norwegian Ministry of Defence, do not necessarily reflect the views of the Govern-
ment of Norway.
The Process
The Norwegian MoD appointed Professor (Emeritus) Yoram Dinstein as academic
director and Judge Advocate General (ret.) Arne Willy Dahl as project manager. The
Norwegian Defence University College agreed to provide administrative services
and has also given invaluable support in the drafting process.
A group of 15 experts were convened, based on professional ability, all of them
participating in the project in their purely personal capacity (the names of all the
experts appear in Appendix I). The Norwegian MoD followed the project via an
observer, and there were also a few other observers present, in particular from the
Norwegian Defence University College. The views expressed in the Oslo Manual do
not necessarily reflect those of the governments or institutions for which some of the
experts participating in the project are working.
The first meeting of the Group of Experts took place at the Norwegian Defence
University College in December 2015. At this meeting a list of 12 topics was
adopted and assigned to individual experts, with a view to the preparation of research
papers (roughly matching sections of the emerging Oslo Manual). Later, some of the
topics were split into two or more parts and a few additional topics added, bringing
the total number of sections to 18.
Subsequent meetings of the Group of Experts took place in June and November
2016, with a final meeting in June 2017. After the November 2016 meeting, a
drafting committee (the names of the members of which appear in Appendix II)
was convened. It met several times during the winter, offering textual additions and
emendations, as well as examining draft commentaries originally provided by the
respective experts. The entire Group of Experts was given an opportunity to offer
feedback throughout the work in progress of the drafting committee.
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At the final meeting of the Group of Experts in June 2017, the Black-letter Rules
were adopted by consensus and the draft Commentary discussed. The Commentary
was updated by the drafting committee thereafter.
In the preparation of the HPCR Manual and the 1994 San Remo Manual,
governments were represented. This was not the case with regard to the Group of
Experts preparing the Oslo Manual. For this reason, it was found necessary to
consult certain governments. This was done at meetings in Washington D.C. in
October and in The Hague in December 2017. The ICRC was also approached with a
view to hear their views. As a result of the oral consultations, some changes were
made immediately and the amended text circulated to the Group of Experts.
The governments that had been consulted were offered to submit written com-
ments, which were considered by the drafting committee together with comments by
some members of the Group of Experts at meetings in April and June 2018. The
comments necessitated some revision of the text, but with regard to the substance,
changes in the Oslo Manual were generally limited to adjust to the fact that there are
different views among States on certain questions and that it is for such reasons more
difficult to draw conclusions about customary law in these matters. A chapeau was
added to several strongly affected sections in order to explain the situation.
The Purpose of the Oslo Manual and its Commentary
It is hoped that theOslo Manual, although it does not have a binding force, will serve
as a valuable new restatement of the law of armed conflict. As such, it may prove
useful in the development of future rules of engagement, the formulation of domestic
military manuals, the preparation of training courses, and – above all – the actual
conduct of armed forces in combat operations. The objective of the Oslo Manual is
to be of help to those who plan, approve, or execute military operations before rather
than after the event.
The Black-Letter Rules of the Oslo Manual
The Black-Letter Rules of the Oslo Manual are a collaborative effort of the Group of
Experts involved in the project. There are 18 sections of varying lengths, depending
on the “density” of State practice and the consequent number of norms that have
been consolidated in each sphere. Consideration of the needs of users has also led to
the elaboration in greater detail of some sections. The first six sections are high-tech
(and in part even futuristic) in their orientation. They are interconnected in the sense
that cybernetics is an important ingredient in outer space operations or in the use of
remotely controlled weapons, and it is an integral part of autonomous weapons. In
undersea systems, autonomy is more developed than in airborne and surface sys-
tems, due to the difficulties in passing signals for remote control through water.
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The subsequent sections are less reliant on high-tech, but the emphasis through-
out is on relatively recent developments in military operations. Occasionally, there
are high-tech dimensions even here (by way of illustration, the increasing tendency
to use civilian employees of the government, or civilian contractors, to fulfill remote-
control combat functions).
The Oslo Manual includes a section on international criminal law. The principal
reason is the need expressed by operators and legal advisers at the AMPLE courses
for guidance with regard to their particular roles and responsibilities in a complex
military environment. Familiarity with what the law of armed conflict requires no
longer seems to suffice: military personnel wish to know the extent of individual
accountability in planning and executing operations, gathering intelligence, evalu-
ating expected collateral damage compared to anticipated military advantage, and so
forth.
The Accompanying Commentary
Each Black-Letter Rule of the Oslo Manual is accompanied by a Commentary. This
is aimed at providing user-friendly brief explanations for both legal advisers and
military officers who plan, approve, or execute operations. Legal cites are kept to a
minimum and the Commentary avoids academic discourses.
Although the Commentary was formulated by a small drafting committee (see
above), this work was carried out in close cooperation with all the members of the
Group of Experts. All participants had an opportunity to see the Commentary as it
evolved and to critique it. Still, for obvious practical purposes, it was impossible to
seek a line-by-line approval of a rather lengthy text by the entire Group of Experts.
Hence, whereas the Black-letter Rules of the Oslo Manual reflect the views of the
Group of Experts as a whole, the Commentary must be seen as the sole responsibility
of the drafting committee.
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Section I: Outer Space
Rule 1
For the purposes of this Manual:
(a) “Outer Space”
i. begins at the lowest possible point of the orbital perigee of artificial
satellites;
ii. lies beyond the jurisdiction of all States.
Commentary
1. There is no general international agreement or customary international law
specifying the precise definition and delimitation of Outer Space. The definition
of “Outer Space” used in this Manual is consistent with current practice.
2. Outer Space with respect to jurisdictional arrangements is similar to the high seas.
3. At present, the lowest orbital perigee of satellites is approximately 100 km above
sea level.1
(b) The Moon and other Celestial Bodies
i. do not include Earth.
ii. are separated by Outer Space but are not stricto sensu part of it.
Commentary
1. The Moon and other Celestial Bodies are generally considered res communis
omnium. This implies that they are open for exploration, exploitation and use by
1As to the 100 kilometre approximation, see Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research at Harvard University, HPCR Manual on International Law Applicable to Air and Missile
Warfare (AMW Manual) (2009), commentary Rule 1 (a) paragraph 5.
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States, whether individually or collectively. They are not subject to national
appropriation, which means that sovereignty can not be excercised over them
by way of occupation (the non-appropriation principle).2
2. The non-appropriation principle implies a freedom of movement where States can
launch objects, including spacecraft into Outer Space in order to orbit Earth, the
Moon or other Celestial Bodies without having to seek permission from other
States as long as the launch trajectory does not transit the national airspace of
another State without authorization.
3. On the responsibility of States for activities conducted by persons belonging to
their armed forces, see Rule 5.
4. The primary interest recognized in the OST is the maintenance of international
peace and security.3 See also Commentary to Rule 2.
(c) “Outer Space operations” are operations that employ capabilities aimed
at achieving objectives in or through Outer Space.
Commentary
1. The phrase “Outer Space operations” is broadly defined in this Manual.4
2. Outer Space operations comprise activities where, for example, an object tra-
verses temporarily through Outer Space as part of a ballistic trajectory, or where
activities on Earth have effects in Outer Space, such as the launching of a satellite.
Use of satellite signals on Earth, including for communication or navigation
(including GPS and communication signals), is not an Outer Space operation.
The jamming of a satellite is an Outer Space operation, whereas conventional
jamming within airspace of a signal transmitted by a satellite is not.
3. Satellites send information via the electromagnetic spectrum, which is the col-
lective term for all known frequencies of electromagnetic radiation and their
linked photon wavelengths. The use of satellites can include the following
categories: remote sensing, communications, scientific research and navigation.
Most terrestrial use of satellite imagery, communication or navigation, however,
does not constitute Outer Space operations as such.
(d) “Outer Space systems and assests” are those human-made systems and
assets located in Outer Space as well as on the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies, with or without human occupants. The phrase includes space-
craft, satellites and all related infrastructure (including up-links and
down-links).
2Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (OST) (1967), United Nations Treaty Series
(UNTS), vol. 610, page 205. See Articles I and II.
3OST, ibid, Article III.
4OST, ibid, Articles VI and VII.
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Commentary
1. “Outer Space systems and assets” create the capabilities for Outer Space opera-
tions as defined in (c).
2. The definition of “Outer Space systems and assets” includes any or all component
parts of the systems and assets as defined.
3. Examples are data and communication links, payloads, and ancillary devices and
facilities such as:
a. Ground stations;
b. Ground station mission or user terminals, which may include initial reception,
processing and exploitation terminals;
c. Launch systems and directly related support infrastructure, including space
surveillance, battle management, command, control, and communications
infrastructure and computers;
d. Launch sites;
e. Booster storage facilities;
f. Satellite storage and assembly facilities;
g. Telemetry, Tracking, and Commanding (TT&C) nodes, including both hot
and cold back up facilities;
h. Research and development facilities; and
i. Launch facilities and vehicles.
4. Manufacturing plants and assembly lines on Earth are generally excluded from
the definition. However, exceptionally, all infrastructure essential for Outer Space
operations, even if located on Earth, would be included.
Rule 2
Outer Space operations are governed by international law, including the
Charter of the United Nations and the applicable principles and rules of the
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC).
Commentary
1. It has to be acknowledged that the degree of practice of States (as well as the state
of opinio juris) leaves some doubt as to whether customary international law has
already consolidated in so far Outer Space operations are concerned. However, in
principle, all Outer Space operations are governed by the Charter of the United
Nations.5
2. Article III of the Outer Space Treaty refers to the applicability in Outer Space of
international law. The Group of Experts believes that the general reference to
international law extends to LOAC. In view of the unique characteristics of Outer
Space activities as such, in the absence of sufficient State practice and opinio
5Charter of the United Nations (1945), UNTS, vol. 1.
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juris, the application or interpretation of LOAC in Outer Space may be subject to
controversy.
3. The OST ostensibly limits the use of Outer Space to “peaceful purposes”6 and the
use of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies to “exclusively peaceful purposes”.7
This terminology is generally construed as proscribing only military operations
that are carried out in breach of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter
explicitly recognizes the exercise of self-defence in response to armed attack
(Article 51) and authorizes enforcement measures taken or authorized by the
Security Council (under chapter “Section VII: Civilians Directly Participating in
Hostilities”).
4. The OST specifically prohibits the establishment of military bases, installations
and fortifications as well as testing of any types of weapons and the conduct of
military manoeuvres, on the Moon and other Celestial Bodies.
5. LOAC comprises both customary law and treaties. Customary law generally
applies to all States. As far as treaties are concerned, they are binding only
upon contracting parties. The reference to applicable principles and rules of
LOAC is intended to emphasize that States are bound by different LOAC treaties
and by applicable customary law. However, which principles and rules of LOAC
apply, and how they apply, may depend, inter alia, on the classification of an act
as an attack under LOAC.
Rule 3
State Parties to the Outer Space Treaty must not place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on the Moon or other Celestial Bodies, or
station such weapons in Outer Space in any other manner.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article IV of the OST which relates to nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Group of Experts believes that
Article IV of the OST today reflects an emerging customary international norm.
2. In order to be considered to be “placed in orbit” an Outer Space object must
complete at least one orbit. WMD or nuclear weapons that simply transit through
Outer Space without completing an orbit, such as an Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM), do not fall within the scope of the prohibition.
3. There is no generally accepted definition of WMD. Nuclear Weapons are not
defined in international treaties, but according to an Advisory Opinion of the
6OST, see fn. 2, Preamble.
7OST, see fn. 2, Article IV(2).
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International Court of Justice they are “explosive devices whose energy results
from the fusion or fission of the atom”.8 The Group of Experts took the view that,
for the purposes of Article IV (1) of the OST, WMD comprise—in addition to
nuclear weapons—those weapons that are prohibited by the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention9 and the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention.10
4. An Outer Space object with a nuclear power source is not necessarily a nuclear
weapon for the purposes of this Manual.
Rule 4
Without prejudice to the Charter of the United Nations, the principles and
rules of LOAC are the lex specialis during armed conflict and prevail over
the general law of Outer Space.
Commentary
1. The general legal regime applicable in Outer Space, based on customary law as
well as applicable treaties, is peacetime law. The OST and other Outer Space
treaties are silent as regards the possibility of an armed conflict.11 However,
LOAC is the lex specialis in the sense that it prevails in situations of armed
conflict (either international or non-international) involving Outer Space opera-
tions over any inconsistent peacetime norm applicable in Outer Space. That said,
LOAC cannot override the Charter of the United Nations.
2. By definition, the principles and rules of LOAC—which apply only in situations
of armed conflict—are more specific than the peacetime principles and rules of
the law of Outer Space which are lex generalis.
Rule 5
With respect to an armed conflict, States bear responsibility for their respec-
tive internationally wrongful Outer Space operations as well as other wrong-
ful activities conducted in Outer Space that are attributable to them.
Responsibility extends to such actions by all persons forming part of the
armed forces.
Commentary
1. This Rule exclusively applies to State responsibility under LOAC. However, the
first sentence of the Rule is also consistent with Article VI of the OST.
8Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 226,
at para 35, page 243.
9Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) (1972), UNTS, vol. 1015, page
164, Article I.
10Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on their Destruction (CWC) (1993), International Legal Materials (ILM), vol.
32, page 800, Article II.
11See fn. 2.
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2. This is also the general Rule of State responsibility as defined by the International
Law Commission,12 which are reflective of customary international law. The
second sentence of the Rule is based on Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention
(IV) and Article 91 of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions
(AP/I).13
3. It is the view of the Group of Experts that the 1972 Liability Convention does not
apply between Belligerent States to an armed conflict.14 The Liability Convention
does however remain effective between a Belligerent State and Neutral States.
See Rule 18.
Rule 6
A person who wrests control of Outer Space systems and assets assumes
responsibility for subsequent use of the system in accordance with the degree
and the duration of the control exercised.
Commentary
1. The Rule refers to the individual responsibility of the person who wrests control
of Outer Space systems and assets. Should such a person act on behalf of a State,
his/her act will be attributable to that State, which will bear State responsibility.
2. A person who wrests control of an Outer Space system and asset, will bear
responsibility for the subsequent use for which the system and asset is put
while that individual retains control. However, a question arises as to the alloca-
tion of responsibility when the person who wrests control of the system then
tranfers that control to another person. There would be potential criminal liability
if intent and knowledge could be established.
3. See Commentary to Rule 45.
Rule 7
(a) In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon,
means or method of Outer Space warfare, a State that is party to
Additional Protocol I must determine whether its employment would,
12International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its fifty-third session,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, Part Two, page 26, Articles 4 and 5.
13Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907 Hague Regulations) (1907), Schindler and
Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflicts, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (Leiden/Boston) (2004), page
66. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), (AP/I) (1977), The Laws of
Armed Conflicts, page 711.
14Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, (Liability Conven-
tion) (1972), UNTS, vol. 961, page 187.
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in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by any rule of international
law applicable to that State.
(b) In the acquisition of a new weapon or means of Outer Space warfare, a
State that is not party to Additional Protocol I should determine whether
its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by
applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 36 of AP/I, which is applicable only to Contracting
Parties.
2. The provision of Article 36 of AP/I has not yet crystallized as customary
international law, and therefore non-contracting Parties are not legally bound to
abide by the full extent of its strictures. Some of the non-contracting Parties
whose interests are specially affected, while conducting significant weapon
review procedures, maintain that this is done as a “best practice” rather than out
of a sense of legal obligation. In other words, these countries do not share an
opinio juris on an independent obligation to conduct legal reviews of weapons
under customary international law.
3. As far as non-contracting Parties to Additional Protocol I are concerned, the
practice regarding the adoption of new methods of warfare is less clear than it is
with regard to new means of warfare.
4. For its part, the Group of Experts believes that there is an implied rule requiring
all States to review the lawfulness of new weapons and means of warfare that they
acquire, with a view to avoiding incompatibility with the two basic principles of
LOAC, i.e., distinction and the prohibition of unnecessary suffering and super-
fluous injury.
5. The reference to the development or acquisition of a new means of warfare has to
be understood as referring to the planned or intended consequence of that means
of warfare in the context of its normal and expected use.
6. Reference to the principles and rules of LOAC does not obviate the need to
conform with other norms of international law as and when applicable.
7. It may as well be added that the testing of nuclear weapons in Outer Space is
specifically prohibited by the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water.15
Rule 8
In Outer Space operations occurring during armed conflict, the concept of
attack applies to all acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence
or defence. The acts must be intended to cause—or must be reasonably
expected to result in—death, injury, destruction or damage. These acts
15Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water
(LTBT) (1963), UNTS, vol. 480, page 44. Articles 1(a) and (b).
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generally do not include those intended to cause only temporary loss of
functionality, e.g., jamming.
Commentary
1. The first sentence, which is reflected in AP/I,16 is based on customary law.
2. The notion of “attack” under this Rule must not be confused with jus ad bellum
rules under the Charter of the United Nations.
3. The second sentence defines the term “acts of violence”. Accordingly, the
intentional destruction of an Outer Space object or the intentional infliction of
any physical damage to it will be an attack under this Rule. Acts that are not
intended to result in such consequences do not qualify as attacks.
4. “Acts of violence against the adversary” include acts against combatants or
civilians, military objectives or civilian objects.
5. During military operations in armed conflict, many acts may be understood to
have some causal connection to death, injury, destruction, or damage. Acts in
support of military operations (e.g., refuelling military aircraft), accidents, or
other acts that simply bear some causal connection to death, injury, destruction,
or damage are not, by that causal connection, automatically considered attacks.
6. Nonetheless, where it is reasonably expected that the direct and ordinary
consequence of an action is to cause death, injury, destruction or damage,
such action could, depending on the circumstances, be regarded as “intentional”
thus qualifying the action as an attack and thereby triggering the legal obliga-
tions that attach to “attacks” under LOAC.
7. Causing temporary loss of functionality, which could either be brief or
prolonged—in and of itself—does not constitute an attack inasmuch as it usually
does not cause death, injury, damage or destruction. However, in Outer Space,
causing a temporary loss of functionality may in certain circumstances be
intended to cause death, injury, destruction or damage, and would thus consti-
tute an attack. For example, the temporary degradation of space assets’, navi-
gation functionality could be used intentionally to cause the crash of those
assets. Conversely, temporary degradation resulting in only temporary conse-
quences, such as temporary loss of communication, would not per se constitute
an attack.
8. “Shadowing” of a satellite, which means depriving it of solar energy supply
through positioning another object in between the satellite and the sun, does not
necessarily constitute an attack. In the context of the present Rule and as regards
what constitutes damage, there are divergent views. Some have said that damage
must be limited specifically to a situation in which physical repairs are required,
whereas others would contend that reduced or extinguished functionality would
be sufficient.
16AP/I, see fn. 13, Article 49.
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9. Similarly, “blinding” a satellite sensor by targeting it with a laser (and causing
no physical damage to the satellite, but temporarily preventing its proper
functioning), does not necessarily qualify as an attack.
10. Jamming, like the blinding of a sattelite, is a form of temporary loss of
functionality. It should be noted, however, that jamming may be a constitutive
component of an overall attack.
Rule 9
In principle, Outer Space systems and assets belonging to the armed forces
constitute military objectives because, by nature, they make an effective
contribution to the enemy’s military action.
Commentary
1. Military objectives by nature are defined in chapter “Section IX: Military Objec-
tives by Nature”, Rules 77 ff.
2. Military objectives by nature are lawful targets at all times and in all circum-
stances during an armed conflict.
3. The words “in principle” were included to clarify that this was a general rule
subject to exceptions. For example, medical aid stations in Outer Space belonging
to the military would be excluded.
4. Outer Space systems and assets belonging to the armed forces may include, e.g.:
military satellites performing telecommunication, Earth Observation (EO), early
warning, weather observation, navigation, and Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance (ISR) functions. See commentary to Rule 1 (d).
5. Since infrastructure components may be located in a Neutral State, additional
considerations apply, see Rules 18–19 and Commentary.
Rule 10
Civilian Outer Space systems and assets must not be the object of attack
unless they qualify as military objectives—if not by nature—by location,
purpose or use.
Commentary
1. Civilian objects are protected against direct attack according to customary LOAC.
This is also the rule under Article 52(1) of AP/I. Ex hypothesi, civilian objects are
not military objectives.
2. Civilian space systems include satellites and all related ground infrastructure that
cannot be classified as a military objective according to Rule 9.
3. Civilian space systems will nevertheless become lawful targets if by location,
purpose or use they make an effective contribution to military action, and if their
total or partial destruction or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time
offers a definite military advantage.
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4. Examples of purpose or use rendering civilian Outer Space systems and assets
lawful targets are:
a. Commercial space systems used to augment military space capabilities and to
increase the resiliency of space architectures, e.g., space launch facilities.
b. Communication satellites or commercial earth-imaging systems normally used
for civilian purposes but effectively contributing to military action, e.g., GPS
satellite systems and EO satellites used for military Command and Control
functions or intelligence collection.
c. Satellites hosting a military payload (dual use).
Rule 11
In Outer Space operations constituting attacks, assessments of collateral
damage should take into consideration the effects of space debris expected
to result from the attack.
Commentary
1. Rule 11 reflects unique Outer Space considerations regarding the proportionality
rule as established by treaty and customary LOAC prohibiting attacks that may be
“expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”17 “Collateral damage” is
the common term for “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof”, as expressed in Article 51(5)(b) of
AP/I.
2. The fact that space debris can be expected to result from a kinetic attack in Outer
Space does not in itself render the attack unlawful, but it may play a significant
role in the assessment of collateral damage.18
3. Due to the particular nature of Outer Space, the debris expected to result from an
attack or the effects of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP), could easily affect
civilian satellites, or damage or destroy the Outer Space assets of the attacking
Party itself.
4. The outcome of the proportionality assessment may depend upon the orbit where
the attack occurs. For example, the effects of an attack by a Kinetic Anti-Satellite
(K-ASAT) Weapon in the geostationary orbit could be particularly serious.
5. An attack upon an Outer Space system or asset may be expected to result
in damage to or destruction of satellites not constituting military objectives.
17AP/I, see fn. 13, Article 51(5)(b).
18Space debris may be defined as all man-made objects, including fragments and elements thereof,
in Earth orbit or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional. See Space Debris Mitigation
Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, endorsed by the UN Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space at its fiftieth session and contained in A/62/20, annex.
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Moreover, an attack may result in the denial of the exercise of the right to use
Outer Space by civilian satellites or seriously damage crucial civilian infrastruc-
tures that depend upon Outer Space systems in order to function properly. Such
expected consequences must be considered in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated when applying the proportionality rule.
6. Collateral damage does not include mere inconvenience. However, if as a result
of the presence of debris in Outer Space a civilian satellite is forced to detour,
thereby expending fuel so as to be unable to perform its normal functions, the
situation may no longer amount to mere inconvenience.
Rule 12
The concept of direct participation in hostilities applies to civilians, including
civilian employees of State agencies, who conduct Outer Space operations in
the context of an armed conflict.
Commentary
1. The concept of direct participation in hostilities (DPH) is firmly established in
treaty and customary LOAC and is expressed in Article 51(3) of AP/I, as well as
common Article 3 to the four Geneva Conventions and Article 13(3) of AP/II
applicable in non-international armed conflicts.19 In accordance with this con-
cept, civilians enjoy protection from attack “unless and for such time as they take
a direct part in hostilities.”
2. This Rule is without prejudice to the question whether a certain activity actually
qualifies as DPH.
3. See chapters “Section VII: Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities” and
“Section VIII: Civilians Participating in Unmanned Operations”.
Rule 13
In Outer Space operations, activities qualifying as direct participation in
hostilities may include:
(a) Any activity designed or intended to directly cause death of, injury to,
damage to or destruction of to an adverse party;
19Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (AP/II) (1977), Laws of Armed
Conflicts, page 775, at page 781. Common Article 3 appears in the following: Convention (I) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (GC I)
(1949), Laws of Armed Conflict, page 459, at page 461; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (GC II)
(1949), Laws of Armed Conflict, page 485, at page 487; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War (GC III) (1949), Laws of Armed Conflict, page 507, at page 512; Convention
(IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time ofWar (GC IV), Laws of Armed Conflict,
page 575, at page 580.
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(b) Defence of military space objects against enemy attacks;
(c) Contributing to targeting procedures, such as helping to identify or
prioritize targets;
(d) Engaging in planning specific attacks;
(e) Military reconnaissance or surveillance; or
(f) Operating a tactical communications relay.
Commentary
1. The entire issue of definition of activities amounting to DPH is subject to
controversy and disagreement among experts. This Manual focuses on examples
on which consensus could be reached.
2. This Rule too is without prejudice to the question whether a certain activity
actually qualifies as DPH. On the notion of DPH, see chapter “Section VII:
Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities”.
Rule 14
In Outer Space operations constituting attacks, feasible precautions should
be taken with a view to the specific characteristics of Outer Space, including
the presence or functions of civilian satellites and the effects on the use of the
electromagnetic spectrum.
Commentary
1. The duty to take feasible precautions in attack is customary in nature and is
reflected in Article 57 of AP/I. “Feasible precautions” are those that are practi-
cable or practically possible, taking into account all circumstances ruling at the
time, including humanitarian and military considerations. In particular, Belliger-
ent States should verify that the target is a military objective and minimize
collateral damage. When feasible, attacks must be cancelled or suspended if
decision-makers learn that the object is not a military objective or if the attack
may be expected to violate the proportionality rule.
2. When alternative targets of attack present themselves, the legal position as far as
Contracting Parties to AP/I are concerned is that—among targets offering similar
military advantage—they must select the one where collateral damage would be
minimized. As far as non-contracting parties to AP/I are concerned, the obligation
to minimize collateral damage in attack may be understood as applying only to
targets offering the same military advantage.
3. Effective advance warning of attacks likely to affect the civilian population must
be provided, unless circumstances do not permit.
4. Verification that a target is a military objective should take into account that
civilian communications satellites often are placed in crowded orbits such as the
geostationary orbit and that they may be controlled by a multitude of owners and
third-party providers of services, in a variety of jurisdictions.
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5. Commercial communication satellites usually have a capacity based on a multi-
tude of transponders, where capacity, not transponders, is sold or leased to a
multitude of clients. Military use of any such capacity renders that satellite a
military objective. The fact that the use of the remaining capacity is civilian in
nature does not affect the characterization of the satellite, but may raise propor-
tionality issues.
6. The electromagnetic spectrum is defined in paragraph 3 of the Commentary to
Rule 1(c) and is the medium for providing satellite-information and services to
the Earth. Feasible precautions should be taken in order to reduce the extent of
harmful effects on space capabilities that do not constitute military objectives.
7. The requirement to take precautions in attack necessitates assessment of the
impact of space debris. It also might involve consideration of the effects on the
use of the electromagnetic spectrum. The assessment includes efforts to assess the
likelihood of civilian satellites being struck by debris (see Rule 11) and a
consideration of limitations on the manoeuvre capabilities of Outer Space vehi-
cles to the extent that this amounts to damage as distinct from mere inconve-
nience. It may also be appropriate to assess the effect of an energized atmosphere
or scintillated ionosphere upon space communications and may require determi-
nation of the likelihood of interference or damage to be caused to a given signal,
satellite, line of communication or ground asset by the effects on the electromag-
netic environment.
8. If an Outer Space system or asset controlled by a Neutral State qualifies as a
lawful target, additional considerations apply. See Rule 18 with Commentaries.
Rule 15
The AP/1 obligations with regard to the natural environment should apply to
Outer Space operations and to their effects on all parts of Outer Space, the
Moon and other Celestial Bodies.
Commentary
1. The provision of Article 35 (3) AP/1 protects the natural environment against
attacks that are expected or intended to cause widespread, long-term and severe
damage. This provision does not apply to Outer Space. However, the Group of
Experts agreed that in the conduct of Outer Space operations the same principle
should be applied by analogy.
2. For the meaning of the AP/1 prohibition, see the Commentary on Rule 140.
3. For an illustration relating to Outer Space, consider the irradiation of areas of
Outer Space protected by the Van Allen belts through nuclear explosions.
Rule 16
States Parties to the ENMOD Convention are prohibited from making any
military or other hostile use of Outer Space environmental modification
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techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.
Commentary
1. Because the ENMOD Convention20 does not express customary LOAC, its
obligations only bind States Parties to the Convention. The ENMOD Convention
specifically prohibits the use of environmental modification techniques on the
“lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of Outer Space.”
Rule 17
(a) Enemy Outer Space systems and assets, in theory, could be subject to
capture as prize.
(b) Enemy character can be determined by registration, ownership, charter,
control, or other criteria.
(c) Neutral Outer Space systems and assets may not be captured as prize,
unless they are used for rendering unneutral service.
Commentary
1. Subject to Rule 3, the LOAC right to capture of enemy Outer Space systems and
assets prevails over the duty to recover and return space objects in the Rescue
Agreement, Article 5.21
2. The use of “in theory” is intended to convey that the Group of Experts was not
aware of State practice in subjecting space systems and assets to prize law.
Moreover, capture of an object in orbit may be impractical under present
technology.
3. The enemy character of an Outer Space system or asset is not necessarily the same
as its “State of registry” according to the Registration treaty.22
4. In theory, rendering unneutral service would make neutral Outer Space systems
and assets liable to be captured as prize. However, many of the services that are
today provided by satellites (such as providing satellite imagery for military use)
could, if provided to a Belligerent Party, render the satellite a lawful military
objective rather than merely subjecting it to capture.
20Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile use of Environmental Modification
Techniques (ENMOD) (1976), UNTS, vol. 1108, page 151.
21Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space (1968), UNTS, vol. 672, page 119.
22Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (1974),UNTS, vol. 1023, page
15, Article 1(c).
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Rule 18
As a general principle, neutral States must not knowingly allow space
systems and assets for which they are responsible to be used by Belligerent
States in Outer Space operations related to armed conflict.
Commentary
1. The concept of neutrality, applicable to a State which is not a Belligerent Party
in a given international armed conflict, relates to the conduct of hostilities in all
circumstances and therefore extends to Outer Space operations. This is partic-
ularly important as regards the obligation of the Neutral State to maintain its
impartiality in the armed conflict.
2. Given that the law of neutrality relies heavily on the concept of “neutral
territory”, some aspects of that law may be inconsistent with the characteristic
of Outer Space. The Group of Experts believe however, that the law of neutrality
may be applied in the context of Outer Space mutatis mutandis.
3. There is substantive treaty law as well as customary law with respect to the
standing of a Neutral State in an armed conflict. However, neither the treaty law
nor customary law pertains to Outer Space as such. Hence, any application of
existing rules in an Outer Space context can only be based on analogy.
4. This Rule reflects the principles of the customary law of neutrality (as expressed,
inter alia, in the 1907 Hague Convention V on Neutral Powers and Persons in
War on Land and the 1907 Hague Convention XIII on Neutrality in Naval
War23).
5. Belligerent States are forbidden from erecting on the territory of a Neutral State
any military ground infrastructure intended to be used in the armed conflict. This
general prohibition also applies to communication installations for satellites
operated by Belligerent armed forces.
6. The prohibition extends to the exclusively military use of such installations,
established before the armed conflict on the territory of a Neutral State.24
7. The employment on neutral territory of ground station functions such as TT&C
(see paragraph 5 of the Commentary to Rule 9) used for communication
between a spacecraft and ground systems for the execution of belligerent acts
is a violation of neutrality. However, the simple downloading of data from a
civilian satellite by ground stations on neutral territory does not violate neutral-
ity when the activity is not linked to the hostilities.
8. A Neutral State may not launch military satellites on behalf of a Belligerent
Party. Nor may it provide any services to a Belligerent Party military satellite
already in orbit.
23Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War
on Land (1907), Laws of Armed Conflicts, page 1399. Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (1907), Laws of Armed Conflicts, page 1407.
24For comparative purposes, see Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention (V) on Neutral Powers
and Persons in War on Land, see fn. 23.
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9. A Neutral State may not sell or otherwise transfer a satellite for military uses by
a Belligerent Party.
10. However, commercial and trade activities by neutral companies or individuals
with a Belligerent State are not prohibited.
11. The use by a Belligerent State of telecommunication satellites owned by or
under the exclusive control of a Neutral State is not a violation of neutrality. A
Neutral State has no obligation to prevent the use of its telecommunication
satellites by a Belligerent State to the conflict which had access to the satellite
prior to the outbreak of hostilities.25
12. Existing non-military telecommunications satellites owned by private compa-
nies or individuals may be used by Belligerent Parties, e.g., by renting satellite
transponder capacity for voice and data communication of a military nature.
13. Restrictions imposed by a Neutral State on the belligerent use of privately
owned telecommunication satellites, must be impartially applied to both (all)
Belligerent Parties.26
14. The necessary use of force by a Neutral State to prevent its Outer Space assets
from being used by a Belligerent State to commit a belligerent act is not a
violation of neutrality.27
15. This Rule is without prejudice to Rules 9 and 10 and the definition of military
objectives.
Rule 19
As a general principle, Belligerent States must conduct their Outer Space
operations with due regard for the rights of Neutral States.
Commentary
1. There is an obligation incumbent on Belligerent States to act with due regard for
the rights of Neutral States to use Outer Space.28
2. In the planning of Outer Space operations, Belligerent States should implement
measures in order to reduce the risk of damaging neutral critical infrastructure and
communication space assets.29
251907 Hague Convention (V) on Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, ibid, Article 8.
261907 Hague Convention (V) on Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, ibid, Article 9.
271907 Hague Convention (V) on Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, ibid, Article 10.
28OST, see fn. 2, Article IX.
29Similar duties are established in naval warfare. See San Remo Manual on International Law
Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea (San Remo Manual) (1994), The Laws of Armed Conflicts,
page 1153, paras 12 and 88.
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Section II: Cyber Operations
At the time of composing the Oslo Manual, there were some fundamental differences
of opinion among States as to the interpretation or acceptability of terms such as
“cyber means of warfare”, “cyber methods of warfare”, and “cyber attacks”. The
Group of Experts took cognizance of those differences of opinion but concluded,
coherent with the view of the International Court of Justice, as expressed in the
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion1 that the cardinal principles of LOAC would
apply to all forms of warfare. This includes cyber warfare.
Rule 20
(a) For the purposes of this Manual, “cyber operations” are operations that
employ capabilities aimed at achieving objectives in or through
cyberspace.
Commentary
1. The definition of cyber operations in this Rule is based on the definitions used in
the US Joint Publications.2 The reference to “primary purpose” in the US
definition is omitted from the present Rule, as it is believed that it unnecessarily
restricts the definition.
2. The fact that objectives are achieved “in or through” cyberspace means that the
operations covered by the present definition include both those the effects of
which are confined to cyberspace and those that have effects in the physical world
through the manipulation, deletion or corruption of data.
3. The kinetic bombardment of physical cyber infrastructures would not be a cyber
operation for the purposes of the present Rules.
1See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 8.
2US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations, 17 January 2017,
page GL-8. See also U.S Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-12 (R),
Cyberspace Operations, 5 February 2013.
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4. “Cyber operations” as defined in this Rule include:
a. Unauthorized access to computers, computer systems or networks to obtain
information, but without necessarily affecting the functionality of the accessed
system or amending, corrupting, or deleting the data resident therein; and
b. Operations, whether in offence or in defence, intended to alter, delete, corrupt
or deny access to computer data or software for the purposes of propaganda or
deception; partly or totally disrupting the functioning of the targeted computer,
computer system or network and related computer-operated physical infra-
structure (if any); or producing physical damage extrinsic to the computer,
computer system, or network.
5. “Cyberspace” is understood in this Rule as “a global domain within the informa-
tion environment consisting of the interdependent network of information tech-
nology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet,
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors
and controllers.”3
(b) Cyber operations, when carried out as part of an armed conflict, are
governed by applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. This Rule is limited to armed conflict, whether international or non-international.
2. Paragraph 5 of the Commentary to Rule 2 explains the import of the phrase
“applicable principles and rules of LOAC”.
3. The expression “when carried out as part of an armed conflict” was included in
order to exclude cyber operations falling outside the scope of the armed conflict.4
Rule 21
With respect to an armed conflict, States bear responsibility for their cyber
operations as well as other activities conducted in cyberspace that are
attributable to them. Such responsibility includes actions by all persons
belonging to the armed forces of the State.
3US Department of Defence, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02,
8 November 2010 (as amended through 15 February 2016), page 58.
4The applicability of LOAC to cyber operations has been affirmed, inter alia, in the Report of
Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the
Context of International Security, 22 July 2015, UN Doc. A/70/174, page 13 and the Department of
Defence Law of War Manual (US DoD Manual) (2015, amended 2016), at page 1013 ff.
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Commentary
1. This Rule deals with State responsibility, which applies in the relations between
an injured State and a wrong-doing State. Hence, its applicability would generally
be confined to international armed conflicts. However, in some situations, State
responsibility vis-a-vis other States will also be relevant to non-international
armed conflicts.
2. The Rule is derived from Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention IV and Article
91 of AP/I.5
Rule 22
All those involved in the conduct of cyber operations, including attacks, are
responsible for their respective roles and, commensurate with their involve-
ment, have obligations to ensure that such operations are conducted in
accordance with the applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. The preceding Rule deals with State responsibility, whereas the present one
addresses the issue of individual responsibility.
2. As for the general principle regarding individual responsibility, see Commentary
to Rule 44.
Rule 23
(a) In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new cyber
weapon, means or method of cyber warfare, a State that is party to
Additional Protocol I must determine whether its employment would,
in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by any rule of international
law applicable to that State.
(b) In the acquisition of a new cyber weapon or means of cyber warfare, a
State that is not party to Additional Protocol I should determine whether
its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by
applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. For the interpretation of this Rule, see the Commentary on Rule 7 which is
applicable mutatis mutandis.
2. Due to the characteristics of cyber capabilities, the distinction between “a method
of cyber warfare” and “means of cyber warfare” is still unclear.
3. Cyber capabilities in general are not inherently unlawful.
4. Cyber capabilities are so diverse and their effects so dependent on the circum-
stances (including the characteristics of the targeted system) that a legal review
can likely only be conducted with regard to each individual capability. In most
5See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13.
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cases, legality will depend on how the capability is used rather than the capability
itself.
Rule 24
In cyber operations occurring during an armed conflict, the concept of
attack applies to all acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence
or defence. The acts must be intended to cause—or must be reasonably
expected to result in—death, injury, destruction or damage. These acts
generally do not include those intended to cause only temporary loss of
functionality.
Commentary
1. For the interpretation of this Rule, see the Commentary on Rule 8 which is
applicable mutatis mutandis.
2. This Rule applies in cyber operations as defined in Rule 20.
3. There are divergent views as to what constitutes damage in cyber warfare. One
view is that damage must be limited specifically to a situation where it is physical
and requires physical repairs. Another view is that extinguished or reduced
functionality per se, irrespective of the need for physical repair, is sufficient.
4. The Group of Experts recognized that the notion of attack is based on the term
“acts of violence”. Such acts generally do not include cyber operations that
merely result in the loss of functionality of cyber or related infrastructure, even
though these operations are often colloquially described as “cyber attacks”. Cyber
operations that may be characterized as “violent”, causing an intentional destruc-
tion of physical infrastructure or an intentional infliction of physical damage to
property or injury to persons, would be attacks under this Rule.
5. The LOAC concept of “attack” has developed in the context of the infliction of
physical destruction, damage, death or injury. However, cyber operations are
liable to cause only non-physical destruction or damage, such as the deletion of
data. Even if such effects are not characterized as destruction or damage, the
respective acts could be subject to other LOAC rules, such as those relating to the
protection of enemy property.
6. As for the temporary disruption of functionality of cyber or related infrastructure,
it must be borne in mind that—although such disruption generally does not
constitute an attack—it could be a component of an attack that is intended to
cause death, injury, destruction or damage, for example through the crash of an
aircraft.6 Conversely, brief or minor disruption of Internet services or briefly
disrupting, disabling, or interfering with communications, would generally not
per se constitute an attack.
6AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, see Commentary to Rule 1(e). Schmitt
(ed.), Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (2nd ed.)
(Tallinn Manual), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2017), see Rule 30.
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Rule 25
In principle, cyber infrastructure belonging to the armed forces constitutes a
military objective by nature.
Commentary
1. For military objectives by nature, see chapter “Section IX: Military Objectives by
Nature”.
2. The phrase “in principle” indicates that it is the general Rule subject to excep-
tions, such as in relation to medical installations and equipment.
Rule 26
Cyber infrastructure which does not belong to the armed forces—even if not
constituting a military objective by nature—may still be attacked if it qual-
ifies as a military objective by location, purpose or use. Cyber infrastructure
not making an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action is a
civilian object and may therefore not be made the object of attack.
Commentary
1. The Group of Experts agreed that, at present, the reference to “location” seemed
to have uncertain factual relevance to cyber warfare. Therefore, this Rule is
mainly directed at use or purpose (with an understanding that purpose is related
to intended future use).
2. For an object to be classified as a military objective, any one of the grounds
specified (nature, location, purpose or use) will suffice. As long as the military
objective is defined by any one of the grounds, no other ground is required for
consideration.
3. Cyber infrastructure that is not classified as a military objective is by definition a
civilian object and thus protected from being made the object of attack.
Rule 27
The concept of direct participation in hostilities applies to civilians, including
civilian employees of State agencies, who conduct cyber operations in the
context of an armed conflict.
Commentary
1. For general remarks on the concept of direct participation in hostilities, see
chapter “Section VII: Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities”.
2. This Rule has a generalised applicability, not only to civilians who act individ-
ually or collectively but also to those employed by State agencies. Some States
seem to be under the impression that civilian employees of State agencies are not
subject to the general Rule relating to DPH. The Group of Experts believed that it
needed to be made clear that DPH applies to all civilians without exception
relating to their employment.
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Rule 28
Cyber operations qualifying as direct participation in hostilities may
include:
(a) Any cyber activity designed or intended to directly cause death, injury,
damage or destruction to an adverse party;
(b) Cyber defence of military objectives against enemy attacks;
(c) Contributing to targeting procedures, such as helping to identify or
prioritize targets;
(d) Engaging in planning specific cyber attacks; or
(e) Providing or relaying information of tactical relevance for the purpose of
aiding in combat operations.
Commentary
1. The overall definition of activities amounting to direct participation in hostilities
is highly controversial. However, the Group of Experts agreed on the five
categories of activities identified in this Rule, without prejudice to other activities
regarding which no consensus could be reached.
2. See also paragraph 1 of the Commentary to Rule 13 with regard to activities
amounting to DPH.
3. As for paragraph (e) of this Rule, it should be noted that obtaining military
intelligence as such is not sufficient to qualify as DPH. Conversely, providing
or relaying such information of tactical relevance for the purpose of aiding in
combat operations is undoubtedly considered DPH. There is a borderline issue of
the processing of information, where the Group of Experts could not determine
whether such activity is sufficient to qualify as DPH.
4. In view of the severe consequences of DPH the decision on whether an activity
qualifies as DPH should be based on reasonably reliable information.
5. See also chapters “Section VII: Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities” and
“Section VIII: Civilians Participating in Unmanned Operations”.
Rule 29
In cyber operations constituting attacks, feasible precautions should be
taken where necessary in order to avoid, or in any event minimize, destruc-
tion or damage to civilian objects, or death or injury to civilians.
Commentary
1. The reference to “feasible precautions” here parallels Rule 14. The meaning of the
phrase is defined in the Commentary to that Rule.
2. Taking feasible precautions will only be required when the operation constitutes
an attack. See Rule 24.
3. For the purposes of taking feasible precautions, it may be necessary to collect
information about the architecture of the network or operating system that is to be
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attacked. The assessment of potential or likely collateral damage will largely
depend on the characteristics of the targeted system.
4. To identify whether the target is a military objective and to assess the expected
collateral damage, Parties conducting cyber operations should, if feasible, collect
sufficiently accurate information about the architecture of the enemy’s network or
the relevant operating system.7
5. Because of the technicalities of cyber operations, the reasonable military com-
mander will almost inevitably need assistance from cyber experts in order to
determine the potential or likely incidental civilian damage of a cyber attack,
unless he or she is a trained cyber expert himself/herself.
Rule 30
A Belligerent State should not conduct cyber operations that constitute
attacks causing physical damage to or destruction of objects located in
neutral territory, including neutral cyber infrastructure, unless the Neutral
State is unable or unwilling to terminate an abuse of such objects or infra-
structure by an adversary of the Belligerent State.
Commentary
1. The meaning of “attacks” in cyber warfare is explained in Rule 24 and
Commentary.
2. It is unclear whether and to what extent the law of neutrality applies in the cyber
context. Divergent views exists with respect to this question. Some States
believe that the raison d’être of the law of neutrality, and its reliance on the
concept of neutral territory, is inconsistent with the characteristics of cyber
activities. Others, on the other hand, argue that the law of neutrality may be
applied in the cyber context mutatis mutandis.
3. Accordingly, and since the Group of Experts recognized that there was not
sufficient acknowledged State practice and opinio juris as regards cyber oper-
ations related to armed conflict, it was decided to avoid the use of mandatory
language in the present Rule (such as “must” or “shall”) and instead to use
“should” in the elaboration of this Rule.
4. This Rule is based on the principles of customary law governing neutrality, as
expressed in the 1907 Hague Convention V on Neutral Powers and Persons in
War on Land.8
5. The inviolability of neutral territory means that Belligerent States should not
conduct cyber operations constituting attacks against targets therein, regardless
of their governmental or private character. As for the mere routing of data
through neutral cyber infrastructure (including the Internet), see Rule 33 and
accompanying Commentary.
7Tallinn Manual, see fn. 6, Rule 53.
8See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 23, Articles 1 and 2.
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6. Equally protected is cyber infrastructure that belongs to a Belligerent State
although located in the territory of a Neutral State, provided that it is not
being abused in support of the military activities of an adversary Belligerent
State.
7. The Rule does not apply to espionage. Likewise, it does not apply to dissemi-
nation of propaganda or other activities that are not intended—or are not
reasonably expected—to cause death, injury, destruction or damage.
8. Cyber operations merely causing inconvenience (as distinct from death, injury,
destruction or damage) are not covered by this Rule.
9. In case of an abuse by a Belligerent State of objects or infrastructure located in
neutral territory, cyber operations against the Neutral State amounting to use of
force under the Charter of the United Nations Article 2(4) will be lawful only if
they are consistent with the inherent right to self-defence (as recognized by
Article 51 of the Charter) or when authorized by the Security Council.9
10. The foregoing Commentary is without prejudice to the legality of an extraterri-
torial exercise of the right of self-defence against non-state actors located in and
operating from the territory of a Neutral State.
Rule 31
Belligerent States must not launch attacks from cyber infrastructure located
in neutral territory or under the exclusive control of Neutral States.
Commentary
1. See Commentary to Rule 30.
2. The launching by a Belligerent State of attacks from neutral infrastructure against
an enemy is a violation of the territorial sovereignty of the Neutral State. The
Group of Experts was aware of the technical and other difficulties of definitively
identifying the actual source of a cyber attack. Despite these difficulties, they took
the position that the principle of the inviolability of neutral territory applies to the
launching of a cyber attack. They further recognized that technology is evolving
rapidly, such that the interpretation of what constitutes “launching” for these
purposes is likely to be affected in the future.
3. In light of the interconnected nature of cyberspace (including the Internet), and
the degree to which cyber infrastructure in one country is used in other countries,
the Group of Experts considered that it—in view of the current extent of State
practice—would impossible to apply the prohibition reflected in this Rule to
cyber operations not constituting attacks. As for the meaning of “attacks”, see
Rule 24. For the mere routing of data through neutral cyber infrastructure, see
Rule 33.
9See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 5.
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4. The prohibition applies to both public and private cyber infrastructure located
within neutral territory (including civilian cyber infrastructure owned by a Bel-
ligerent Party to the conflict or its nationals), and to neutral non-commercial
governmental cyber infrastructure (under the exclusive control of the State)
irrespective of its location.10 Both the remote taking control of computer systems
located in neutral territory to conduct cyber operations that constitute attacks and
the execution of cyber operations that constitute attacks by organs or agents of the
Belligerent State located in the territory of the Neutral State are prohibited.11
5. In the case of botnets used to conduct attacks, the prohibition relates to the
situation in which the botmaster controls a botnet from neutral territory.
Rule 32
If in the context of an armed conflict a Belligerent Party undertakes cyber
operations constituting an attack from cyber infrastructure located on Neu-
tral territory, the neutral State must use reasonable means at its disposal to
terminate the attack once it becomes aware of it.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on the principles of customary law of neutrality, as expressed
in the 1907 Hague Convention V on Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land
and the 1907 Hague Convention XIII on Neutrality in Naval War.12
2. The duty to use reasonable means to terminate on-going cyber attacks hinges on
knowledge by the Neutral State as to the use of cyber infrastructure within its
territory. Such knowledge may be based either on information obtained by the
Neutral State itself or on information provided to it, including by the aggrieved
Belligerent State.
3. Assuming that such knowledge exists, the Neutral State must take reasonable
action to terminate the cyber attacks by the Belligerent State. However, the
Neutral State may not be able to prevent such attacks before they are launched.
The Neutral State has no duty continuously to monitor cyber traffic within its
territory.
4. The duty to use all reasonable means to terminate attacks applies to cyber attacks
launched by botmasters located in neutral territory.
10Tallinn Manual, see fn. 6, page 248, and 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) on Neutrality in Naval
War, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 23, Articles 8 and 25.
11Tallinn Manual, see fn. 6, page 251.
121907 Hague Convention (V) on Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, see chapter
“Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 23, Article 5. 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) on Neutrality in Naval
War, see fn. 25, Article 8.
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Rule 33
The mere fact that cyber operations are routed through neutral cyber
infrastructure does not constitute a violation of neutrality.
Commentary
1. The Group of Experts acknowledged that the routing of cyber operations will,
likely, involve the dynamic relocation of individual packages through diverse
servers.
2. The fact that particular packages might move through neutral cyber infrastructure
(including the Internet) would not, per se, amount to a breach of neutrality.
Rule 34
(a) Without prejudice to Rule 32, the mere use of neutral cyber infrastruc-
ture by a Belligerent State is not generally prohibited.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 8 of the 1907 Hague Convention V on Neutral
Powers and Persons in War on Land.13
2. Rule 32, to which this Rule is subordinated, excludes cyber attacks.
(b) Belligerent States are thus permitted to:
i. Erect a new cyber communication installation on the territory of a
Neutral State that is exclusively used for non-military
communications;
ii. Use an existing cyber communication installation established by
them before the outbreak of the armed conflict (including for mili-
tary communications), provided that it is open for the service of
public messages; or
iii. Use an existing cyber communication installation established by
them before the outbreak of the armed conflict and which is not
open for the service of public messages, provided it is for
non-military communications.
Commentary
1. This Rule is linked to Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention V. The expression
“for the service of public messages” is found in Article 3(b).14
2. Cyber communication installations may include computers, servers, routers and
networks.
13See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 23.
14Ibid.
28 Section II: Cyber Operations
Rule 35
Any measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a Neutral State with
regard to the activities referred to in Rule 34 should be impartially applied to
all Belligerent States.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 9 of the Hague Convention V on Neutral Powers in
War on Land.15
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Section III: Remote and Autonomous
Weapons
1. The technologies discussed in this Section are either novel or have yet to emerge
and are not explicitly dealt with in either customary international law or in treaty
law. The principal purpose of the present Section is to explain some of the main
legal issues that the development of these new technologies seem likely to raise in
relation to LOAC.
2. Different countries may choose to categorize these technologies in differing
terms. This variety could not be adequately reflected in the present Section.
Moreover, the terminology and definitions used in this Section may be expected
to evolve in the light of future developments. Accordingly, the phrase “For the
purposes of this Manual” (appearing in Rule 36 and other provisions of this
Section) reflects the provisional status of the language that is employed.
3. The implementation of the law of targeting under LOAC is traditionally achieved
by the human user of a weapon system applying the principle of distinction and
the rules as to discrimination, proportionality and precautions. A number of the
technologies discussed in the present Section may, in the future, enable a weapon
system to make determinations as to whether an attack will take place and if so
what the target will be and how the attack will be prosecuted. Even when the
technologies covered by this Section are employed, the role of a human user of a
weapon system may not be excluded. However, if no human being will play a role
in the attack decision-making process, the question will arise as to whether some
other method can be adopted to enable application of the principle of distinction
and the rules pertaining to discrimination, proportionality and precautions. It was
the position of the Group of Experts that, irrespective of the method of warfare
adopted, the aforementioned principle and rules must be observed.
4. It should be emphasized that LOAC does not impose obligations on weapon
systems themselves, but rather on the persons making decisions in connection
with their use. In other words, LOAC requires that those persons will only act in
compliance with LOAC principles and rules (taking into account the systems
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capabilities and constraints). In the final analysis, legal responsibility will devolve
on the State and on individuals involved in that activity (see Rules 43 and 44).
Rule 36
For the purposes of this Manual, a “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPA) is an
aircraft that is controlled via a remote communication link by a human
operator who is not located on board the aircraft.
Commentary
1. The term “remotely piloted aircraft” (RPA) has been used to reflect that the
aircraft is piloted by an individual who is not on board. The word “drones” is
also frequently used to refer to such vehicles. The controller of an RPA may
occupy a control station distant from the RPA’s area of operation. From that
control station the controller employs computerized links with the RPA to guide it
and monitors the output of its sensors.
2. RPAs are aircraft and are distinguished from other aerial weapon systems such as
missiles. In contrast to missiles, RPAs are normally recoverable.
3. The AMW Manual draws a distinction between “unmanned aerial vehicles” in
general and “unmanned combat aerial vehicles”, the latter comprising unmanned
military aircraft of any size that can carry and launch a weapon or that can use
on-board technology to direct a weapon to a target.1 The term RPA, however,
does not distinguish between unmanned aircraft on the basis of their roles, which
may include, e.g., reconnaissance, surveillance, information gathering, commu-
nications or other battle support, logistical or general military tasks and attacks.
4. RPAs can vary in size, e.g., from Global Hawk with a wingspan of 116 feet and a
payload of up to 2000 pounds to the US Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency Nano Air Vehicle with a wingspan of 16 cm and a weight of 19 g. Both
would, however, constitute aircraft,2 and thus (if remotely controlled), RPAs.
5. RPAs using currently available technology, whether they are being employed on
reconnaissance, surveillance, attack or other missions, are normally recovered at
the conclusion of the assigned mission. However, the issue of recovery is not
essential in terms of the definition of RPAs. The essential features of an RPA are
that (i) it is piloted by a person who is not on board the aircraft and (ii) being an
aircraft, it derives lift from the air. The possibility cannot be excluded that
disposable RPAs may be developed. If such disposable systems derive lift from
the air and are remotely piloted, they could, for the purposes of this Manual, be
classed as RPAs.
1AMW Manual, see fn. 1, rules 1(dd) and 1(ee).
2UKMinistry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (UKManual), Oxford: Oxford
University Press (2004), paragraph 12.4.1 as amended.
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6. During an international armed conflict, an RPA may only be used to exercise
belligerent rights, such as attack or interception operations, if it fulfills the
requirements of a military aircraft.3 To qualify as a military aircraft, it must be
operated by the armed forces of a State, bear the military markings of that State
(provided the size of the aircraft allows for such marking), be commanded by a
member of the armed forces and be controlled by personnel subject to regular
armed forces discipline.4
Rule 37
For the purposes of this Manual, a “highly automated” weapon system is a
system that, once activated, is capable of identifying and engaging a target
without further human input, while being constrained by algorithms that
determine its responses by imposing rules of engagement and setting mission
parameters which limit its ability to act independently.
Commentary
1. A “highly automated” weapon system performs functions in a self-contained and
independent manner once activated. It independently verifies or detects a partic-
ular type of target and then fires or detonates a munition. Automated technologies
in general are not new and have been employed in the past, e.g., in mines and
booby-traps.5
2. Reference is being made here to “highly automated” as distinct from “automated”
in recognition that there are numerous degrees of automation and a variety of
functions that are capable of being automated. These may include, e.g., naviga-
tion of a platform; navigation of a munition; the co-ordination or fusion of data
with a view to presentation of it to a pilot or other operator; functions associated
with the fusing of the weapon, the locking on by an air to air missile to a target
aircraft to which it has been directed by a pilot; and so on. Numerous weapon
systems incorporate automated functions but do not come within the definition of
autonomous systems, see Rule 38.
3Hague Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air Warfare
(Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare) (1923), Laws of Armed Conflicts, at page 315, Article 13;
UK Manual, see fn. 2, para 12.34; German Federal Ministry of Defence, Law of Armed Conflict
Manual (German Manual) (2013), Joint Service Regulation (ZDv) 15/2, para 1103; US DoD
Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, para 14.3.3.
4Hague Draft Rules of Aerial Warfare 1923, Articles 3, 13 and 16, see fn. 3; and US DoD Manual,
see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, paras 14.3.2 and 14.3.3; so, law enforcement,
customs, or coastguard aircraft, including RPA, that do not qualify as military aircraft and that are
not incorporated into the armed forces may not engage in hostilities. It remains to be seen whether,
as small and unmanned military air platforms start to be more widely used, States continue to apply
to them rules as to military and nationality marking.
5US DoD Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, para 6.5.9.1.
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Rule 38
For the purposes of this Manual, an “autonomous” weapon system is a
weapon system that is programmed to apply human-like reasoning to deter-
mine whether an object or person is a target, whether it should be attacked,
and if so, how and when.
Commentary
1. The concept of autonomy as used here may be narrower than that used by some
roboticists.
2. There are different definitions of “autonomous weapon systems”. For example,
the US Department of Defense Directive 3000.09 defines “autonomous weapon
systems” as “a weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets
without further intervention by a human operator. This includes human-
supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human
operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage
targets without further human input after activation.” In this Manual systems
described in the second sentence of the US definition come within the ambit of
Rule 39 (b), i.e., “man-on-the-loop systems”.
3. This Rule reflects that the single most important defining characteristic of an
autonomous system is its ability to apply what perhaps can most accurately be
described as “human-like reasoning”. By using this term, the Group of Experts
was seeking to express the process of human judgment in which disparate facts
are assessed and sometimes compared in order to reach an evaluative decision
which will require the application of judgment. At the present time, such systems
are not known to exist.
4. It is the application of human-like reasoning independently to identify and decide
to engage targets that is the vital distinguishing feature of this technology. Such a
weapon system is not pre-programmed to target a specified object or person. It is
the software that decides which target to engage, how and when. Accordingly, the
weapon system is making the relevant judgments by applying the kinds of
thought process that a human being would use when employing a more conven-
tional weapon system, and, again like a human decision-maker, the autonomous
weapon system has the capacity to adapt its behaviour in response to changed
circumstances.
5. The reference to being “programmed” in the definition indicates that the system’s
software will have been so engineered as to enable, perhaps require, the system to
analyze information and make decisions having applied human-like reasoning to
the facts that either it detects or that are otherwise disclosed to the system. The
reasoning process is likely to be similar, in terms of decisions made, to that which
a human being might be expected to undertake, although the logical processes
may not necessarily be the same as a human being would apply.
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6. While it is possible to characterize an autonomous weapon system as making a
decision in a factual sense, it is also critical to emphasize that LOAC imposes
obligations on persons and does not impose direct obligations on the weapons
themselves. LOAC does not, for example, express a requirement that an auton-
omous weapon system must determine whether its target is a military objective, if
no human being is involved in the attack decision-making process. Nevertheless,
LOAC still requires the attack to be conducted in accordance with targeting law
(see Rule 41). For State responsibility and any responsibility by individuals
involved in an attack, see Rules 43 and 44.
Rule 39
For the purposes of this Manual:
(a) A “man-in-the-loop system” positions the operator within the loop
formed by the decision-making process of the system such that the
human operator decides on the firing of a weapon.
Commentary
1. The cycle of receiving input, analyzing the input and taking action can be
regarded as a loop, and the presence of the human controller within this loop
characterizes the system as “man-in-the-loop”. A “man-in-the-loop system”
positions the operator within the loop formed by the decision-making process
of the system, using up- and down-links to the remotely piloted aircraft.
2. Up- and down-links are the means whereby the human operator communicates
with the vehicle and whereby the operator receives communications from the
vehicle.
3. Where RPAs are concerned, the link from the controller to the RPA (see Rule 36)
is used, inter alia, to direct the flight of the RPA and to instruct the RPA to
perform tasks. The link down from the RPA to the control station is used, inter
alia, to deliver information from on-board sensors. Taken together, these links
can be regarded as a loop, and the presence of the controller within this loop
characterizes such systems as “man-in-the-loop systems”.
4. Remotely controlled vehicles in other environments may have similar capabilities
for the receipt and transmission of data.
(b) A “man-on-the-loop system” is one that is capable of highly automated
or autonomous operation but is supervised by a human operator who
has the capability to intervene and override a decision, such as the
decision to fire a weapon.
Commentary
1. A “man-on-the-loop system” is differently configured from a “man-in-the-loop
system”. The operator is not positioned, either physically or structurally, within
the loop formed by the system’s decision-making process to fire a weapon after
receiving external inputs. The weapon system may be capable of making and
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implementing its own determinations as to attack, reconnaissance, information
gathering or other tasks, but the “man-on-the-loop” element inserts the presence
of a human operator who—while not involved in the firing of the weapon or other
decisions—is nevertheless able to observe the determination being made and the
action being taken by the weapon system and to intervene and countermand any
determination or actions that seems likely to lead to unlawful or undesirable
consequences. Such aircraft can be distinguished from other aircraft in which the
human controller decides which target is to be engaged or which task is to be
undertaken and who undertakes the attack by initiating the firing mechanism or
transmitting the instructions for the performance of the chosen task using the
remote-control facility built into the RPA system.
2. The use of a “man-on-the-loop system” for the gathering of information, for
reconnaissance or similar tasks, could assist in addressing issues under the law of
targeting. Indeed, using such systems to obtain timely, accurate information as to
the situation in an area where attacks are intended is likely to promote adherence
to the principle of distinction. There is no LOAC rule prohibiting or limiting the
use of such technologies. Furthermore, such systems will generally be equipped
with sensors and associated systems that are designed to allow military com-
manders to control the effects of these weapons (e.g., to ensure that the weapons
do not cause excessive collateral damage or result in “friendly fire”).
3. The human being who is monitoring a “man-on-the-loop” system and who is able
to cancel a firing determination that the system might undertake, may assist in
ensuring that the system can be used in accordance with LOAC. This is not
intended to imply that LOAC requires that a person must necessarily be in or on
the loop to render the use of a highly automated or autonomous system lawful. If
the highly automated or autonomous system is capable of being used in accor-
dance with targeting law, LOAC contains no specific requirement that a person be
either in or on the loop in the sense that those terms are employed in this Manual.
Rather, where necessary, the monitoring can be conducive to avoiding or mini-
mizing the risk of civilian casualties.
4. The person “on-the-loop”may find it necessary to intervene and countermand any
determination made by the weapon system for a variety of reasons. So, for
example, there could be clear cases in which (if the weapon were to fire) a civilian
taking no direct part in the hostilities, or a civilian object, would be struck, and the
“man-on-the-loop” would be obliged to intervene and stop the weapon system.6
There are other circumstances when such intervention would be called for, for
example if the object of attack is a person or object entitled to special protection
under the law of armed conflict, or if the attack that the weapon system has
decided upon would be contrary to the commander’s intent.
6AP/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Articles 51(2), 52(1) and 57(2)(b).
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5. While the presence of the person “on-the-loop”may, in the context of a particular
weapon system, be the aspect that enables the required precautions in attack to be
undertaken, the circumstances in which the person is operating “on-the-loop”will
determine whether the precautions are actually taken with sufficient care. Thus,
for example, if a person is contemporaneously placed “on-the-loop” of numerous
weapon systems, or of weapon systems undertaking numerous contemporaneous
operations or attacks so that he/she is not practically able to monitor properly the
precautions that targeting law requires (including those referred to in the present
Commentary) this might have the consequence that the requirement to take
feasible precautions would not be complied with to an acceptable degree. The
word “might” is used here because there may be other elements of the weapon
system or of its method of operation that do enable particular precautions to be
taken. The point remains, however, that if legal compliance relies on a man “on-
the-loop” and if that person is over-tasked in whatever way, compliance is put
at risk.
Rule 40
For the purposes of this Manual, a “swarm” is a group of aircraft or other
vehicles of any size that is performing (or is intended to perform) military
tasks in which the individual aircraft or other vehicles are autonomously
coordinating or acting in formation.
Commentary
1. Given the early state of “swarming” technology, it is unclear what could arise in
the context of aircraft being operated as part of a “swarm” for the performance of
military tasks. Swarms could comprise numerous aircraft and whether the indi-
vidual vehicles of the swarm are large or small or of various sizes might not be
relevant to the characterization of the group as a swarm. It is possible that some
swarms will operate such that the individual members maintain a fixed formation
while other swarms may involve dissimilar movements. Swarms could involve
RPAs, highly automated systems or autonomous systems. Other swarms may
comprise a mixture of these types of platforms, or the same platforms may have
different modes of operation.
2. Whether operating in formation or with the individual vehicles undertaking
dissimilar movements, the swarm will need to maintain some form of coordina-
tion among its vehicles to avoid collisions and other mutual interference.
3. What appears distinctive regarding “swarms” is the use of autonomy to coordi-
nate vehicles in the swarm by, for example, distributing tasks among vehicles in
the swarm.
Rule 41
The employment of remotely piloted, highly automated or autonomous
systems and swarms for the purposes of attack is subject to the applicable
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principles and rules of LOAC, in particular distinction, proportionality and
the obligation to take feasible precautions.
Commentary
1. The Group of Experts agreed that the existing principles and rules of LOAC are
the basis on which the lawfulness of using RPAs, highly automated or autono-
mous weapon systems, or swarms is to be judged.
2. For the notion of “applicable principles and rules of LOAC”, see paragraph 4 of
the Commentary to Rule 2.
3. Human-like reasoning (referred to in Rule 38) may not be necessary to secure
compliance with targeting law by an autonomous weapon system in specific
circumstances. For instance, the employment of a weapon system may be limited
to a time and location where all those present certainly qualify as lawful targets.
4. In other situations, it would be necessary to ensure that the introduction of an
autonomous weapon system operating with human-like reasoning would be in
full compliance with the principles and rules of LOAC. This could be attained if
the weapon system were able to make two classes of determination. The first
concerns the lawfulness of the target, i.e. a determination whether it is a combat-
ant, a civilian taking a direct part in the hostilities or an object that is a military
objective. The second concerns the legality of attacking it in the circumstances
prevailing at the time.
5. It should be stressed that RPAs, autonomous weapons systems and “swarms” are
not per se prohibited by the principles and rules of LOAC.
6. If a swarm is used to undertake reconnaissance, information gathering or other
tasks that do not constitute part of an attack, LOAC issues will not be engaged
merely by virtue of the character of the group of aircraft so involved as a swarm.
7. If a swarm is being used to undertake attacks, the factors that determine whether
and to what extent controllers or operators are required may include: (i) the
number of aircraft in the swarm; (ii) the number, nature and circumstances of
the targets that are to be attacked; (iii) the nature, quality and reliability of the up-
and down-links to each aircraft; and (iv) the degree to which the swarm is
operated in a formation.
8. If achieving compliance with the applicable principles and rules of LOAC
necessitates human presence “in” or “on-the-loop”, it is important to ensure that
the relevant personnel are not tasked to such a degree or located in such a way as
to preclude their proper performance of the required feasible precautions. If the
technology incorporated into the swarm is such that the individual weapon
systems are capable of making the determinations required by targeting law in
the intended circumstances of use, the presence of a person or persons “in” or “on
the loop” of elements of the swarm may not be required. It will be a question of
fact whether the swarm does indeed have that technical capability and whether it
is able to operate with an acceptable level of reliability. In certain circumstances,
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achieving compliance with targeting law may require that there be sufficient
controllers or operators adequately linked in with the activities of each aircraft.
9. The determination whether or not to act in formation may be taken autonomously.
Rule 42
(a) In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of new weapon sys-
tems addressed in this Section, a State that is party to Additional Proto-
col I must determine whether its employment would, in some or all
circumstances, be prohibited by any rule of international law applicable
to that State.
(b) In the acquisition of a new weapon system addressed in this Section, a
State that is not party to Additional Protocol I should determine whether
its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by
applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. For the interpretation of this Rule, see the Commentary on Rule 7 which is
applicable mutatis mutandis.
2. There are at present no rules of LOAC that specifically refer to RPAs or other
remotely piloted or controlled weapon platforms. Similarly, no specific rules refer
to highly automated or autonomous attack technologies as such.7 The fact that a
weapon system is remotely controlled, highly automated or autonomous does not,
therefore, per se render the system unlawful.
3. When the review concerns such weapon systems, it is necessary for the person
conducting the weapon review to determine whether the weapon system is
capable of being used in accordance with the rules prescribed by LOAC. The
question is not whether the weapon system will comply with targeting law on a
particular occasion but whether the way in which the system is designed and will
be operated enables the targeting law rules to be properly applied. In practice, the
main question may be whether the anticipated employment of the weapon system
will be consistent with the principles of distinction and proportionality.
Rule 43
With respect to an armed conflict, States bear responsibility for internation-
ally wrongful operations using RPAs, highly automated weapon systems or
autonomous weapons that are attributable to them. Such responsibility
encompasses actions by all persons belonging to the armed forces.
7Note, however, that Protocol (II) to the Conventional Weapons Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II to CCW) (1980),
The Laws of Armed Conflicts, page 185, address, inter alia, “other devices” which include manually
emplaced munitions actuated by remote control.
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Commentary
1. For an interpretation of this Rule, see the commentaries on Rules 5 and 21.
Rule 44
All those involved in the conduct of operations, including attacks, using
RPAs, highly automated weapon systems or autonomous weapons, are
responsible for their respective roles and, commensurate with their involve-
ment, have obligations to ensure that such operations are conducted in
accordance with the applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. See Commentary on Rules 5 and 22.
2. Numerous individuals may have various roles that may be relevant to the conduct
of an RPA operation. Those individuals include, but are not limited to: (i) the
RPA operator; (ii) any technicians who may be assisting the operator; (iii) those
involved in launching the RPA; (iv) the commander of the mission; (v) those who
planned the mission; (vi) those who prepared the software; (vii) those who loaded
data into the mission control systems; (viii) those who gave legal advice in
connection with the mission and so on. All such individuals have obligations
with respect to the implementation of applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
3. The degree and nature of the responsibility of each individual depends, inter alia,
on the nature and extent of that individual’s role, on the rank of the individual, on
the operational relationships between the persons involved, and on the informa-
tion available to the particular individual at a specific time. Although the negli-
gent performance of duties is likely to attract disciplinary liability for armed
forces members under their service code, gross negligence, recklessness and
intent may, depending on the consequences, involve criminal liability.
4. Manning and other arrangements for RPA operations should facilitate compli-
ance with targeting law.
5. The information that the sensors aboard an RPA gather may be used to support
the decision to engage a specific target, may be used in support of other military
operations or may contribute more generally to the commander’s picture of the
battlespace. An RPA that is on a reconnaissance or information gathering mission
will generally be used to provide information for one or more of these purposes.
6. The mere fact that an autonomous or highly automated weapon system is used to
undertake an attack does not preclude the potential liability under international
criminal law of any person for his/her involvement in such a military operation.
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7. In view of the novelty and complexity of the technology, it is not clear exactly
where responsibility under international criminal law will lie for specific acts
performed by an autonomous or highly automated weapon system. See chapter
“Section XVII: International Criminal Law” with regard to individual criminal
liability in international law and command responsibility particularly.
Rule 45
A person who wrests control of a weapon system referred to in this
Section assumes responsibility for its subsequent use in accordance with
the degree and the duration of the control exercised.
Commentary
1. This Rule refers to the individual responsibility of a person who wrests control of
weapon systems referred to in this Section. Should such a person act on behalf of
a State, his/her wrongful act will be attributable to that State which will bear State
responsibility, see Rule 43.
2. This Rule reflects that a cyber hacker who achieves control of the enemy’s
weapon system or its munition becomes responsible for his/her subsequent
employment of the weapon. The hacker’s employment of the weapon must
comply with principles and rules of LOAC including distinction, discrimination8
and proportionality as well as the obligation to take precautions in attack. If the
cyber hacker does not achieve absolute control of the weapon system and its
munitions, but interferes in the way in which the weapon system and munitions
are operated by the enemy, responsibility for the use of the weapon system or
munition should be determined in accordance with the following criteria.
a. If a cyber hacker exercises control of a weapon system referred to in this
Section and knowingly or intentionally directs its weapon—or knowingly or
intentionally causes the weapon system to direct weapons—at a target or
category of targets of his/her choice, he/she becomes responsible for the
consequences of such employment of the weapon.
b. This subparagraph applies if the cyber hacker does this with the intention of
causing the weapon to attack civilians, civilian objects or persons or objects
entitled to specific protection, or to undertake indiscriminate attacks. If this
sub-paragraph applies, the cyber hacker is responsible for the consequences of
the use of the weapon.
c. If in the circumstances described in sub-paragraph b the cyber operation
foreseeably causes the adverse party’s attack(s) to become indiscriminate,
8Discrimination is here used to refer to indiscriminate attacks.
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the cyber operation is likely (depending on the circumstances) to conflict with
obligations under Articles 57(1) and 58(c) of AP/I.9
3. If two adversaries are contesting control over a weapon system and the system
ends up crashing and harming civilians, responsibility may be impossible to
attribute to either of them.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
9See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13.
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Section IV: Unmanned Maritime Systems
To a certain extent, this Section overlaps some provisions of chapter “Section III:
Remote and Autonomous Weapons” inasmuch as both Sections deal with unmanned
systems. However, whereas chapter “Section III: Remote and Autonomous
Weapons” addresses both unmanned platforms and weapon systems, the present
Section focuses on unmanned maritime platforms that may or may not be integral
parts of a weapon system. The maritime platforms and systems dealt with here must
therefore be distinguished from automated weapon systems, in particular those for
the defence of surface platforms against missile threats. Accordingly, the terminol-
ogy used in this Section does not necessarily replicate that used in chapter “Section
III: Remote and Autonomous Weapons”.
Rule 46
(a) “Unmanned Maritime Systems” (UMS) are:
i. self-propelled or remotely-navigated craft that are normally recover-
able and designed to perform functions at sea by operating on the
surface, semi-submerged or undersea; and
ii. either:
a. are remotely operated,
b. are remotely controlled, or
c. perform their functions independently from a human controller or
operator on board the craft.
Commentary
1. UMS comprise surface, semi-submersible and undersea vehicles of various sizes.
They are either remotely operated/controlled or “autonomous”. Many of the
systems in use today are remotely operated or controlled but they “capitalize on
automation in extreme circumstances, such as a lost link condition, to perform
automatically a pre-programmed set of instructions.” At present, there is no
© The Author(s) 2020
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maritime system which may be considered as fully autonomous as defined in
Rule 38.
2. UMS can perform a wide variety of missions or tasks. It is important to bear in
mind that UMS, in particular Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUVs), are today
used for the performance of the following important civilian/non-military tasks:
a. Offshore oil and gas missions;
b. Undersea cable deployment and inspection;
c. Commercial salvage;
d. Aquaculture; and
e. Science missions, such as oceanography and marine archaeology.
3. According to the DoD Roadmap, current military missions performed by UMS,
i.e. Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and UUVs, include “mine warfare, mine
neutralization, reconnaissance, surveillance, hydrographic surveying, environ-
mental analysis, special operations, and oceanographic research”. Similarly, the
UUV Master Plan identifies nine specific mission categories and prioritizes them
as follows:
a. Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR);
b. Mine countermeasures (MCM);
c. Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW);
d. Inspection/identification;
e. Oceanography;
f. Communication/navigation network node (CN3);
g. Payload delivery;
h. Information operations (IO); and
i. Time-critical strike (TCS).
4. Although it is still possible to distinguish between remotely operated and auton-
omous maritime vehicles, certain vehicles may have technological capabilities to
be operated either by remote control or autonomously.
(b) UMS include Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs) and Unmanned
Underwater Vehicles (UUVs).
Commentary
1. According to the US DoD, “UMS comprise unmanned maritime vehicles
(UMVs), which include both unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned
undersea vehicles (UUVs), all necessary support components, and the fully
integrated sensors and payloads necessary to accomplish the required missions”.1
1U.S. Department of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap FY2013-2038 (DoD
Roadmap), page 8.
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Although those definitions seem to suggest that UMVs/USVs are but components
of UMS, it would not be correct to hold that UMVs/USVs do not qualify as
“systems” because they are composed of various subsystems.2
2. While some Governments presently prefer the use of the term “UMV”, the Group
of Experts took note of the fact that there is not yet a sufficiently agreed upon
understanding of the various concepts. Although it is possible that all UMVs will
be considered “vessels” or “ships”, State practice has not yet crystallized. Since a
distinction between “systems” and “vehicles” does not prove helpful, it seems
appropriate, for the purposes of this Manual, to consider the terms “UMS” and
“UMV” as synonymous.
Rule 47
If owned or operated by a State and used only on Government
non-commercial service, all UMS enjoy sovereign immunity. This is without
prejudice to their status under LOAC.
Commentary
1. The language of this Rule is based on Article 96 of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).3
2. Nevertheless, although UMS navigate at sea, it is not clear whether they can be
considered ships. The international law of the sea lacks a uniform definition of the
term “ship”. UNCLOS uses the terms “vessel” and “ship” interchangeably,
without providing a definition of either term. Other relevant treaties provide
varying definitions that are functionally limited. While those treaties generally
do not prohibit treating UMS as vessels or ships, a number of the relevant rules
were created specifically with manned systems in mind. In view of these diffi-
culties, UMS are in some contexts not characterized as ships or vessels but rather
as “craft”.4 It is quite possible that a considerable number of States are not
prepared to recognize UMS as ships/vessels, although more may be known
about State views in the coming years given efforts at the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) to assimilate unmanned craft to vessels/ships.
3. If UMS are operated by the armed forces or any other Government agency of a State,
they may not necessarily qualify as warships or State ships. However, since they
either constitute State property or used only onGovernment non-commercial service,
2For example, the major UUV’s subsystems are: the pressure hull, the hydrodynamic hull,
ballasting, power and energy, electrical-power distribution, propulsion, navigation and positioning,
obstacle avoidance, masts, manoeuvre control, communications, locator and emergency equipment,
payloads. See National Defense Research Institute, A Survey of Missions for Unmanned Undersea
Vehicles (RAND) (2009), page 46 ff.
3United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December (UNCLOS) (1982), UNTS, vol.
1833, page 397.
4U.S. Navy/U.S. Marine Corps/U.S. Coast Guard, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of
Naval Operations (NWP 1-14M), paras. 2.3.4–2.3.6 (Edition July 2007).
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they do enjoy sovereign immunity. Hence, theymay only be interferedwith by other
States in very exceptional circumstances (e.g., in an international armed conflict).
Accordingly, “USVs and UUVs engaged exclusively in Government,
non-commercial service are sovereign immune craft.”5
4. It is important to note that an independent legal status of sovereign immunity
applies to UMS operating independently from another platform. Therefore,
“USV/UUV status is not dependent on the status of its launch platform.”6 If the
UMS is tethered to a controlling platform, it is difficult to attach to it an
independent legal status.
5. This Rule is without prejudice to the belligerent right of sinking warships and
other lawful targets in armed conflict.
Rule 48
In peacetime, UMS enjoy all navigational rights in accordance with the
international law of the sea, i.e. innocent passage in territorial sea areas,
transit passage in international straits, archipelagic sea lanes passage and
freedom of navigation in the high seas and in the Exclusive Economic Zone
(EEZ).
Commentary
1. USVs and UUVs retain the same independent rights of navigation as manned
surface vessels and submarines. States in general have not (as yet) made state-
ments to that effect, although they make use of UMS for governmental, scientific
and commercial purposes. Hence, it is safe to conclude that UMS enjoy the right
of freedom of navigation in the high seas and in the EEZ as well as the rights of
innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage.
Rule 49
With respect to an armed conflict, States bear responsibility for internation-
ally wrongful operations using UMS that are attributable to them. Such
responsibility encompasses actions by all persons belonging to the armed
forces.
Commentary
1. For an interpretation of this Rule, see the commentaries on Rules 5, 21 and 43.
Rule 50
All those involved in the conduct of operations, including attacks, using
UMS, are responsible for their respective roles and, commensurate with
5NWP 1-14M, see fn. 4, para. 2.3.6.
6Ibid.
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their involvement, have obligations to ensure that such operations are
conducted in accordance with the applicable principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. See Commentaries on Rules 5, 22 and 44.
Rule 51
A person who wrests control of a UMS or its weapons, assumes responsibility
for its subsequent use in accordance with the degree and duration of the
control exercised.
Commentary
1. See the Commentaries on Rules 6 and 45.
Rule 52
During an armed conflict, UMS may be employed for attacks and for the
exercise of other belligerent rights if they:
(a) are operated by the armed forces of a State;
Commentary
1. Although it is unsettled whether UMS qualify as, or are assimilated to, warships,
State practice seems to suggest that they are, and will be, used not only for attack
purposes but also for the exercise of other belligerent rights, such as inspection of
vessels.
(b) bear the military markings of that State; and
Commentary
1. Since the exercise of belligerent rights will predominantly occur in high seas
areas, there is a need for transparency because not only enemy vessels may be
affected but also neutral vessels. Therefore, in times of international armed
conflict, UMS should be identifiable as belonging to the armed forces of a
Belligerent State.
(c) are controlled or deployed by persons subject to regular armed forces
discipline.
Commentary
1. Those controlling or deploying UMS should be under regular armed forces
discipline in order to ensure compliance with LOAC. The fact that the software
on the UMS has been programmed by civilians is irrelevant with respect to the
legal status of the UMS.
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2. Control and deployment of UMS can include either direct control or the setting of
mission conditions, objectives or parameters.
Rule 53
The employment of UMS for the purposes of attack is subject to the appli-
cable principles and rules of LOAC, in particular, distinction, proportion-
ality and the obligation to take all feasible precautions.
Commentary
1. Whereas many UMS are used for ISR or oceanography, some are designed for
combat purposes, such as those employed for ASW, MCM or mine-laying. If and
to the extent UMS are employed for the purposes of attack, they qualify as means
of warfare,7 and their employment is subject to weapons law and targeting law.
Rule 54
(a) UMS may be made the object of attack if they qualify as lawful targets.
(b) Enemy military UMS under Rule 52 are:
i. military objectives by nature; and
ii. subject to the concept of booty of war.
Commentary
1. Subparagraph (a) applies also to neutral UMS if they qualify as military objec-
tives. See Rule 55.
2. This Rule reflects the customary definition of military objectives.8 Like enemy
warships, military UMS make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military
action by nature. Therefore, their destruction, capture or neutralization will
regularly offer a definite military advantage. Non-military UMS of enemy char-
acter qualify as military objectives only if they make an effective contribution to
the enemy’s military action by use, purpose or location and their total or partial
destruction or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.
3. If captured, enemy warships and military UMS constitute “booty of war” and,
therefore, title to them passes without the need for prize proceedings.
Rule 55
Neutral UMS may not be attacked or captured, unless they qualify as lawful
targets.
7As defined in AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, Rule 1 (t).
8San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para 40. See also Rule 77.
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Commentary
1) As in the case of neutral merchant vessels, neutral civilian UMS are liable to
attack if they make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action by
use, purpose or location and their total or partial destruction, capture or neutral-
ization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military
advantage.9
2) It needs to be emphasized that capture under this Rule must be distinguished from
capture as prize. The latter is not limited to vessels or UMS qualifying as lawful
targets.
3) Therefore, neutral civilian UMS may become military objectives if they:
a. Engage in belligerent acts on behalf of the enemy;
b. Are incorporated into or assist the enemy’s intelligence system;
c. Act as auxiliaries to the enemy’s armed forces; or
d. Otherwise make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action.
4) It needs to be stressed that, at present, the capture of neutral civilian UMS seems
likely to occur only in very exceptional situations. It seems unlikely that UMS
would be used for the transport of cargo that could constitute contraband.
Nevertheless, it may be imprudent to predict with confidence how technologies
will be employed in the future.
5) Should neutral civilian UMS carry cargo qualifying as contraband, they are liable
to capture.10 The contraband cargo will be liable to condemnation in prize pro-
ceedings. If the contraband, reckoned either by value, weight, volume, or freight,
forms more than one-half of the cargo, the UMS itself may be condemned by a
prize court.11
Rule 56
Enemy UMS are not liable to capture, if they are used exclusively for
non-military scientific purposes.
Commentary
1. Like enemy merchant vessels, UMS are liable to capture outside neutral waters.12
According to Article 4 of the 1907 Hague Convention (XI)13 and customary
9San Remo Manual, ibid, para 67.
10Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War (London Declaration) (1909), The Laws of Armed
Conflict, page 845, Article 37; San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para
146(a).
111909 London Declaration, see fn. 10, Article 40.
12San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, paras 112 ff.
13Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of
Capture in Naval War, (1907), The Laws of Armed Conflicts, page 819.
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international law,14 “vessels charged with scientific missions are [. . .] exempt
from capture”.
2. However, they are exempt from capture only if they:
a. Are innocently employed in their normal role;
b. Do not commit acts harmful to the enemy; and
c. Do not intentionally hamper the movement of enemy naval forces.
Rule 57
In so far as the use of neutral waters and ports is concerned, belligerent UMS
are subject to the same rules as manned belligerent warships. Accordingly:
(a) Hostile actions by belligerent UMS are prohibited.
Commentary
1. The prohibition of hostile actions in neutral waters has been acknowledged in
Article 2 of the 1907 Hague Convention (XIII)15 and is customary in nature.16
Accordingly, it also applies to belligerent UMS.
2. Neutral waters consist of the internal waters, territorial sea, and, where applicable,
the archipelagic waters, of Neutral States.17
3. Hostile actions include, inter alia:
a. Attack of objects and persons located in, on or over neutral waters or
territory; or
b. Laying of mines.
(b) Belligerent UMSmay not use neutral waters as a base of operations or as
a sanctuary.
Commentary
1. This prohibition is based on Article 5 of the 1907 Hague Convention (XIII) and
customary international law.18
(c) Subject to the 24-hour rule, belligerent UMS have the right of stay in
neutral ports or of innocent passage in neutral waters, unless the neutral
coastal State has, on a non-discriminatory basis, conditioned, restricted
or prohibited such stay or passage.
14San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para. 136 (e).
151907 Hague Convention (XIII) on Neutrality in Naval War, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”,
fn. 23.
16San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para 15.
17San Remo Manual, ibid, para 14.
18San Remo Manual, ibid, paras 16 (b) and 17.
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Commentary
1. In times of armed conflict, UMS continue to enjoy navigational rights, including
innocent passage, transit passage, and, where applicable, archipelagic sea lanes
passage, in neutral waters. However, a belligerent UMS may not extend the
duration of its passage through neutral waters for longer than 24 hours unless
this is unavoidable on account of damage or the stress of weather.19 The 24 hours’
limitation does not apply to transit passage or to archipelagic sea lanes passage.
2. A Neutral State may, on a non-discriminatory basis, condition, restrict, or prohibit
the entrance to or passage through its territorial sea by Belligerent State vessels,
including UMS operated for non-commercial Government purposes.20
Rule 58
A Neutral State may not suspend or otherwise hamper the rights of bellig-
erent UMS as regards transit passage in international straits and passage
through archipelagic sea lanes.
Commentary
1. The concepts of transit passage and of archipelagic sea lanes passage have been
recognized in Articles 38 and 53 of UNCLOS.
2. In view of the importance of these passage rights, they have matured into
customary international law, which applies in times of peace as well as of
international armed conflict.21
Rule 59
(a) In the Exclusive Economic Zone or on the continental shelf of Neutral
States, UMS must be employed with due regard for the rights and duties
of the coastal State.
Commentary
1. In an international armed conflict, Belligerent States are not barred from the
exercise of belligerent rights in the EEZ or on the continental shelf of Neutral
States. However, Neutral States continue to enjoy functionally limited sovereign
rights. Accordingly, when conducting hostile actions within the EEZ or on the
continental shelf of Neutral States, belligerents shall, in addition to observing the
basic principles and rules of the law of naval warfare, have due regard for the
rights and duties of the coastal State, inter alia, for the exploration and exploita-
19San Remo Manual, ibid, para 21.
20San Remo Manual, ibid, para 19.
21San Remo Manual, ibid, para 29.
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tion of the economic resources of the EEZ and the continental shelf and the
protection and preservation of the marine environment.22
(b) Hostile actions on the high seas involving the use of UMS must be
conducted with due regard for the high seas freedoms of Neutral States
and for the exploration and exploitation of the “Area” under the 1982
Law of the Sea Convention.
Commentary
1. Although Belligerent States may exercise belligerent rights in the high seas, the
vessels of Neutral States continue to enjoy high seas freedoms. Moreover, the
seabed and subfloor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction—the “Area”23—
enjoys a special legal status that cannot be ignored. Accordingly, Belligerent
States are obliged to pay due regard to those lawful uses of the high seas and of
the “Area”.
(c) The obligation of due regard is without prejudice to recognized force
protection measures, such as warning zones or defence bubbles.
Commentary
1. Under customary international law, defence bubbles and warning zones as well as
the control of the immediate vicinity of naval and aerial operations are recognized
measures of force protection that apply in times of peace and of international
armed conflict.24 They are lawful provided that they do not unduly impede the
exercise of the freedoms of the high seas by neutral vessels, and that any uses of
force to protect activities from interference are necessary and proportionate.
2. Belligerent States continue to enjoy the right to take all necessary measures of
force protection. However, efforts should be made to ensure that the implemen-
tation of any warning zone or a defence bubble does not conflict with the
requirements of a safety zone established by the neutral coastal State around
artificial islands, installations or structures.
Rule 60
In sea areas beyond the territorial sea of any State, UMS operated by
Neutral States for exclusively non-commercial governmental purposes
must be respected.
22San Remo Manual, ibid, para 34.
23UNCLOS, see fn. 3, Article 1(1).
24San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para 108; AMW Manual, see
chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, Rule 106.
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Commentary
1. UMS operated by Neutral States for exclusively non-commercial governmental
purposes enjoy sovereign immunity. They may neither be attacked, nor captured,
visited, searched or otherwise interfered with.
2. This Rule applies in sea areas beyond the territorial sea of Neutral States. Of
course, within neutral waters, UMS still enjoy sovereign immunity consistent
with international law, and Belligerent States are obliged to refrain from any
exercise of belligerent rights.
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Section V: Undersea Infrastructure,
Systems and Devices
Rule 61
With due regard for the rights of other States, coastal States are entitled to
install, operate and maintain undersea systems and devices, whether military
or civilian in nature, in their territorial sea, continental shelf and EEZ.
Commentary
1. This Rule reflects customary international law which has long recognized the
rights of coastal States to install, operate and maintain underwater systems. Such
systems are used for a wide variety of civilian and scientific purposes, such as
maintenance and operation of offshore installations, submarine pipelines and
cables, preservation of the marine environment and protection against natural
disasters (e.g., tsunamis).
2. They also serve a wide variety of military or security purposes. Sensors and other
devices have for a long time been used for the detection of submarines and for the
protection of certain parts of the coastline against potential enemies, criminals or
terrorists.
3. There are only few provisions in UNCLOS (e.g., Article 258 on scientific
research installations) or in other treaties addressing the installation of undersea
systems and devices used for purposes other than the exploration and exploitation
of the natural resources of the EEZ or the continental shelf. Of course, within their
internal waters, territorial sea or, where applicable, archipelagic waters coastal/
archipelagic States are entitled to install and operate such systems, whether
civilian or military in nature. Coastal and archipelagic States may also install
and operate undersea systems and devices, such as undersea systems and devices
for the purpose of marine scientific research or in the exercise of other rights and
duties in relation to the EEZ or continental shelf. Coastal States are entitled to
maintain, repair and protect them.
© The Author(s) 2020




Subject to the coastal States’ rights (including its rights to exercise jurisdic-
tion and its rights regarding marine scientific research) and with due regard
to the rights of other States, all States are entitled to install, operate and
maintain undersea systems and devices for data collection and survey activ-
ities, whether military or civilian in nature, on the continental shelf or in the
EEZ of other States.
Commentary
1. Generally, States other than the coastal State may install and operate such systems
in the EEZ of other States. Coastal State jurisdiction with respect to the estab-
lishment and use of structures and installations is generally limited to structures
and its installations for economic purposes and to those structures and installa-
tions that may interfere with the rights of the coastal State in its EEZ.1 Otherwise,
beyond the territorial sea of any State, the freedom to construct installations
permitted under international law applies (subject to part 6 of UNCLOS
concerning the continental shelf2). Accordingly, as a rule, the coastal State does
not have jurisdiction with respect to installation and structures for military or
other non-economic purposes if they do not risk interfering with the coastal
State’s exercise of its EEZ. Coastal States do, however, have the exclusive right
to authorize and regulate drilling on their continental shelves for all purposes.3
Insofar as they are used for marine scientific research (MSR), the consent of the
coastal State may be required consistent with Part XIII of UNCLOS.
2. UNCLOS does not define the term “marine scientific research”, and States have
not agreed on the need for—or formulation of—a particular definition. One
proposed definition based in part on Article 243 of UNCLOS is that MSR refers
to “those activities undertaken in ocean space to expand scientific knowledge of
the marine environment and its processes.”4
3. A systematic interpretation of the different UNCLOS provisions leads to the
conclusion that MSR must be distinguished from “survey activities”.5 Accord-
ingly, MSR does not include hydrographic surveys,6 including military surveys,
or operational oceanography.
1UNCLOS, see chapter “Section IV: Unmanned Maritime Systems”, fn. 3, Article 60.
2UNCLOS, Article 87.
3UNCLOS, Article 81.
4G. Walker (ed.), Definitions for the Law of the Sea, (Leiden/Boston) (2012), page 241.
5See UNCLOS, see chapter “Section IV: Unmanned Maritime Systems”, fn. 3, Articles 19 (2)(j),
21 (1)(g) and 40.
6For the importance of hydrographic surveys and nautical charting, including electronic charting,
see UNGA resolution A/RES/66/231 of 24 December 2011.
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4. Military surveys in foreign EEZs have been conducted by numerous States,
including Russia, Japan, Australia, South Africa, China and NATO States.
They cannot be considered MSR and they are not covered by the jurisdiction
enjoyed by the coastal State in accordance with Article 56 (1)(b)(ii) of UNCLOS.
Rather, any form of marine data collection that is not covered by the term “MSR”
is a right granted either under “other internationally lawful uses of the sea”7 or
under “other pertinent rules of international law”.8 This rights may not be
impeded or interfered with by the coastal State. Hence, it is safe to conclude
that survey activities and operational oceanography not qualifying as marine
scientific research are lawful.
5. The States having installed and operating such systems or devices in the EEZ, or
whose nationals have installed and operate them, are entitled to take appropriate
measures to maintain, repair and protect them. The above conclusion also applies
to the continental shelf, if drilling on the shelf is not involved.
Rule 63
All States are entitled to install and operate undersea systems and devices in
the high seas with due regard to the rights of other States.
Commentary
1. On the high seas, the right to install and operate such systems and devices is
recognized by both the “freedom to construct artificial islands and installations”
and by “other rules of international law”, as provided for in Article 87(1) of
UNCLOS.
2. This right is not limited to civilian or scientific systems and devices. The peaceful
uses clause in Article 88 of UNCLOS, which according to Article 58(2) of
UNCLOS also applies in the EEZ, does not prohibit military uses of the seas
that do not qualify as a use or threat of force.
3. It must be borne in mind that in the high seas there is no prohibition of MSR. On
the contrary, the freedom of the high seas includes the freedom of scientific
research subject to Parts VI and XIII of UNCLOS. It must be noted that scientific
research is broader than the UNCLOS term of art “marine scientific research”.
Rule 64
During an armed conflict:
(a) Enemy undersea systems and devices may not be attacked, unless they
qualify as lawful targets.
7UNCLOS, Article 58 (1).
8UNCLOS, Article 58 (2).
Section V: Undersea Infrastructure, Systems and Devices 57
Commentary
1. The law of naval warfare is silent on the legal status of undersea systems and
devices. It is, however, beyond doubt that they are liable to destruction or capture
if they directly contribute to the enemy’s military action by nature, location,
purpose or use and their total or partial destruction or neutralization, in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage. Hence,
military systems will qualify as lawful military objectives.9
2. The same holds true for civilian enemy and neutral systems and devices that
directly contribute to the enemy’s military action.
(b) Subject to Rule 65, enemy undersea systems and devices may be cap-
tured outside neutral waters.
Commentary
1. The law of naval warfare provides no rules as to the admissibility of the capture of
enemy civilian undersea systems and devices. There is, however, no cogent
reason to treat such systems and devices differently from enemy vessels—
whether merchant or otherwise—or enemy cargoes, which may be captured
outside neutral waters.10
2. If an enemy undersea system or device that qualifies as a lawful target is located
in neutral waters, the Neutral State is under an obligation to terminate that
violation of its neutrality. If the Neutral State fails to do so, the opposing
belligerent may be entitled to respond to the violation of neutrality, including,
if necessary, by the use of force.11
Rule 65
If innocently employed in their normal role, the following enemy civilian
undersea systems and devices should be exempt from capture:
(a) Undersea systems and devices exclusively used for non-military scientific
missions;
Commentary
1. In principle, civilian enemy undersea systems and devices are liable to capture.
Some undersea systems and devices, however, serve important scientific or
humanitarian functions. Therefore, the same principles as those underlying the
1907 Hague Convention (XI)12 should be applied. Accordingly, undersea sys-
9The definition of military objectives is included in Rule 77.
10San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para 135.
11Ibid, para 22.
121907 Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the Exercise of the Right of
Capture in Naval War, see chapter “Section IV: Unmanned Maritime Systems”, fn. 29.
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tems and devices used for non-military scientific missions should be excluded
from the right of capture.13
2. The term “should” is used in this context because there is not yet sufficient State
practice that has crystallized into a rule of customary international law.
(b) Undersea systems and devices exclusively used for preventing or
responding to pollution incidents in the marine environment; and
Commentary
1. Systems exclusively employed for the prevention of pollution incidents,14 such as
those monitoring and repairing submarines pipelines, should not be liable to
capture.
(c) Undersea systems and devices exclusively used for the collection of data
necessary to warn the civilian population of natural disasters, such as
tsunamis.
Commentary
1. Systems exclusively employed for the advance warning of natural disasters
(e.g. tsunamis) should not be liable to capture.
2. Of course, that protection is dependent on their innocent employment. Accord-
ingly, such systems will no longer be protected from capture and destruction if
they are used for the transmission of military data.
Rule 66
Neutral undersea systems and devices that qualify as lawful targets are liable
to capture.
Commentary
1. Neutral undersea systems and devices qualify as lawful targets if they make an
effective contribution to the enemy’s military action, by location, purpose or use
and their total or partial destruction or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling
at the time, offers a definite military advantage.
2. Otherwise, neutral undersea systems and devices are protected by their neutral
status, and it is prohibited for Belligerent States to capture them.
3. As distinct from neutral vessels and civil aircraft,15 undersea systems and devices
cannot at present be used for purposes—such as carriage of contraband—that
would make them liable to capture under the law of prize.
13See also San Remo Manual, fn. 31, para 136(e).
14San Remo Manual, ibid, para 136(g).
15San Remo Manual, paras 67 and 146.
Section V: Undersea Infrastructure, Systems and Devices 59
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
60 Section V: Undersea Infrastructure, Systems and Devices
Section VI: Submarine Cables and Pipelines
Rule 67
States, having laid submarine cables or pipelines, or whose nationals have
laid and operate such cables and pipelines, are entitled to take protective
measures with a view to preventing or terminating any harmful interference.
Commentary
1. The right of all States to lay submarine cables and pipelines in high sea areas and
in the EEZ, and in the continental shelf of other States has been recognized by the
international law of the sea.
2. The international law of the sea regulates the relations between coastal States and
the States laying submarine cables and pipelines in a general manner, by
distinguishing between the different sea areas.1 Articles 113 and 114 of UNCLOS
deal with the breaking or injuring of a submarine cable or pipeline, and Article
115 provides for indemnity for loss incurred in avoiding injury to a submarine
cable or pipeline.
3. However, UNCLOS is silent on certain aspects regarding submarine pipelines
and cables and the question of whether and to what extent such cables and
pipelines are subject to the jurisdiction of the States that own them or whose
nationals have laid and operate them.
4. Article 113 of UNCLOS does not make it clear which other States also have
jurisdiction over the breaking or injuring of submarine cables and pipelines
beyond the territorial sea. It is, however, questionable whether only a flag State
may exercise jurisdiction against foreigners regarding the breaking of cables or
pipelines outside its own maritime zones.
1See the following provisions in UNCLOS, see fn. 58: Article 51(2)—archipelagic waters; Article
58(1)—EEZ; Article 79—continental shelf; Articles. 87(1) lit. (c), 112—high seas.
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5. Article 113 of UNCLOS merely deals with the obligation to penalise the breaking
or injuring of submarine cables or pipelines by the flag State or the State of
nationality of the perpetrator. This does not imply the exclusion of an exercise of
jurisdiction in other than criminal matters. States have accepted the obligation to
enact domestic criminal legislation because they agree that submarine cables and
pipelines must be protected. Recognition of that obligation may not be considered
a waiver of exercising jurisdiction in other matters or of taking the measures
necessary to protect submarine cables and pipelines against malicious
interference.
6. Hence, States having laid submarine cables and pipelines, or whose nationals
have laid and/or operate them, may exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with
well-established principles of international law, e.g., under the passive nationality
and protective principle.
Rule 68
During an armed conflict, submarine pipelines and high voltage cables
exclusively serving one or more Belligerent States may—if it is militarily
necessary—be seized or destroyed subject to the applicable principles and
rules of LOAC, in particular distinction, proportionality and the obligation
to take feasible precautions.
Commentary
1. The supply of a Belligerent State with oil, gas and electricity may be crucial for
war-fighting. Therefore, a Belligerent State may have a legitimate interest in
denying the enemy such supply.
2. The traditional law of naval warfare is silent on submarine pipelines. Submarine
telegraph cables are only addressed insofar as they are connecting occupied
territory with neutral territory.
3. According to the Explanations in the San Remo Manual, “cables and pipelines
exclusively serving one or more of the belligerents might be legitimate military
objectives.”2 Submarine cables and pipelines are not explicitly protected against
seizure or destruction if they are connecting enemy territory, which is not
occupied, with neutral territory.
4. A fortiori, this holds true for submarine cables exclusively serving one or more
Belligerent States. Such cables and pipelines do not enjoy special protection from
seizure or destruction. In the past, submarine cables were liable to seizure and
destruction only when imperatively demanded by the necessity of the war.
However, in view of the development of the law of naval warfare, this is lawful
only if they qualify as lawful military objectives and if the basic principles and
rules of the law of naval warfare are observed.
2San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29—Explanations, page 111.
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Rule 69
Submarine communications cables, whether or not connecting occupied
territory with neutral territory, may not be seized or destroyed even if they
are serving one or more Belligerent States. Belligerent States must take care
to avoid damage to such cables, unless they qualify as lawful targets.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on the San Remo Manual paragraph 37, see fn. 31.
2. The San Remo Manual provides that “[b]elligerents shall take care to avoid
damage to cables and pipelines laid on the sea-bed which do not exclusively
serve the belligerents.”
3. Article 54 of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the provisions of the San Remo
Manual seem to reflect correctly the lex lata insofar as submarine pipelines and
submarine high voltage cables are concerned. If they qualify as lawful military
objectives, they may be seized or destroyed, provided the principle of propor-
tionality and the obligation to take feasible precautions are observed.
4. It is, however, doubtful whether the 1907 Hague Regulations and the San Remo
provisions also apply to submarine communications cables. Other than tele-
graphic cables, modern submarine communications cables are the backbone of
global data traffic. Although they may physically connect the territories of two
States, it will only in rare circumstances be possible to determine that they are
“exclusively serving one or more belligerents” or one or more Neutral States.
Today’s submarine communications cables are interconnected. Hence, data pack-
ages will travel over routes that are unpredictable. Accordingly, it is important to
distinguish between submarine communications cables and other submarine
cables.
Rule 70
Submarine pipelines and high voltage cables connecting occupied territory
with neutral territory must not be seized or destroyed except in the case of
absolute necessity. They must likewise be restored and compensation paid
when peace is concluded.
Commentary
1. This Rule reflects customary international law insofar as submarine pipelines and
high voltage cables are concerned. Article 54 of the 1907 Hague Regulations
provides that submarine telegraph cables “shall not be seized or destroyed except
in the case of absolute necessity” and that “they must likewise be restored and
compensation fixed when peace is made.”
2. The same logic applies to high voltage cables. This Rule does not apply to
modern submarine communications cables dealt with in Rule 67.
Section VI: Submarine Cables and Pipelines 63
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
64 Section VI: Submarine Cables and Pipelines
Section VII: Civilians Directly Participating
in Hostilities
Rule 71
Civilians directly participating in hostilities lose their protection from attack
for such time as they do so.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 51(3) of AP/I.1 Non-contracting parties to AP/I
support the customary principle on which that Article is based.2
2. The rule on direct participation in hostilities has been addressed in the ICRC
Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under
International Humanitarian Law.3 The content of the Interpretive Guidance has
been contested by many commentators.
3. The loss of civilian immunity from attack due to direct participation in hostilities
is limited to “such time” as the participation lasts. However, the precise duration
of the timeframe involved is a matter of some controversy (particularly in
“revolving door” situations).
4. When a person is a member of an organized armed group, he/she is targetable at
all times.
5. The Group of Experts agreed that civilians are subject to attack when they take a
direct and continuous part in armed conflict, and they cannot invoke protection
from attack during temporary lulls in this participation.4 Accordingly, the
1See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13.
2US DoD Law of War Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4 Section 5.9.1.2.
3International Committee of the Red Cross, ICRC Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law (2009).
4US DoD Law of War Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, at 5.8.4
(discussing the duration for which a civilian in DPH is subject to attack),; HCJ 769/02 Public
Committee Against Torture v. Government of Israel para. 27, 38–40 [2006] (Isr.).
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timeframe for the loss of protection due to DPH would be analogous to that of
their military counterparts, as the assigned function of operating RPAs or UMSs
would be considered sufficient evidence of a continuous/ongoing pattern of DPH
subjecting the civilian to deliberate attack.
6. The operating of RPAs or UMSs by civilians may result in loss of protection, but
this will depend on the activity in which they are engaged.
7. In view of the severe consequences of DPH the decision on whether an activity
qualifies as DPH should be based on reasonably reliable information.
Rule 72
Private military contractors (PMC) retain their civilian protection as long as
they are not incorporated in the armed forces—including militia or volun-
teer corps—and do not directly participate in hostilities.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 51(3) of AP/I. Non-contracting parties to AP/I
support the customary principle on which that Article is based.5
2. Private military contractors may be individually hired or, alternatively, may be
employees of private military corporations.
3. The status of PMC is examined in detail in the Montreux document of 2008,
which points out pertinent legal obligations and good practices applicable to
States using PMCs in military operations.6 Although the Montreux document is
not legally binding, it reflects the policy views of participating States.
4. Provided the following activities do not constitute direct participation in hostil-
ities, they may be undertaken by PMCs without losing their civilian protection:
a. Guarding of store houses;
b. Escorting civilian dignitaries;
c. Undertaking construction works;
d. Engaging in food services;
e. Engineering;
f. Providing technical support;
g. Carrying out instruction tasks; and
h. Other non-combat activities.
Rule 73
If persons who are authorized to accompany the armed forces without
actually being members thereof—such as supply contractors—fall into the
5US DoD Law of War Manual, Section 5.9.1.2.
6See The Montreux Document On pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for
States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict
(2008).
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power of the enemy during an international armed conflict, they are entitled
to the status of prisoners of war in accordance with the third Geneva
Convention of 1949 Article 4(A)(4).
Commentary
1. This Rule, which is based on GC/III, is today declaratory of customary interna-
tional law applicable in international armed conflict.7
2. In accordance with GC/III, persons authorized to accompany the armed forces
may also include:
a. Civilian members of military aircraft crews;
b. War correspondents;
c. Members of labour units or of services responsible for the welfare of the armed
forces;
3. The armed forces that the persons concerned are authorized to accompany must
provide them with an identity card, as indicated in GC/III. Loss of an identity card
does not deprive the person concerned of POW status.
4. There were divergent views within the Group of Experts about the status of
persons who accompany the armed forces but participate directly in hostilities.
One view was that by participating directly in hostilities, they retain POW status
but may be criminally liable under domestic law for any act of hostility. By
contrast, the other view was that they may lose their entitlement to POW status in
certain situations in as much as they are assimilated to unlawful/unprivileged
combatants. Another view, also reflected in the U.S DoD Law of War Manual, is
that they are entitled to POW status, and generally cannot be held criminally
liable for authorized support activities, including such support activities consti-
tuting direct participation in hostilities.
5. In any event, an enemy person who is captured shall initially be treated as a POW
until his/her status has been determined. If the person claims POW rights e.g., by
producing an identity card indicating that he or she is a person authorized to
accompany the armed forces, but circumstances indicate that the person’s status is
dubious, the case should be heard according to GC/III Article 5(2).
6. Article 5 of GC/III (second paragraph) provides that “[s]hould any doubt arise as
to whether persons, having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the
hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such
persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal”.
7. States bound by AP/I are obligated to observe Article 45(1), whereby “[a] person
who takes part in hostilities and falls into the power of an adverse Party shall be
presumed to be a prisoner of war, and therefore shall be protected by the Third
Convention, if he claims the status of prisoner of war, or if he appears to be
entitled to such status, or if the Party on which he depends claims such status on
7GC/III, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19, Article 4 A (4).
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his behalf by notification to the detaining Power or to the Protecting Power.
Should any doubt arise as to whether any such person is entitled to the status of
prisoner of war, he shall continue to have such status and, therefore, to be
protected by the Third Convention and this Protocol until such time as his status
has been determined by a competent tribunal”.
8. This Rule is of course limited to International Armed Conflicts. It is not applica-
ble to Non-International Armed Conflicts.
Rule 74
Persons who are authorized to accompany the armed forces without actually
being members thereof, but participate directly in hostilities, are subject to
attack by the enemy.
Commentary
1. The consensus view of the Group of Experts was that LOAC does not prohibit
DPH by civilians, but only exposes them to certain consequences as a result
of DPH. Accordingly, DPH itself cannot be properly characterized as a breach of
LOAC or as a war crime. Nonetheless, DPH may result in a violation of
applicable domestic criminal laws, either as a result of the DPH itself (e.g., in
U.S. law the crime of providing material support to terrorism), or as a result of its
consequences (e.g., an attempted or completed violation of domestic criminal
prohibitions against murder, arson, aggravated assault, etc.).
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Section VIII: Civilians Participating
in Unmanned Operations
Rule 75
In the context of armed conflict—whether international or
non-international—civilians who conduct attacks using unmanned systems,
including RPA and UMS, are directly participating in hostilities.
Commentary
1. For a general comment on the notion of DPH in LOAC, see paragraph 1 of the
Commentary to Rule 12 and chapter “Section VII: Civilians Directly Participat-
ing in Hostilities”.
2. Attacks fall within the range of activities that unquestionably qualify as DPH.1
3. Although there may be legitimate debate over the point at which support for RPA
operations (see Rule 44)—such as launch and recovery, maintenance and repair,
input of data into control and target acquisition systems—amount to DPH, there is
general agreement among the Group of Experts that actually controlling the
aircraft during certain missions and/or executing lethal attacks constitutes DPH.
4. This Rule applies to any civilian, regardless of whether he/she has been autho-
rized to accompany the armed forces. With regard to status upon capture, see
Commentary to Rule 74.
5. The notion of DPH applies during all armed conflicts, whether international or
non-international in character.
1Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmermann (eds.), Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June
1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 (AP/I Commentary), (Geneva: Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers) (1987), at page 619: “Thus direct” participation means acts of war which by their nature
or purpose are likely to cause actual harm to the personnel and equipment of the enemy armed
forces. It is only during such participation that a civilian loses his immunity and becomes a
legitimate target.”
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6. This Rule applies to civilians supporting State armed forces, to civilians associ-
ated with other State agencies or organizations (such as intelligence services), and
to civilians supporting non-State organized armed groups.
Rule 76
To facilitate the implementation of the principle of distinction in an interna-
tional armed conflict, States should refrain from authorizing civilians to
engage in attacks using unmanned systems.
Commentary
1. LOAC does not prohibit the use of civilians to engage in activities that qualify as
DPH. However, LOAC does render civilians liable to be attacked for such time as
they take a direct part in hostilities. To facilitate implementation of the principle
of distinction, the Group of Experts recommended that States refrain from use of
civilians engaging in activities that qualify as DPH.
2. Distinction between combatants (and/or members of armed groups) and all other
individuals is facilitated when combatants effectively distinguish themselves
from the civilian population. Such “passive distinction” measures facilitate the
ability to make lawful versus unlawful attack decisions.
3. LOAC does not recognize any category of “quasi” combatant. When civilians are
known by the enemy to be engaging in DPH, the protection afforded to other
civilians not so engaging may be jeopardized. This may happen because innocent
civilians may erroneously be assessed as engaging in DPH and thus may be
subjected to attack. Accordingly, the Group of Experts recommended that States
endeavour to limit civilian roles to those functions that do not qualify as DPH,
such as operating RPAs in hostilities.
4. LOAC does not indicate or restrict the manner by which individuals may be
incorporated into the armed forces. Instead, this is left exclusively in the hands of
domestic authorities.
5. This chapter relates exclusively to the issue of protection from enemy attack. The
separate issue of capture by the enemy of civilians who are engaging in DPH has
little or no relevance to RPA operators who are usually placed at some distance
from the theatre of operations.
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Section IX: Military Objectives by Nature
Rule 77
“Military objectives”, as far as objects are concerned, are those objects
which by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribu-
tion to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
military advantage.
Commentary
1. The definition is based on Article 52 (2) of AP/I.
2. Four critical terms in the definition are “nature”, “location”, “purpose” and “use”.
This Section applies mainly to military objectives by “nature”. The extent of
application of the category of military objectives by “nature” is not universally
agreed upon. In particular, there is disagreement on whether military objectives
by “nature” constitute an absolute or relative category. Rules 78 through 84 reflect
the consensus reached by the Group of Experts.
3. The definition of military objectives is confined to objects. Human beings are not
military objectives for the purpose of this particular definition, but may be lawful
targets as combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities.
4. Animals can be military objectives. An example could be a mule carrying military
supplies. However, animals must not be made the object of attack unless required
by military necessity, i.e., they constitute military objectives.
Rule 78
(a) An object can simultaneously fall within more than one of the “nature”,
“location”, “purpose” and “use” classifications.
(b) In particular, the distinction between “nature” and “use” is that if an
object qualifies as a military objective by nature it remains so classified
irrespective of its current use. A military objective by “nature” can be
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attacked independently of its present “use”, while a military objective by
“use” can be attacked only if it is actually used for military purposes.
Commentary
1. The four key terms “nature”, “location”, “purpose” and “use” convey different
meanings, but are nevertheless interlinked. Any one classification, or combina-
tion thereof, can serve as the basis for satisfying the test of whether an object is a
military objective.
2. Generally speaking, a military objective by nature can be attacked at all times.
However, there are obvious exceptions. For example, an obsolete tank, aircraft, or
warship—presented for display in a museum or elsewhere—would be exempted
from attack. See also Rule 79.
3. Every civilian object can become a military objective by use, cf. Article 52(2) of
AP/I.
4. An example is that of an art museum which—owing to its status as cultural
property—does not constitute a military objective by nature. Nevertheless it can
become a military objective by use if the enemy establishes, e.g., a command post
there.
5. In the past broadcasting and TV stations were regarded as military objectives by
nature. This view is today largely outmoded. In the past, such facilities were in
most countries under centralized control and instrumental in passing information
from the Government to the general public, including mobilisation orders. Today,
broadcasting or equivalent functions take place from a multitude of studios and
via the Internet and cell-phone networks in addition to traditional means. Broad-
casting and TV stations will, however, in many situations be military objectives
by use.1
6. As for military objectives by use in Outer Space, see Rule 10.
7. With regard to military objectives in cyberspace, see Rule 26.
Rule 79
The classification of an object as a military objective by “nature” is not
altered only because it is in disuse or under repair, unless its fundamental
character has changed.
Commentary
1. Even when not in use, such objects always constitute lawful targets during armed
conflict. For example, an abandoned tank is still a military objective by nature, if
it is capable of making an effective contribution to military action (e.g., it can be
repaired/re-manned and used consistent with its nature). See also comment 2 to
Rule 78.
1Note e.g. ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, paras. 71–79 (13 June 2000).
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2. However, some objects cease to be military objectives by nature, for example,
when an object that was once military equipment is turned into a museum piece,
its nature has changed and it may no longer be a military objective. In this regard,
see chapter “Section XV: Cultural Property” on cultural property.
3. The principles of proportionality and of precautions in attack will apply notwith-
standing the classification of an object as a military objective by nature. It should
be recalled that (see Rule 78a) the fact that an object is a military objective by
nature does not exclude the possibility that it can also be classified as a military
objective by location, purpose or use.
Rule 80
(a) An object qualifying as a military objective by “nature” can be either
movable or immovable.
Commentary
1. In order to qualify as a military objective by “nature”, the object in question must
have an inherent characteristic or attribute that contributes effectively to military
action.
2. Objects under Rule 80 are typically designed and produced in order to be used for
military purposes. They can be either movable or immovable.
(b) Examples of movable military objectives by “nature” include military
aircraft (other than medical aircraft); tanks and armoured personnel
carriers (APCs) (other than medical transport); missiles and other
weapons; military equipment; warships; UMS operated by the armed
forces; military satellites; and mobile military ground stations.
Commentary
1. Rule 80 (b) is based on the AMW Manual Rule 22 (a).2
2. See Rules 52 and 54 on UMS.
3. See Rule 9 on military satellites.
4. The list of movable military objectives provided here is not exhaustive and is
limited to the most obvious examples.
5. Military medical aircraft are entitled to certain protections from being made the
object of attack. Nevertheless, medical aircraft are not civilian objects.
(c) Examples of immovable military objectives by “nature” include military
fortifications, facilities and depots; military ports and airfields; missile
silos; military satellite communications facilities; armaments factories;
and Ministries of Defence.
2See also, DoD Law of War Manual, chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, Section 6.6.1.1.
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Commentary
1. Ministries of Defence are military objectives even if such Ministries are staffed in
part by civilians. Of course, to the extent that a Ministry of Defence has physically
separate non-defence departments, as in the case of the Swiss Federal Department
of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS), its facilities devoted exclusively
to such civilian functions are not military objectives by nature.3
2. The list of immovable military objectives provided here is not exhaustive and is
limited to the most obvious examples.
Rule 81
Military Command, Control and Communications centres (C3) are military
objectives by “nature”, whether movable or immovable.
Commentary
1. The distinction between movable and immovable military objectives by “nature”
does not apply to military C3 because they could be either the one or the other.
2. Needless to say, C3 objects are of critical importance for all military operations
and their attack would likely always be prioritized by the enemy.
Rule 82
Computers that are components of weapons, weapon systems or other
military systems (such as military radar stations or military Outer Space
systems) are military objectives by “nature”.
Commentary
1. For the purposes of this Manual, a computer is considered a component of a
weapon, weapon system or other military system if it is designed from the outset
or programmed specifically to play an essential role in the functioning of such
weapons or systems. It can be an integral part of a weapon, a platform, a weapon
system, a C3 system, etc.
2. Military computers can be either movable or immovable.
3. Computers that are military objectives by “nature” are categorically recognized as
such regardless of their current use. Conversely, computers that are normally
dedicated to civilian purposes may become military objectives by virtue of their
actual use, e.g., in support of military action.
4. Military computers can be integral parts of a cyber infrastructure or operate on a
stand-alone basis.
3See also, DoD law of War Manual, Section 5.6.4.
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5. Military computers can be attacked by cyber, kinetic or electronic means. They
can be destroyed or made to malfunction in a way advantageous to the enemy.
6. When military computers that are connected to the Internet are attacked, the
expected damage or destruction to systems connected to the Internet that are
not military objectives must be kept in mind.
Rule 83
In addition to the items listed in Rules 80 through 82, which are military
objectives by nature, objects that will presumptively qualify as military
objectives by “nature” include, but are not limited to:
Commentary
1. Rule 83 is based on the concept that, whereas some objects constitute military
objectives by “nature” in all circumstances (see Rule 80–82) there are other
objects that may be presumed to be military objectives by nature, but that
presumption may be rebutted due to the particular circumstances prevailing at
the time.
2. Although the Group of Experts determined that there was a rebuttable presump-
tion that certain objects were military objectives by nature, they recognize that
several States would prefer that the Rule be expressed in terms of “very likely”
instead of “presumptively”.
3. Accordingly, objects which will “presumptively” qualify as military objectives
by nature will in most practical circumstances be lawful targets unless the
concrete circumstances prevailing at the time indicate otherwise.
4. The distinction between a more and less absolute “nature” of military objectives
is also reflected in Articles 22 and 23 of the AMW Manual.
5. This position—that there are objectives that are not military objectives by nature
as an absolute matter but may necessarily be presumed to be such in the absence
of circumstances to defeat that presumption—was adopted by the majority of the
Group of Experts. However, there was a dissenting opinion.
6. Rule 83 deals with objects that are normally also made for civilian use, but where
the potential for military use is so evident that it is more likely than not that they
would make an effective contribution to military action in the near future.
7. Paragraphs (a) to (g) set forth examples of the application of this Rule. It must be
noted, however, that not every example is necessarily regarded by all of the
participating experts in the Group as constituting military objectives by nature.
(a) Main railway lines, main roads, bridges and tunnels;
Commentary
1. Branch railway lines are military objectives by “nature” if they connect places of
military significance such as military bases, depots, weapon systems and muni-
tion factories and important airfields or harbours to the main railway network.
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2. Railway lines that predominantly serve suburban commuter traffic are not mili-
tary objectives by “nature”.
3. Main roads include highways but may also include secondary roads when such
roads would clearly serve as back-up if highways are closed. However, urban
streets and avenues would not presumptively qualify as military objectives by
nature.
4. Bridges and tunnels are military objectives by “nature” when they are a part of
main railway lines or main roads, but they can be military objectives by “nature”
for other reasons as well.
(b) If of military importance, data lines, fibre-optic cables, telephone lines
and telegraph lines;
Commentary
1. Electronic communications are vital for military command and control purposes.
Communication lines built for civilian purposes are likely to be used by the
military in lieu of or as back-up for dedicated military lines.
2. Supporting structures, such as switchboards, servers and micro-wave datalink
facilities are included among the objects that are presumptively military objec-
tives by nature.
(c) Airports and airstrips of military significance;
Commentary
1. Airports and airstrips are of military significance when they are likely to serve as
dispersal fields if military air bases are threatened by attack, or for bringing in
military supplies when military air bases are closed.
2. Such airports and airstrips need to have runways of a sufficient length to serve
combat or transport aircraft.
3. It must be borne in mind that attacks on civilian airports and airstrips always bring
into play consideration of precautions and application of the proportionality
principle.4
(d) Harbours of military significance;
Commentary
1. Deepwater ports that are connected to main railway lines and main roads are
presumed to be military objectives by “nature”.
2. Harbours that are predominantly used by coastal fisheries, and marinas for
yachting are not presumed to be military objectives by “nature”.
4AP/I, see fn. 15, Article 51(5)(b). The principle of proportionality is recited in para 1 of the
Commentary to Rule 11.
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(e) Electricity production facilities serving military needs, including power
transmission facilities and equipment;
Commentary
1. Electricity is necessary for operating military bases and many weapon systems.
When such military needs are (as is usually the case) provided for over the general
electricity grid, the electricity production facilities and their transmission infra-
structure are military objectives by “nature”. See Rule 84.
2. If, however, military and civilian electricity needs are served by separate produc-
tion facilities and networks, only those serving military needs are military
objectives.
3. In most practical circumstances, even if military bases, radar and weapons
systems etc., have their separate electricity generators, the general electricity
grid will serve industry, harbours, and transportation and communications sys-
tems of military importance. In such situations, collateral damage to civilian and
civilian objects must be considered under the principle of proportionality.5
4. It should also be kept in mind that the party subject to attack has a duty to take
precautions against the effects of attacks.6 Such “passive precautions” could for
instance include the installation of emergency generators at hospitals and other
particularly vulnerable civilian institutions.
(f) Oil production facilities for use by the enemy or its co-belligerents, oil
terminals, refineries, crude oil and refined products storage depots, and
pipelines.
Commentary
1. Fuel, predominantly based on oil, is vital for military operations. Facilities for
producing, importing, refining, storing and transporting oil for use by the enemy
or its co-belligerents are therefore military objectives by “nature”.
2. If oil is produced and transported for export, generating revenues to finance the
war effort, the facilities fall in the category of war-sustaining industries. The
lawfulness of attacking such industries, as well as transportation to facilitate
export, is contested. See also chapter “Section XI: Destruction of Property”
Rule 101.
(g) Outer space systems and assets belonging to the armed forces.
Commentary
1. See Rule 9.
5AP/I, ibid, Article 51(5)(b). The principle of proportionality is recited in para 1 of the Commentary
to Rule 11.
6AP/I, ibid, Article 58.
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Rule 84
The status of a military objective by “nature” is not altered, even if it is also
used for civilian purposes.
Commentary
1. So-called dual-use objects will always constitute lawful military objectives in
light of the fact that one component of the duality involves an effective contri-
bution to the military effort.
2. Again, the principle of proportionality must be applied even when the object
under attack is a military objective by nature.
Rule 85
Attacks that treat as a single object of attack a number of clearly separated
and distinct lawful targets located in a city, town, village or area containing a
similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects, are considered indis-
criminate and are prohibited.
Commentary
1. This Rule is not restricted to military objectives by “nature”.
2. Rule 85 is based on Article 51(5)(a) of AP/I which is reflective of customary
international law.
3. Rule 85 is derived from the acute need to cope with the problem of “target area”
bombing that arose in WWII. The text seriously limits the possibilities in which
clusters of military objectives may be attacked as if they were a single lawful
target. On the other hand, it does not deny the possibility that a number of lawful
targets, which are not clearly separated and distinct, may be treated as a single
lawful target.
4. As the experience of WWII demonstrated, recourse to “target area” bombing may
cause humanitarian devastation on an unprecedented scale because of the location
of lawful targets—which are not clearly separated and distinct—within an urban
centre, or other residential area. However, it must be borne in mind that, under the
current LOAC, all attacks are subject to the principle of proportionality and the
requirement to take feasible precautions in attack. Hence, the expected collateral
damage to civilians and civilian objects must not be excessive compared to the
overall military advantage anticipated.7
5. Although it is not contested that this Rule is based on customary international
law, some States that are not contracting parties to AP/I believe that is should be
confined to circumstances in which there is an intention to terrorize the civilian
population or in which the attack is expected to cause excessive collateral
damage.
7AP/I, ibid, Article 51(5)(b) and Article 57. The principle of proportionality is recited in para 1 of
the Commentary to Rule 11.
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6. As in other instances when the attacker is facing the risk of a breach of the
principle of proportionality, the availability of precision-guided munitions (PGM)
may facilitate striking lawful targets in a manner that will avoid—or, in any event,
minimize—the expected collateral damage to civilians or civilian objects.
Rule 86
This Section is without prejudice to Article 56 (5) of AP/I and Article 15 of
AP/II for those States Parties bound thereby. Accordingly, military objec-
tives must not be attacked if erected for the sole purpose of protecting from
attack works or installations containing dangerous forces (provided that
they are not used in hostilities, except for defensive actions necessary to
respond to attacks against the protected works or installations).
Commentary
1. This Rule is not restricted to military objectives by ‘nature’.
2. This Rule is obligatory only for States Parties that have not made reservations
concerning the provision in Article 56 (5) of AP/I and for States Parties to Article
15 of AP/II. This obligation is not considered customary international law.
3. The expression “works or installations containing dangerous forces”means dams,
dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations. It does not include petrochemical
works.
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Section X: Civil Aviation and Civilian
Airliners
Rule 87
(a) During an armed conflict, whether international or non-international,
States are entitled to restrict or prohibit entry into their national
airspace.
Commentary
1. The Rules in the present Section apply to States and not to non-State actors in a
non-international armed conflict (NIAC). That is to say, the Rules of this
Section other than Rule 90 (b) do not apply to non-State organised armed groups
involved in a NIAC.
2. States have complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above their land
and sea territory.1 This is reflected in both treaty2 and customary international
law.3
3. This Rule also applies to entry by a military aircraft into the national airspace of a
co-belligerent.
1
“Air” or “airspace” is defined in the AMW Manual Rule (1)(a), see chapter “Section I: Outer
Space”, fn. 1, as “the air up to the highest altitude at which an aircraft can fly and below the lowest
possible perigee of an earth satellite in orbit. Under international law, airspace is classified as either
national airspace (that over the land, internal waters, archipelagic waters, and territorial seas of any
State) or international airspace (that over contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, the high
seas, and territory not subject to the sovereignty of any State).”
2See 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), ICAO Doc. 7300/9,
Articles 1 and 2.
3Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, page 14 ff., at page 128, para. 251: “The principle
of respect for territorial sovereignty is also directly infringed by the unauthorized overflight of a
State’s territory by aircraft belonging to or under the control of the government of another State.”
© The Author(s) 2020
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4. Article 3(c) of the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Chicago Convention) states: “No state aircraft of a contracting State shall fly
over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by special
agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.”
5. Article 89 of the Chicago Convention sets forth: “In case of war, the provisions of
this Convention shall not affect the freedom of action of any of the Contracting
States affected, whether as belligerents or as neutrals. The same principle shall
apply in the case of any Contracting State which declares a state of national
emergency and notifies the fact to the Council.”4 The State should however avoid
discriminating between aircraft of its own, neutral or allied registration and
ownership when limiting access to its airspace.5
6. As regards transit and landing rights of scheduled air services, i.e. services granted
access to foreign airspace under international agreements other than the Chicago
Convention itself, their application to armed conflicts would be regulated by the
relevant agreement, rather than Article 89 of the Chicago Convention.
(b) Subparagraph (a) is without prejudice to the rights of transit passage
above international straits and of archipelagic sea lanes passage.
Commentary
1. Generally speaking, neutral States bordering international straits may not sus-
pend, hamper or otherwise impede the right of transit passage.6
2. Neutral warships, auxiliary vessels, and military and state aircraft may exercise
the rights of passage provided by general international law through, under and
over belligerent international straits and archipelagic waters. The neutral State
should, as a precautionary measure, give timely notice of its exercise of the rights
of passage to the belligerent State.
3. Neutral States may not suspend, hamper or otherwise impede the right of transit
passage nor the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage.7
Rule 88
During an international armed conflict:
(a) Belligerent military aircraft are prohibited from entering neutral
national airspace.
4Chicago Convention, Article 9 (a) and (b), see fn. 2. See also ibid., Annex 2 Rules of the air, page
3-1 (Article 3-1-10). A similar right to limit the use of airspace in “areas of active hostilities or of
military occupation, and in time of war along the supply routes leading to such areas” is found in the
1944 International Air Services Transit Agreement, UNTS, vol. 84, page 389, Article 1.
5Chicago Convention, see fn. 2, Article 9.
6UNCLOS, see chapter “Section IV: Unmanned Maritime Systems”, fn. 3, Articles 38 and 44.
7Ibid. Articles. 53 and 54.
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Commentary
1. This Rule is based on the customary law of neutrality as referred to in paragraph
1 of the Commentary to Rule 18. Minor intrusions into neutral airspace occur
from time to time, and are usually not challenged, but they do not call into
question the general applicability of the Rule.
2. This Rule is subject to the power of the UN Security Council to exclude the
application of the neutrality principle by virtue of a binding provision.
(b) Subparagraph (a) is without prejudice to the rights of transit passage
above international straits and of archipelagic sea lanes passage.
Commentary
1. See the Commentary to Rule 87 (b).
(c) Neutral States have a duty to prevent or terminate the violation of their
national airspace by belligerent military aircraft.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on the customary law of neutrality as reflected in the Com-
mentary to Rule 88 (a) and in Article 8 of the 1907 Hague Convention XIII on
Neutrality in Naval War.
2. The Group of Experts agreed with the statement made in Rule 168 (b) of the
AMW Manual: “If the use of the neutral territory or airspace by a Belligerent
Party constitutes a serious violation, the opposing Belligerent Party may, in the
absence of any feasible and timely alternative, use such force as is necessary to
terminate the violation of neutrality.”
(d) If a belligerent military aircraft has been forced to land, the crew must
be interned for the duration of the armed conflict.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on article 11 of the 1907 Hague Convention V.
Rule 89
Civil aviation may be prevented from using the airspace covered by a no-fly
zone (within belligerent national airspace) or by an exclusion zone (within
international airspace).
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Commentary
1. Restrictions in aviation may take the shape of no-fly zones or exclusion zones.8
As stated in Rule 60 in the AMW Manual, “civilian airliners (whether enemy or
neutral) ought to avoid entering a no-fly or an ‘exclusion zone’”. However, “they
do not lose their protection merely because they enter such areas.”9
2. This Rule must be seen in relation to Rule 96 of this Manual, which urges civilian
airliners to avoid areas of hazardous military activity.
3. Civil aviation may be prohibited from entering such zones if and to the extent that
the Security Council has rendered a decision to that effect in the exercise of its
powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
Rule 90
(a) For the purposes of this Section, “civilian aircraft” means any aircraft
that is not used in military, customs or police services of a State.
Commentary
1. This definition is based on Article 3(b) of the 1944 Chicago Convention.
2. The reference to the “services of a State” excludes private security and other
functions.
(b) Civilian aircraft may not be attacked unless they qualify as lawful
targets. Any attack on such aircraft is subject to the applicable principles
and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. For general remarks on when objects that would ordinarily be considered civilian
objects become military objectives, see paragraph 3 of the Commentary to
Rule 10.
2. The principle of proportionality is addressed in general in paragraph 1 of the
Commentary to Rule 11.
3. Particular considerations may arise with regard to civilian aircraft, similar but not
equal (in gravity) to those that arise with regard to civilian airliners, see Rule
91 (b) with Commentary.
Rule 91
(a) “Civilian airliner” means a civilian aircraft identifiable as such and
engaged in carrying civilian passengers in scheduled or non-scheduled
service.
8Dealt with in the AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, Section P.
9See also the San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 29, para 72.
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Commentary
1. This definition is based on the definition made in the AMWManual Article (1) (i).
(b) Civilian airliners are civilian objects and entitled to particular care in
terms of precautions.
Commentary
1. For general remarks with regard to the duty to take feasible precautions, see
paragraph1 of the Commentary to Rule 14.
2. As stated in the Commentary on the AMW Manual, the precautionary measures
of identifying the object as a lawful target “must be meticulously observed” by
those attacking this category of aircraft10; i.e. airliners are entitled to “particular
care in terms of precautions”.11 This particular care would seem to follow from
the aircraft’s importance to international air navigation and the risks to which
“innocent [civilian] passengers” are exposed where an armed conflict takes
place.12 The vulnerability of the aircraft and the possibility of it carrying a large
number of passengers—typically civilians—argues for additional protection.13
3. There appears to be some reluctance to acknowledge that civilian airliners (like
passenger ships) are entitled to particular care insofar as precautions in attacks are
concerned. However, the Group of Experts believes that—in light of general
acceptance of this notion in the San RemoManual as well as the AMWManual—
it is appropriate to recognize that civilian airliners (like passenger ships) are
entitled to supplementary protection.
(c) The mere fact that a civilian airliner is carrying some enemy military
personnel, equipment, or supplies together with civilian passengers does
not deprive it of its entitlement to particular care in terms of precautions.
Commentary
1. When a civilian airliner, which is supposed be engaged in carrying civilian
passengers, carries enemy military personnel, it becomes a military objective by
10Commentary on the AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, page 156 (Com-
mentary to Rule 58).
11Commentary on the AMWManual, ibid, page 31ff. (Commentary to Rule 1(i)), 137 (introductory
Commentary to Rule 40), 155 (Rule 58) and 156 (Commentary to Rule 58). San Remo Manual, see
chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, page 92 (Commentary to para 13(m)).
12Commentary on the AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, page 31 (Com-
mentary to Rule 1(i)).
13As mentioned as one of two conflicting views in Commentary on the AMW Manual, ibid, page
155 (Commentary to Rule 58), see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1.
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use. However, attack of a civilian airliner can only be considered in the most
extreme circumstances and in compliance with the proportionality rule, bearing in
mind that civilian airliners are entitled to particular care in terms of precautions.
2. In some instances, the presence of fewer yet key enemy military personnel—such
as Generals or other high ranking officers in command with significant influence
over on-going hostilities—may turn the airliner into a lawful target. Even then,
proportionality must always be borne in mind (see Rule 90(b)).
(d) If intercepted within a no-fly or an exclusion zone, civilian airliners
continue to be entitled to particular care in terms of precautions.
Commentary
1. With regard to interception, see Rule 92 with accompanying Commentary.
Rule 92
Upon reasonable grounds, civilian airliners are liable to interception and
inspection at a sufficiently safe airfield, subject to the following:
Commentary
1. The phrase “sufficiently safe” is relative and must be assessed under the circum-
stances ruling at the time, whereas the phrase “reasonable grounds” may, e.g.,
refer to suspicion that a civilian airliner is carrying contraband.14
(a) During an international armed conflict, interception may be exercised by
belligerent military aircraft anywhere outside neutral national airspace.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on customary international law as also expressed in the AMW
Manual Rule 137.
(b) During a non-international armed conflict, interception may be
exercised only by the State Party to the armed conflict and exclusively
within its national airspace. If, in extraordinary situations, the respective
aircraft is present in international airspace, such interception should be
exercised only in the vicinity of that State’s national airspace.
14The due regard to safety norm is also expressed in the guidelines by ICAO: International Civil
Aviation Organization, Manual concerning Interception of Civil Aircraft (2nd ed. 1990), ICAO
Doc. 9433-AN/926.
86 Section X: Civil Aviation and Civilian Airliners
Commentary
1. The limitation on interception laid down in this Rule is based on general inter-
national law which makes no allowance in non-international armed conflict for
the exercise of belligerent rights against aircraft of foreign nationality, and on the
concern for the safety of civil aviation in international airspace.
2. An extraordinary situation might be when there is reason to believe that a
hijacked airliner will be used as a suicide bomber. Any action against such aircraft
would be based on the right to self-defence.
3. The term “vicinity” should be interpreted in light of the prevailing circumstances.
Rule 93
Refusal to obey an order to land or to change course may render a civilian
airliner a lawful target.
Commentary
1. Civilian airliners are obliged to comply with an order issued by a State party to a
conflict to land or to change course. According to customary international law,
non-compliance with such orders may render a civilian airliner a military
objective.
2. This is based on the San Remo Manual paragraphs 63 and 70 and the AMW
Manual Rule 27(d) and 63(e).
Rule 94
The responsibility of States that provide air-traffic services for the safety of
civil aviation remains intact during an armed conflict.
Commentary
1. The obligation to provide air navigation facilities for the purpose of international
air navigation is found in Article 28 of the Chicago Convention. During an armed
conflict, the States involved in the conflict, as well as Neutral States, will typically
continue to provide such air traffic services in relation to their flight information
regions (FIR).15 The State providing air traffic services will in its flight informa-
tion region “have a special responsibility for the safety of civil aircraft”.16
2. The State responsible for providing air traffic services, should, based on the
information that is available, “identify the geographical area of the conflict, assess
the hazards or potential hazards to international civil aircraft operations, and
15A FIR is defined in the AMW Manual as “an aviation term used to describe airspace with specific
dimensions, in which a flight information service and an alerting service are provided. Oceanic
airspace is divided into Oceanic Information Regions and delegated to controlling authorities
bordering that region. The division of authorities is done by international agreement through
ICAO.” See here Commentary on the AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”,
fn. 1, page 239. See also Chicago Convention, fn. 2, Annex 2 Rules of the air, page 1–4.
16See 1990 Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Haz-
ardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, ICAO Doc. 9554, page 14, para. 10.2.
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determine whether such operations in or through the area of conflict should be
avoided or may be continued under specified conditions. An international Notice
to Airmen (NOTAM) containing the necessary information, advice and safety
measures to be taken should then be issued and subsequently updated in the light
of developments.”17
3. A special problem occurs where such air traffic services are provided by an
authority or entity located in a third State, as it might be difficult to gather
sufficient information on the relevant risk levels in the foreign areas where it
provides the said services. For instance, the Swiss company Skyguide—Swiss
Air Navigation Services Limited—provides air traffic services for Switzerland,
but also for adjoining areas in Germany, Austria, France and Italy.18 Should a
non-international or international armed conflict take place in any of these areas
beyond the Swiss borders, the authorities of the relevant territories may restrict or
close their airspace although the airspace is normally handled by Skyguide. No
such authority to close or restrict national airspace would seem to have been
delegated to the company by the abovementioned States, but it is to be expected
that the company will issue statements regarding the perceived threat level. Here,
its potential responsibility for damage or destruction following insufficient warn-
ings to civilian air traffic may presumably be reduced considering that it has less
access to situational information on the current or planned military operations
than would be the case for a national agency providing such services.
Rule 95
(a) During an armed conflict, States should—whenever necessary for the
safety of civil aviation—restrict access to their national airspace
(in whole or in part) by civilian airliners.
Commentary
1. See Rule 87 (a) with Commentary for general remarks on States’ entitlement to
restrict their national airspace. The present Rule is non-binding in character and
concerned with situations when States should use their entitlement in this regard.
2. The failure of States to restrict access to their national airspace may contribute to
tragic events such as the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 above
Hrabove, Ukraine, on 17 July 2014.
171990 Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous
to Civil Aircraft Operations, see fn. 16, page 14, para. 10.3.
18See Skyguide, Annual Report 2015 (Geneva 2016) pages 22 and 28.
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3. The Chicago Convention Annexes 11, 15 and 17 place a due diligence obligation
upon the State to ensure the safety of its airspace.19 Correspondingly, under
Chicago Convention Annex 11, close cooperation must be established between
air traffic services authorities and military authorities, and coordination of activ-
ities potentially hazardous to civil aircraft must also be established.20
4. Where a State has knowledge of a credible and concrete risk to airliners, and
where restriction on the use or closure of its airspace is the only reasonable
measure available, the State is obligated to act accordingly. Otherwise, a State is
only obliged—at some indeterminate stage during the intensification of military
activities in the airspace—to close parts of its airspace to foreign civil aviation.
An alternative to prohibiting flights at all altitudes may be the prohibition against
flying below a certain altitude.21
5. The Dutch Safety Board’s consideration of States involved in NIACs shows that
few States actually practice the closing (in whole or in part) of their airspace.22
6. Regardless of whether the territorial State decides to keep its airspace open, the
State where the operator is registered may obligate the carrier not to use a specific
foreign airspace or, at the very least, may place restrictions on the use of that
airspace by its aircraft.23
19Chicago Convention, see fn. 2, Annex 11, Art. 2.17, Annex 15, Art. 5.1.1.1 (l) and (n), and Annex
17, Arts. 2.1.2, 2.4.3, and 3.1.3. Whether the Standards and Recommended Practices contained in
annexes to the Chicago Convention are binding on the State parties is on the other hand disputed.
For the ICAO view, see Res. A36-13 (2007) Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies
and associated practices related specifically to air navigation. See as well statements by the ICAO
Secretary General Raymond Benjamin in a letter to state civil authorities, 24 July 2014, page
2, para. 5.
20Articles 2.17 and 2.18. See also Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military
Activities Potentially Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, see fn. 16.
21A slightly different view might be held by the Dutch Safety Board. See Dutch Safety Board, Crash
of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014 (The Hague, October 2015) page
172. Here, the Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially
Hazardous to Civil Aircraft Operations, see fn. 11, para. 3.1.1 holds that “[i]n the event that a
sudden outbreak of armed hostilities or any other factors preclude this normal co-ordination
process, appropriate State and ATS authorities, civil aircraft operators and pilots-in-command of
aircraft must assess the situation based on the information available and plan their actions so as not
to jeopardize safety.”
22Dutch Safety Board, Crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014
(The Hague, October 2015) pages 199–205 (Libya, Northern Mali and, after the MH17 incident, the
Ukraine).
23Dutch Safety Board, Crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014
(The Hague, October 2015) pages 173–174, 221, 232 and 242.
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(b) A State must keep under review the level of danger to civil aviation
under its air traffic control and inform the relevant foreign actors of any
imminent dangers to aviation in the airspace for which it is responsible.
Commentary
1. The Group of Experts came to the conclusion that, as opposed to Rule 94 (a), the
present Rule is binding upon States as an expression of customary international
law. It appears that some States regard the general practice in this context as a
matter of “best practice” rather than binding custom.
2. The Group of Experts was of the opinion that this duty is comparable to the duty
of a coastal State to inform other States of a minefield in its territorial sea which
poses imminent danger to shipping.24 It is, however, difficult to find State practice
and opinio juris supporting an obligation to inform more generally on changes in
the risk level during an armed conflict,25 although the non-binding ICAOManual
Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazard-
ous to Civil Aircraft Operations indicates that the territorial State should do this.26
Rule 96
Civilian airliners should avoid areas of potentially hazardous military activ-
ity, even if civil aviation has not been restricted or prohibited in the respec-
tive airspace.
24The Corfu Channel Case, Judgment 9 April 1949, I.C.J. Reports 1949, pages 4–169, page 22:
“The obligations incumbent upon the Albanian authorities consisted in notifying, for the benefit of
shipping in general, the existence of a minefield in Albanian territorial waters and in warning the
approaching British warships of the imminent danger to which the minefield exposed them. Such
obligations are based, not on the Hague Convention of 1907, No. VIII, which is applicable in time
of war, but on certain general and well-recognized principles, namely: elementary considerations of
humanity, even more exacting in peace than in war; the principle of the freedom of maritime
communication; and every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts
contrary to the rights of other States.”More generally, a coastal State is under an obligation to “give
appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation, of which it has knowledge, within its territorial
sea” according to UNCLOS, see chapter “Section IV: Unmanned Maritime Systems”, fn. 1, Article
24 (2).
25Dutch Safety Board, Crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014
(The Hague, October 2015) pages 207 and 262. The Dutch Safety Board report recommends on
page 264 that ICAO member States “[e]nsure that States’ responsibilities related to the safety of
their airspace are more strictly defined in the Chicago Convention and the underlying Standards and
Recommended Practices, so that it is clear in which cases the airspace should be closed.”
261990 Manual Concerning Safety Measures Relating to Military Activities Potentially Hazardous
to Civil Aircraft Operations, see fn. 16, page 14, para. 10.3. See also Dutch Safety Board, Crash of
Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July 2014 (The Hague, October 2015) pages
173 and 208–209. Chicago Convention, see fn. 2, Annex 15 Article. 5.1.1 here holds that
“[a] NOTAM shall be originated and issued promptly whenever the information to be distributed
is of a temporary nature and of short duration or when operationally significant permanent changes,
or temporary changes of long duration are made at short notice, except for extensive text and/or
graphics.”
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Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Rule 54 of the AMWManual and is a corollary non-binding
Rule to the one applicable to States in Rule 95, in order to ensure the safety of
civil aviation in time of armed conflict.
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Section XI: Destruction of Property
Rule 97
It is specifically prohibited to destroy, damage or seize enemy private or
public property unless such destruction is justified by military necessity
under the principles and rules of LOAC.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 23(g) of the 1907 Hague Regulations and the
customary international law of armed conflict.1 The Rule is, in principle,
applicable to all domains of warfare (air, sea, land, cyber and space).
2. Military necessity includes those measures imperatively required in order to
achieve the aims or ends of warfare, and (hereunder) having a reasonable
connection to those ends. Military necessity must be distinguished from polit-
ical, economic or diplomatic needs.
3. Destruction of property qualifying as military objectives is a fortiori also
necessary, and lawful. The practical scope of the Rule thus relates to enemy
civilian property during international armed conflict.
4. The notion of property is not defined by applicable treaties. The notion of
property must therefore be understood in light of its ordinary (dictionary)
meaning. All tangible, movable or immovable items as well as real property
fall within the notion of “property”.
1The rule appeared at the Brussels Conference (1874), The Laws of Armed Conflicts, page
21, Article 13(g). Today, its customary status is expressed for example in Henckaerts and
Doswald-Beck, International Committee of the Red Cross Customary International Humanitarian
Law (CIHL), (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (2005, reprint 2009), vol. I, rule 50, and the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) (1998), The Laws of Armed
Conflicts, page 1309, Article 8(2)(b)(xiii).
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5. There is an increasing legal debate as to whether intangible objects are to be
considered property. The Group of Experts did not reject the possibility that, for
example, data can qualify as “property” under LOAC. On the other hand, the
majority of the Group was of the opinion that intellectual property does not
qualify as “property” under LOAC.
6. Necessary destruction, damage or seizure of property may be connected to an
attack, but it may also result incidentally from sheer movements and
manoeuvers of armed forces. By way of example, buildings, roads, bridges,
fences and cultivated fields may be destroyed or damaged as a result of the
weight and speed of military vehicles (such as tanks).
7. Military necessity may require and thus justify the destruction, damage or
seizure of enemy property in the course of or in preparation for an attack
(as defined in LOAC) or other military operations.
8. Destruction, damage or seizure of enemy property may occur in a manner that is
incidental to movement and manoeuver of troops. Such destruction, damage or
seizure may be considered as an unavoidable consequence of warfare and is thus
justified on the basis of military necessary.
9. Military necessity must be assessed by the commander based on the facts
reasonably available to him/her under the circumstances prevailing at the time.
10. The present Rule applies without prejudice to rules governing special protection
from attack, such as the rules providing protection of cultural property (see
chapter “Section XV: Cultural Property”)2 and medical facilities.3
11. The present Rule is without prejudice to the rules governing destruction, seizure
and confiscation in the context of belligerent occupation.
12. In non-international armed conflict, the issue of what property is regarded as
enemy property is more complex than in international armed conflicts, inasmuch
as the State may seize, destroy or damage property under its jurisdiction in
conformity with its domestic law.
Rule 98
In an international armed conflict, any extensive destruction or seizure of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly constitutes a war crime.
2AP/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space” I, fn. 13, Article 53, Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1954), The Laws of Armed Conflicts, page
747, Article 4. Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (1999), The Laws of Armed Conflicts, page 1037, Article
6. See also Rule 98 and chapter “Section XIV: Humanitarian Assistance” of this Manual.
3AP/I, ibid, Article 12, and GC/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19, Article 19. AMW
Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, Section L. San Remo Manual, see chapter
“Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para 169–183.
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Commentary
1. The present Rule is based on the language of Article 147 of GC/IV, which of
course uses the language of “grave breach” of the Geneva Convention now
understood to mean war crime (cf. Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court).
2. The Rule is, in principle, applicable to all domains of warfare (air, sea, land, cyber
and outer space).4
3. For all practical purposes, wantonness is the opposite of necessity (see Rule 97).5
Wanton destruction is particularly egregious destruction of property that is not
motivated by lawful aims of warfare, but is random conduct or conduct motivated
by a desire to inflict destruction as an end in itself.6 In order to qualify as a war
crime the destruction or seizure of property must also be unlawful and extensive.
An example of such wanton destruction is the burning of Kuwaiti oil wells by the
retreating Iraqi forces in 1991 that was carried out without military necessity.
4. Destruction of property qualifying as a military objective is never considered
wanton. Destruction of enemy property justified by military necessity in accor-
dance with Rule 97 is never wanton.
5. The prohibition applies regardless of whether the property is State owned or
owned by private persons or legal entities.
6. Destruction of property is generally accompanied by the counterpart term, dam-
age (see Rule 97). The term damage does not appear in the present Rule because it
is not mentioned in the text of Article 147 of GC/IV.
7. The term seizure is used in this Rule as a corollary of Rule 97. It encapsulates the
notion of appropriation of property mentioned in Article 147 of GC/IV.
8. The present Rule is without prejudice to the rules governing destruction, seizure
and confiscation in the context of belligerent occupation.
Rule 99
(a) It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population for the specific
purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the civilian pop-
ulation or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, whether in order to
starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Articles 54(2) of AP/I and 14 of AP/II.
4See Rule 97 with regard to the scope of application.
5As already expressed in the Lieber Code.
6In re List and Others (Hostages Trial), United States Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in Annual
Digest and Reports of Public International Law Cases (1948), at page 647.
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2. Under AP/I, exceptions exist for this Rule, such as for objects used by an adverse
party “as sustenance solely for the members its armed forces” or “if not suste-
nance, then in direct support of military action”. However, actions against this
latter category of objects forfeiting protection may not be taken if they “may be
expected to leave the civilian population with such inadequate food or water as to
cause its starvation or force its movement”.
3. Customary international law prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of
warfare.
(b) In recognition of the vital requirements of any Party to the conflict in the
defence of its national territory against invasion, derogation from the
prohibition in subparagraph (a) may be made by a Party to the conflict
within such territory under its own control where required by impera-
tive military necessity.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 54(5) of AP/I.
2. The Rule applies to the defence of a Belligerent State’s own territory against an
invading enemy force. That is to say the tactics of “scorched earth” cannot be
used by the invading enemy, nor can such tactics be used by a State not taking
action in the defence of its own territory.
Rule 100
Rules 97 and 98 are without prejudice to specific rules on capture as booty of
war or as prize.
Commentary
1. Capture of property as booty of war or for prize is governed by specific rules.7
When capture or destruction is lawful according to these specific rules, the acts
are also ipso facto required by military necessity and will not amount to acts of
wantonness.
Rule 101
In a non-international armed conflict, destruction or seizure is not
prohibited when directed against items illegally appropriated or produced
(such as oil or opium) by non-State armed groups and used by them to
generate revenue for the purpose of continuing the hostilities.
7Capture of war booty is a recognized lawful practice in customary international law, see CIHL,
Rule 49, see fn. 1. Capture for prize at sea is dealt with in the San Remo Manual, see chapter
“Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 29, para 135–158, and in the AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I:
Outer Space”, fn. 1, Section U.
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Commentary
1. The Group of Experts was aware of the fact that this Rule is not accepted by all
States. However, the majority of the Group believed that there is sufficient
practice of States (as manifested in Syria since 2015) to substantiate the text.
2. Nevertheless, the majority of the Group of Experts could not agree on the
conceptual underpinning for this new Rule. Different views were put forward
with the view to providing a proper rationale.
3. One view, based on a wider—largely US—perception of LOAC, is that lawful
targets of attack (and a fortiori property that it is lawful to destroy or seize, see
paragraph 3 of the Commentary to Rule 97) include not only “war-fighting” or
“war-supporting” but also “war-sustaining” enemy objects that qualify as military
objectives.8
4. Another view, is that there is a sui generis rule relating to action against fleets of
oil-tanker trucks (irrespective of their destination).
5. A third view is that this is a land alternative to naval or aerial blockade.
Ordinarily, exports can be barred only through the imposition of a blockade.
Yet, blockade as a method of warfare is irrelevant to (i) land-locked enemy
countries in an international armed conflict, or (ii) any insurgent-held areas in a
non-international armed conflict (since the construct of neutrality is alien to
non-international armed conflicts). Absent the possibility of blockade, it has
been argued that enemy exports can be barred through attacks against truck
convoys.
6. Finally, there was a minority of the Group of Experts that acknowledged that the
conduct described in this Rule would not qualify as a war crime, but that took the
view that it would still be in violation of the law of non-international armed
conflict.
7. In any event, destruction and seizure of items that are illegally (according to
domestic law) appropriated or produced by non-State actors, is lawful according
to the domestic law of most States.
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8See US DoD Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, at page 237–238.
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Section XII: Surrender
Rule 102
Enemy military personnel and civilians who have been directly participating
in hostilities who manifest the intent to surrender and who comply with the
additional requirements of Rules 103 and 104 are hors de combat and may
not be denied quarter.
Commentary
1. “Manifest” means to express or demonstrate clearly.
2. The Rule applies to combatants and civilians participating directly in hostilities.
The norm may also apply to other persons who are eligible for POW status.1 On
persons eligible for POW status, see Rule 105.
3. Enemy personnel may offer to surrender themselves (and the military equipment
under their control) to a Belligerent State. The obligation to accept valid offers to
surrender is a LOAC rule that does not preclude a Belligerent State from
prohibiting surrender by its own personnel within its own national jurisdiction.
Domestic law, however, does not alter the LOAC obligation to accept such
surrender, and the fact that a surrender was offered in violation of domestic law
does not invalidate the surrender under international law.
4. The prohibition against denying quarter to those manifesting the intent to
surrender is based on Article 23 (d) of the 1907 Hague Regulations2 and on
1GC/III, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19, Article 4.
21907 Hague Regulations, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 23: “In addition to
the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is especially forbidden: . . . (d) to declare that
no quarter will be given.”
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Article 40 of AP/I.3 To deny quarter to an enemy means to refuse to accept an
offer to surrender.
5. The requirement to accept surrender applies whether or not the person
surrendering is able to fight.
6. Persons who resist in any way or otherwise continue to pose a threat to the enemy
cannot be regarded as having surrendered.
7. It is unlawful to kill or injure persons who have surrendered regardless of whether
or not they have combatant status.
8. If an individual soldier manifests the intent to surrender while his/her comrades
continue to fight, difficult situations may arise. The following considerations
should be borne in mind:
a. During an engagement, it may be impossible to distinguish between the
individual who has attempted to offer his or her surrender and his/her com-
rades who continue the fight; and
b. The soldier purporting to surrender may be conspiring with his/her comrades,
acting perfidiously in order to lure the enemy into a trap. See Rule 104 and the
important conditions set out in Rule 103.
9. In a non-international armed conflict, any persons—including members of armed
forces and of non-state armed groups—may give themselves up for capture and
thereby receive the protection specified in Rule 106.
Rule 103
In order to be valid, surrender must meet the following conditions:
(a) The offer to surrender is communicated in a clear manner to the enemy.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 41(2) of AP/I and Article 23(c) of the 1907 Hague
Regulations, which has customary law status.
2. If the forces of a Belligerent State are unaware of the intent to surrender, they
cannot be expected to desist from further attacks.
3. If a person makes an attempt to communicate an intent to surrender in a manner
that is not clear, the condition is not met. However, if circumstances permit, the
enemy should make reasonable efforts to seek clarification.
4. Surrender must be distinguished from retreat. The mere fact that retreating
personnel have disposed of their weapons, ought not to be confused with the
concept of laying down of arms referred to in Common Article 3 of GC I-IV,
which manifests an intent to surrender.
5. In land warfare, traditional ways of communicating intent to surrender are to
lay down one’s weapons and to raise one’s arms. The display of a white flag,4
3AP/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 40: “It is prohibited to order that there
shall be no survivors, to threaten an adversary therewith or to conduct hostilities on this basis.”
41907 Hague Regulations, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 32.
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which once meant only a request to parley, is today also used as a means of
communicating an intention to surrender.
6. In naval warfare, the traditional signal of surrender is to strike the flag.
7. Unlike land warfare, the practice of air warfare does not reveal any commonly
accepted indication of an aircrew’s wish to surrender.5
8. Rule 103 (a) applies mutatis mutandis to capture in non-international armed
conflict (see paragraph 9 of the Commentary to Rule 102).
9. It must be borne in mind that in an international armed conflict waged between
two or more adverse parties that do not share a common language, linguistic
problems may arise in the communication of an intent to surrender. Every effort
must be made to surmount such difficulties.
(b) The offer to surrender is genuine.
Commentary
1. For further discussion, see Commentary to Rule 104.
2. In air warfare, aircrews or aircraft operators—as with persons in land or naval
warfare—must assess in good faith whether persons are offering a genuine
surrender based on the information that is available to them at the time. There
is no obligation to presume that a person is hors de combat if there is doubt as to
the genuineness of a surrender.
3. The obligation to manifest the intention to surrender lies with the individual who
offers to surrender. Thus, the offer to surrender must be communicated under
circumstances where it can be properly received and understood by the enemy
forces.
4. Whether an offer to surrender must be regarded as genuine relies on a balancing
of several factors, including:
a. Time available for deliberation and for consideration of ambiguous offers of
surrender.
b. Risk to the attacking party.
c. Cultural mores of the enemy forces with respect to surrender.
d. Prior history with respect to the conduct of the enemy forces in similar
situations.
e. Enemy history of compliance with LOAC, including with respect to perfidy.
f. Other considerations that may bear on the genuineness of the offer.
5. If there is indeed a genuine offer to surrender and other requirements set out in the
present Section are met, the surrendering person is protected from attack for as
long as he or she remains in the power of the capturing party. For comments on
the duty to release captured enemy combatants, see Rule 105(a).
5AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, Comment 2 on Rule 128.
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6. A previous reneging on an offer to surrender or the resumption of hostile acts
subsequent to an offer to surrender can constitute prima facie evidence that the
offer is not genuine.
7. Rule 103(b) applies mutatis mutandis to capture in non-international armed
conflict.
(c) The offer to surrender must be unconditional
Commentary
1. This requirement is reflected in Article 23(c) of the 1907 Hague Regulations,
which provides the surrender must be “at discretion”.
2. The expression, “at discretion” implies that if the person offering to surrender
poses certain conditions, and these conditions are accepted, then (and only then)
the surrendering individual becomes hors de combat.6
(d) Those offering to surrender have laid down their arms and do not engage
in any further hostile acts.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 41(2) of AP/I.
2. A person engaging in hostile acts cannot be regarded as having laid down
his/her arms.
3. Hostile acts may include acts like transmitting intelligence to the enemy. Such
acts are not compatible with surrender.
4. Killing or injuring an adversary while feigning surrender amounts to the war
crime of perfidy.7 For States Parties to AP/I the same applies to capturing an
enemy while feigning surrender.
5. Rule 103 (c) applies mutatis mutandis to capture in non-international armed
conflict (see paragraph 9 of the Commentary to Rule 102).
(e) No attempt is made to evade capture.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Article 41(2) of AP/I.
2. A person who tries to evade capture has not laid down his/her arms in the legal
sense, and is not hors de combat. He/she can therefore be attacked.
3. An individual on the ground or at sea who surrenders to an aircraft must stay
visible to the aircraft and obey any instructions given until he/she can be taken
into custody by any aircraft, vessel or ground forces called to the scene by the
capturing aircraft. For situations where capture is under no circumstances feasi-
ble, see Rule 104.
6DoD Law of War Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, 5.9.2.3.
7AP/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 37.
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4. Rule 103 (d) applies mutatis mutandis to capture in non-international armed
conflict (see paragraph 9 of the Commentary to Rule 102).
(f) Those who offer to surrender strictly comply with instructions from the
adversary.
Commentary
1. See paragraph 3 of the Commentary to Rule 103(e).
2. The obligation to comply strictly with instructions issued by the adversary also
applies to ground forces wishing to surrender to an aircraft. See further the
Commentary to Rule 104.
3. Rule 103 (e) applies mutatis mutandis to capture in non-international armed
conflict (see paragraph 9 of the Commentary to Rule 102).
Rule 104
An offer to surrender may not be genuine if manifested in circumstances in
which it is not feasible for the opposing party to accept the surrender.
Accordingly, the offer of surrender by ground forces to an aircraft may be
invalid if taking the forces into custody is not feasible in the prevailing
circumstances.
Commentary
1. This issue was subject to lengthy discussions among the Group of Experts.
2. Two scenarios may illustrate the problem:
a. A military aircraft flying over enemy positions behind enemy lines discovers
an enemy tank and observes that its crew has raised their hands. There are two
issues here: (i) whether the conditions laid down in Article 103(a) through
(e) appear to have been fulfilled and (ii) whether capture can be effected under
Rule 104.
b. For example, if a small unit the size of a patrol operating in contested territory
encounters an enemy infantry battalion offering to surrender, capture may not
be possible. This example must, however, be understood without prejudice to
Article 41(3) of AP/I and the duty to release combatants who have fallen into
the power of the enemy under unusual circumstances that prevent their
evacuation.8 See also Rule 105(a).
3. Surrender by ground forces to aircraft raises problems of factual impracticability
in the taking of such persons into custody. Different views were expressed
8AP/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 41(3): “When persons entitled to
protection as prisoners of war have fallen into the power of an adverse Party under unusual
conditions of combat which prevent their evacuation as provided for in Part III, Section 1, of the
Third Convention, they shall be released and all feasible precautions shall be taken to ensure their
safety.” The customary status of this rule is confirmed by several military manuals, including theUS
DoD Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, para 9.9.3.
Section XII: Surrender 103
among the Group of Experts. According to some of the Experts, the possibility
of the taking of such persons into custody is irrelevant to the genuineness
of the offer to surrender. Another view would preclude ground forces from
gaining hors de combat status vis-a-vis an aircraft because an offer to surrender
cannot be genuine when it is factually impossible for the opposing party to
accept. According to an intermediate view, the validity of the offer by
forces surrendering to an aircraft has to be determined on a case-by- case
basis (e.g.,when there is an effective possibility of capture owing to the proximity
to the contact zone).
4. The conditions laid down in Rule 103(a)-(e) require mutually understood com-
munication between those surrendering and the capturing personnel. See, in
particular, paragraph 3 of the Commentary to Rule 103(b).
5. The crews of military aircraft are duty bound to accept genuine offers of surren-
der, but an offer is genuine only if made in circumstances in which it is feasible
for the adversary to accept it. In practice, much depends upon the time available
for deliberation and the level of risk to the attacking party.
Rule 105
(a) Unless released, captured persons who are entitled to Prisoner of War
status must be transported, as soon as it is practicable, to a Prisoner of
War Camp.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Articles 19 ff of GC/III which expresses customary LOAC.
2. Captured enemy personnel must be evacuated as soon as possible to camps
situated far enough from the combat zone to be “out of danger”. The notion of
“out of danger”must be understood according to the circumstances. For example,
the phrase has been understood to mean that the camp should be out of range of
enemy artillery.
3. The duty to transport to a Prisoner of War Camp applies to all those entitled to
POW status who are not released, repatriated or hospitalized prior to the time of
internment. When circumstances do not permit the legally required evacuation
due to “unusual conditions of combat”, those who are Party to AP/I must release
enemy personnel in accordance with Article 41(3) of AP/I.9
4. Captured personnel who are not entitled to POW status may be interned in a camp
other than a Prisoner of War Camp. However, the fundamental guarantees
enumerated in Article 75 of AP/I must be observed. See also Rule 106 with
regard to non-international armed conflicts.
5. POWs who are accused and convicted of crimes in accordance with applicable
domestic or international law (see chapter “Section XVII: International Criminal
9See fn. 170.
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Law”) may, instead of being interned in a POW camp, serve sentences of punitive
confinement under the same conditions as those applying to members of the
armed forces of the Detaining Power.
(b) Captured enemy combatants may be detained temporarily in a forward
transit, screening or detention facility, or a field hospital.
Commentary
1. Article 19 of GC/III allows for temporary internment in a danger zone owing to
the prevailing circumstances.
Rule 106
In non-international armed conflicts, the legal status of Prisoner of War does
not apply, but all captured persons must at all times be treated humanely in
conformity with applicable international standards, regardless of whether
the captured persons are subjected to criminal prosecution.
Commentary
1. Common Article 3 of the GC I-IV provides minimum safeguards standards for
persons who have been deprived of their liberty. Those guarantees are reflective
of customary LOAC. See also Article 5 of AP/II.
2. As a minimum, all persons deprived of their liberty in a NIAC must be:
a. Treated humanely without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour,
religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria;
b. Protected against violence to life and person, torture, or cruel, humiliating and
degrading treatment; and
c. Afforded the judicial guarantees recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples, if subject to criminal proceedings. In this regard, see chapter “Section
XVII: International Criminal Law”.
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Section XIII: Search and Rescue
Rule 107
For the purposes of this Manual, “Shipwrecked” means persons, whether
military or civilian, who are in peril at sea or in other waters during an
armed conflict as a result of misfortune affecting them or the vessel, aircraft,
or spacecraft carrying them.
Commentary
1. This definition draws from Article 12 of GC/II and Article 8(b) of AP/I but
clarifies that spacecraft can also yield a shipwreck situation. It must be taken into
account that the AP/I definition (which includes all civilians and all types of
waters) is not binding on non-contracting Parties. Moreover, there is not yet
enough State practice related to the status of former occupants of spacecraft.
2. Although the crews of neutral aircraft or ships are not included in the list of
protected persons under Article 13 of the GC/II, the Group of Experts agreed that
the term shipwrecked also applies to them. This is true, in particular, if their
vessel, aircraft or spacecraft has been attacked.
3. An individual who is without vessel, aircraft, or spacecraft at sea or other waters
should be presumed to be at peril unless there is contrary information indicating
the individual is at sea or other waters by choice. For example, an individual who
chooses to swim into the water to avoid a land-based attack is not hors de combat
due to shipwreck. Neither are the members of a water-borne combat unit who
have entered the water voluntarily.
4. “Shipwrecked” are military or civilian persons in a perilous situation at sea or on
any other waters following a misfortune and who refrain from all acts of hostility.
See Rule 108.
5. Under Article 8(b) of AP/I the concept is expanded to include persons, who are
in peril at sea or in other waters (e.g. lakes). The term “shipwreck” means
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shipwreck from any cause and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft
(first paragraph of Article 12 of GC/II).
6. There is no evidence in general State practice to the effect that persons can reach a
coast and nevertheless remain “shipwrecked” although such position has been
taken by some.
Rule 108
Shipwrecked and other persons hors de combat are protected from attack,
provided that they abstain from any hostile act and no attempt is made to
evade capture or escape.
Commentary
1. This Rule is derived from Article 41 of AP/I. See also Article 23(c) of the 1907
Hague Regulations and Article 3 of GC/II.
2. For this context, there are two categories of persons hors de combat:
a. Those who have clearly expressed an intention to surrender; and
b. Those who are incapacitated. This latter category falls into three subsets: sick;
wounded; and shipwrecked.
Upon due consideration, the majority of the Group of Experts decided not to
retain the separate category of Article 41(a) of AP/I, i.e. persons “in the power
of an adverse Party”, in view of the fact that such category is irrelevant for the
purpose of the present Section.
3. Note that clearly expressing an intention to surrender indicates more than mere
desire to do so. See chapter “Section XII: Surrender”.
4. Although, as a term of art, the expression “hors de combat” is reserved for
combatants, for the purposes of this Rule the concept covers incapacitation of
both combatants and civilians who have directly participated in hostilities since
the latter will, by definition, no longer be participating in hostilities when hors de
combat.
5. The presumption of hors de combat status for an individual at sea or other waters
during an armed conflict is rebutted if he or she commits a hostile act, or attempts
to escape or evade capture.
6. The status of hors de combat, including that of “shipwrecked”, applies both in
international and in non-international armed conflict.
7. Although Article 41(2) of AP/I conditions hors de combat status on the absence
of an “attempt to escape” the Group of Experts decided that in case of shipwreck
the condition must be extended so that no attempt to evade capture is made.
Rule 109
(a) Persons parachuting from an aircraft in distress may not be made the
object of attack during their descent unless they engage in hostile acts.
(b) Upon reaching the ground in territory controlled by the adverse party
the parachutists from an aircraft in distress shall be given an opportunity
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to surrender, unless it is apparent that they are engaging in a hostile act
or attempting to evade capture.
(c) Airborne troops are not protected by this Rule.
Commentary
1. This provision is based on Article 42 of AP/I.
2. Although not expressly referred to by AP/I as hors de combat, parachutists from
aircraft in distress may be assimilated to that status during their descent, unless
they engage in hostile acts.
3. The assumption is that upon landing in a territory controlled by the enemy the
parachutist from the aircraft in distress will surrender. The enemy must provide
him/her with an opportunity to do so.
Rule 110
A person who is hors de combat remains as such until the circumstances that
gave rise to that status are altered.
Commentary
1. Whether an individual is hors de combat depends on facts and is based on the
circumstances ruling at the time.
2. An individual can be hors de combat for a particular reason, may thereafter lose
that status as a result of a change in the circumstances that rendered him/her hors
de combat, but may then become hors de combat for another reason. For
example, a shipwrecked individual may be rescued—in which case he/she is no
longer hors de combat by reason of shipwreck—but may also be wounded thus
acquiring the status of hors de combat due to injury.
3. An individual who is hors de combat is not a lawful target, regardless of the
reason why he or she is hors de combat.
4. It goes without saying that anyone who engages in hostile acts can no longer be
protected as hors de combat.
Rule 111
(a) A shipwrecked combatant remains hors de combat during rescue
provided he or she refrains from all acts of hostility.
Commentary
1. If someone is hors de combat due to shipwreck, he/she will be considered
hors de combat due to shipwreck throughout a rescue.
2. This Rule is consistent with the definition of “shipwrecked” found in Rule 107.
(b) “During rescue” means the time during which a shipwrecked individual
is in the process of being rescued from sea or other waters. This includes
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the time during which the person is being assisted onto land, or into an
aircraft, a vessel or another conveyance.
Commentary
1. This Rule is consistent with the definition of “shipwrecked” found in Rule
107 and Article 8 (b) of AP/I. It is designed to clarify that point during a rescue
operation at which a shipwrecked individual might regain combatant status. See
also, Rule 112 and its Commentary.
Rule 112
A combatant or other person, after being rescued and transported onto land,
or into an aircraft, a vessel or another conveyance capable of transportation
to a safe location, is no longer hors de combat by reason of being
shipwrecked.
Commentary
1. The precise moment when a rescue concludes, thus terminating an individual’s
hors de combat status by reason of shipwreck, depends on the circumstances.
Generally, it includes the time during which the individual is being lifted into a
helicopter or a vessel designed for normal conveyance of personnel.
2. The requirement that the ultimate conveyance that triggers the termination of hors
de combat status be “capable of transportation to a safe location” is meant to
exclude life boats and other vessels designed to preserve life but not provide
transportation to safety. The conveyance need not be designed specifically to
carry passengers, such as a ferry, but it has to be seaworthy or otherwise capable
of transport in the conditions prevailing at the time.
3. By way of example, shipwrecked individuals are hors de combat while
being lifted into a rescuing helicopter but are no longer hors de combat upon
reaching the helicopter. Conversely, shipwrecked individuals being lifted into
an emergency life boat remain hors de combat until ultimately rescued from
the lifeboat and moved onto a conveyance capable of carrying them to land
or otherwise removing them from peril.
4. Once a rescue is complete, the individuals are no longer hors de combat due
to shipwreck. However, they may become hors de combat for another reason.
See Commentary to Rule 110.
Rule 113
The conduct of search and rescue operations does not cause military aircraft,
vessels or other conveyances, or military personnel conducting the opera-
tions, to be protected from attack, regardless of whether the person being
rescued is civilian or military.
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Commentary
1. The status of military personnel and of military conveyances as lawful
targets does not change due to the mere fact that they are engaged in search and
rescue operations, whether for the benefit of either combatant or civilian
shipwrecked.
2. Even if the persons who are the object of rescue are hors de combat by reason of
shipwreck, their protected status does not (i) extend to the military personnel or
the military conveyances searching for or rescuing them; or (ii) endure after they
have been lifted to the aircraft or vessel and are no longer in water.
3. A separate issue arises with regard to persons who remain hors de combat due to
being wounded. Regardless of whether they continue to be protected after having
been lifted to an aircraft or vessel, the status of the vehicle as a lawful target
remains unchanged. Whether an attack on the vehicle is consistent with LOAC is
subject to proportionality and precautions in attack, if the persons rescued are
civilians.
Rule 114
(a) “Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) operations” enjoy no protection
from attack.
(b) “CSAR operations” means the rescue, or attempted rescue, of combat-
ants in distress, whether at sea, on land, or in Outer Space, when the
rescue or attempted rescue occurs during an armed conflict and is
carried out by combatants.
Commentary
1. If a search-and-rescue operation is conducted during armed conflict by military
personnel or conveyances, for the benefit of combatants in distress, then it is a
combat search-and-rescue operation (CSAR). Such an operation enjoys no pro-
tection from attack. Similarly, if the rescued persons were civilians in distress, the
rescuers and the operation itself would not enjoy protection even if the
shipwrecked persons being rescued would.
2. See Commentary to Rule 113 regarding the propriety of including wounded
individuals in proportionality analyses.
Rule 115
(a) Medical aircraft lose their specially protected status if they engage in
conduct inconsistent with the requirements of that status.
(b) Such inconsistent activities include CSAR operations.
Commentary
1. Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed for the removal
of wounded and sick and for the transport of medical personnel and
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equipment,1 enjoy specially protected status within the scope of Articles
36 and 37 of GC/I, Articles 25–31 of AP/I and customary LOAC.
2. Under GC/I, the specially protected status of medical aircraft is dependent on the
location of the medical aircraft and on, when so required, a prior agreement
between the parties to the conflict.2
3. Even if there is a valid reason for discontinuing the specific protection of medical
units or medical transports, a warning must be issued first.3 The warning may take
various forms. In many instances, it can simply consist of an order to cease the
harmful act within a specified period. The time-limit must be reasonable in order
to give an opportunity for the unlawful acts to be stopped or to allow removal to a
place of safety of the wounded and sick within the medical units or medical
transports, prior to any attack. In some cases, it may be reasonable to insist on
immediate compliance with a warning. However, even in these cases, the princi-
ple of proportionality and the requirement to take feasible precautions in attack
apply. Medical aircraft do not become lawful targets unless the warning remains
unheeded.4
4. Paragraph 3 of this commentary is without prejudice to the exceptional circum-
stance of a medical aircraft engaging in attack, in which case a warning may
become redundant when self-defence measures are resorted to.
5. In the absence of a specific agreement between parties to an armed conflict,
medical aircraft should refrain from conducting search-and-rescue operations
because it may lead to the conclusion that they are engaging in combat operations.
For that reason, this Rule clarifies that if these medical aircraft engage in search-
and-rescue operations they lose their protection. However, this Rule notes the
requirement that any attacker give the medical aircraft a warning and a reasonable
time-limit to heed that warning.
Rule 116
Hospital ships and coastal rescue craft lose their specially protected status if
they engage in conduct inconsistent with the conditions of their protection
and if the requirements of the law of naval warfare are met.
Commentary
1. Hospital ships, that is to say, ships built or equipped specially and solely with
a view to assisting the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, to treating them and
to transporting them,5 and coastal rescue craft, i.e. craft employed by the State or
1GC/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19, Article 36.
2AP/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Articles 25–27. AMW Manual, see chapter
“Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, Rules 77 and 78.
3AMW Manual, ibid, Rule 38.
4GC/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19, Article 21.
5GC/II, ibid, Article 22.
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by the officially recognized lifeboat institutions for coastal rescue operations,6
enjoy special protection in accordance with Article 34 of GC/II and Article 22 of
AP/I. This means that hospital ships as well as coastal rescue craft may be neither
attacked nor captured.
2. Non-compliance with the conditions of their protection as laid down in Article
30 of the GC/II will usually render hospital ships and coastal rescue craft liable to
capture. However, if they commit “acts harmful to the enemy” they will become
liable to attack subject to the requirements set out in paragraph 3.
3. Hospital ships and coastal rescue craft committing acts harmful to the enemy may
be made the object of an attack only after a due warning has been given, naming
in all appropriate cases a time limit, and after such warning has remained
unheeded.7 Acts not amounting to acts harmful to the enemy are listed in Article
35 of GC/II. However, in so far as the use of secret codes for communications
systems is concerned, see the position taken in the San Remo Manual paragraph
171 as to subsequent practice.8 The text of GCII, which governs the use of
hospital ships, does not make it clear whether such a vessel can itself indulge in
rescue operations or, alternatively, it merely transports and treats those rescued by
other craft.
4. It is important to note that hospital ships are entitled to additional protections
under LOAC that are not accorded to coastal rescue craft. This is illustrated in
Article 27 of GC/II, which states that “[u]nder the same conditions as those
provided for in Articles 22 and 24 [referring to hospital ships], small craft
employed by the State or by the officially recognized lifeboat institutions for
coastal rescue operations, shall also be respected and protected, so far as opera-
tional requirements permit.”
5. The San Remo Manual’s assessment of customary international law, besides
confirming in Rule 49 that hospital ships must be warned that their exemption
from attack is endangered and cannot be targeted unless they do not heed the
warning, specifically states that hospital ships can be targeted only “as a last
resort.”9 The San Remo Manual does not articulate a requirement that coastal
rescue craft be given a warning or that they be attacked only “as a last resort.”10
Rule 117
Non-military aircraft other than medical aircraft, and non-naval vessels
other than hospital ships and coastal rescue craft, which are engaged in
search and rescue operations, may not be attacked unless they:
6GC/II, ibid, Article 27.
7GC/II, ibid, Article 34.
8See as well US DoD Manual, chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, para 7.12.2.7.
9San Remo Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, para 51.
10San Remo Manual, ibid, para 52.
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(a) Assist a rescued enemy combatant, or other person liable to capture, to
escape or evade capture;
Commentary
1. Civilians engaged in efforts to return combatants to the battlefield are directly
participating in hostilities (see chapter “Section VII: Civilians Directly Partici-
pating in Hostilities”) and thus no longer protected against attack.
(b) Refuse a demand to surrender an enemy rescued combatant; or
Commentary
1. A refusal to surrender an enemy rescued combatant may also amount to direct
participation in hostilities.
(c) Otherwise make an effective contribution to the enemy’s military action.
Commentary
1. The Rule in (c) serves as a reminder that objects may become lawful targets by
conduct not covered in (a) or (b), such as the transmission of military intelligence
to the enemy.
Rule 118
The Rules of this Section are without prejudice to the right of the parties to
the conflict to enter into agreements on the protection of aircraft, vessels or
other vehicles employed for search and rescue.
Commentary
1. This Rule reflects the principle that parties to the conflict may always agree on the
creation of additional protections that are not required by LOAC, and that search
and rescue operations represent an understandable area for such additional
protections.11
11See for example, AP/I, chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 26 (1) and 27 and 28 (4).
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Section XIV: Humanitarian Assistance
Rule 119
(a) If the civilian population in occupied territory is not adequately provided
with food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter or other
supplies or care essential to its survival, the Occupying Power must
undertake, facilitate, or allow relief consignments, which are humanitar-
ian and impartial in character, and conducted without adverse
distinction.
(b) If the Occupying Power does not provide the civilian population in the
occupied territory with adequate humanitarian relief as provided for in
(a), it must consent to humanitarian relief consignments by other States
or impartial international humanitarian organizations as described in
Rules 120 and 121.
Commentary
1. “Humanitarian aid” or “humanitarian relief” is not defined by treaty LOAC,1 but
GC/I-IV and AP/I provide the key elements thereof: “medical and hospital
stores”, “essential foodstuffs, clothing and tonics intended for children under
fifteen, expectant mothers and maternity cases”,2 “other articles if the resources of
the occupied territory are inadequate”,3 “clothing”4 and “bedding, means of
shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population”.5
1For the purposes of this Manual the expressions “humanitarian aid”, “humanitarian assistance” and
‘humanitarian relief’ are synonymous.
2GC/IV, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19, Article 23.
3GC/IV, ibid, Article 55.
4GC/IV, ibid, Article 59.
5AP/ I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 69 (1).
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2. The obligation to take care of the needs of the civilian population is most clearly
regulated with regard to occupied territories: the Occupying Power has the duty of
“ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population”—to the fullest extent
of the means available to it—and it is obliged to, in particular, “provide necessary
foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied
territory are inadequate”.6
3. In case the needs of the “whole or part” of the civilian population cannot be met
by the Occupying Power, the latter shall agree to humanitarian relief consign-
ments for the benefit of the said population, which may be undertaken either by
States or impartial humanitarian organizations, and shall facilitate them “by all
the means at its disposal”.7
4. In a situation of occupation, the Occupying Power may verify that the relief
consignments are purely humanitarian in their nature (see Commentary to Rule
125(a)), a process that may take some time, but it cannot withhold consent
indefinitely.
Rule 120
(a) If the civilian population of any territory under the control of a party to
the conflict, other than occupied territory, is not adequately provided
with food, medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter or other
supplies or care essential to its survival, relief consignments, which are
humanitarian and impartial in character and conducted without adverse
distinction, must be undertaken and facilitated.
(b) Where humanitarian relief consignments are offered by other States or
impartial international humanitarian organizations, this can be under-
taken only subject to the consent of the territorial State.
(c) Such consent cannot be withheld arbitrarily.
Commentary
1. This Rule deals with international armed conflicts in situations that do not
entail belligerent occupation. As for non-international armed conflicts, see
Rule 129.
2. It is primarily a responsibility for each State to take care of the humanitarian needs
of the civilian population within its territory. Hence, the territorial State has the
primary role in the initiation, organization, coordination, and implementation of
humanitarian assistance within its territory.8
6GC/IV, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19, Article 55.
7GC/IV, ibid, art. 59.
8See UN GA Res 46/82 (1991), Annex, paragraph 4.
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3. With regard to international armed conflicts, the current status of the law is that
consent of the controlling State is required. This follows explicitly from Article
70(1) of AP/I.9
4. It is generally agreed, however, that consent cannot be withheld arbitrarily.10
Rule 121
Withholding of consent can be arbitrary if it is not compatible, inter alia,
with other obligations under applicable principles and rules of LOAC, or if it
is unreasonable given the needs of the civilian population in the prevailing
circumstances.
Commentary
1. The phrase “applicable principles and rules of LOAC” is explained in paragraph
5 of the Commentary to Rule 2.
2. With regard to the notion of “arbitrarily”, justification for the denial of an offer of
humanitarian assistance is crucial. Withholding consent to external assistance is
not arbitrary where:
a. A State is capable of providing, and willing to provide, an adequate and
effective humanitarian assistance on the basis of its own resources;
b. An affected State has accepted appropriate and sufficient assistance from
elsewhere; or
c. The relevant offer is not extended in accordance with the principles of neu-
trality, impartiality, and non-discrimination, as laid down in Rule 127. Con-
versely, where an offer of assistance is made in accordance with the foregoing
and no alternate sources of humanitarian assistance are available, there would
be a strong inference that a decision to withhold consent is arbitrary.11
Rule 122
Consent is not required if the Security Council has made use of its powers
under the Charter of the United Nations to authorize in a binding manner
relief actions for the civilian population in any situation of armed conflict.
9AP/ I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 70 (1); “Parties” in plural, since the
consignments may travel through several countries.
10See the position in the US DoD Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 4, para
17.8.1: “States may withhold consent for, inter alia, legitimate military reasons, but should not
arbitrarily withhold consent”.
11Report ILC, 66th Session, No. A/69/10 (UN, New York, 2014), Chapter V.
Section XIV: Humanitarian Assistance 119
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on the powers vested in the Security Council by Chapter VII of
the Charter of the United Nations to authorize measures binding upon States.
2. Refusal to abide by a binding decision of the Security Council is, by definition,
arbitrary as well as unlawful under Article 25 of the Charter of the United
Nations.
Rule 123
Offers to provide humanitarian relief consignments to the civilian popula-
tion of another State shall not be regarded as:
(a) Interference in the armed conflict;
(b) An unfriendly act; or
(c) An interference in the domestic affairs of the State concerned.
Commentary
1. Subparagraphs (a) and (b) are derived from AP/I 70 (1).
2. This Rule is embedded in the judgement of the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case.
3. As clarified by the court in the Nicaragua Case, this Rule is confined to the
“provision of food, clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance, and it
does not include the provision of weapons, weapons systems, ammunition, or
other equipment, vehicles, or material which can be used to inflict serious bodily
harm or death”. This requirement reflects the prohibition against intervening in
matters that are essentially internal to the State concerned. In this regard the ICJ
stated that “there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to
persons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or
objectives, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way
contrary to international law”.12
Rule 124
Humanitarian relief consignments may be provided in accordance with Rule
119 and 120 either by States or by impartial humanitarian organizations,
such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
Commentary
1. There are no formal requirements as to who may seek to provide humanitarian
relief consignments subject to the conditions set out in Rule 125.
2. The International Committee of the Red Cross is the paradigmatic example of an
impartial humanitarian organization, but of course it is not the only one.
12ICJ, Nicaragua v. United States of America, see chapter “Section X: Civil Aviation and Civilian
Airliners”, fn. 3, paragraphs 242 and 97.
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Rule 125
(a) States should allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of
humanitarian relief consignments, equipment and personnel in accor-
dance with Rules 119 and 120, subject to technical arrangements.
Commentary
1. This Rule deals in a combined manner with occupied and non-occupied territory.
However, it must be underscored that in occupied territory, the obligation borne
by the Occupying Power (under Rule 119) is unqualified.13
2. Although the distribution of humanitarian relief consignments must not be
arbitrarily impeded, it may be subjected to technical arrangements.
3. Obviously, compliance with technical arrangements may be time consuming.
However, it must not become an excuse for an arbitrary withholding of consent to
humanitarian relief action.
(b) Technical arrangements may derive from operational exigencies and
may include matters such as:
i. Verification that the relief supplies do not contain weapons, muni-
tions, military equipment or other supplies reasonably expected to be
used for military purposes;
ii. Regulation of the relief consignment in order to prescribe times and
routes in such a way as to avoid hampering military operations and to
conform to the maximum extent with security requirements;
iii. Establishment of air corridors for the transit of relief air transports;
or
iv. Organisation of air drops or landings.
Commentary
1. The mentioned list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
(c) Technical arrangements under sub-paragraph (b) must in no case be
misused in order to make the provision of relief consignments inopera-
tive or to delay the forwarding of relief unduly.
Rule 126
(a) Personnel of impartial humanitarian relief organizations, acting within
their mandates, must be respected and protected and must not be made the
object of attack or of any action that arbitrarily prevents them from
discharging their mandate. The protection extends to their humanitarian
transports, installations, goods and activities.
13See 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19.
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(b) Only in the case of imperative military necessity may the activities of
personnel of impartial humanitarian relief organizations be limited or their
movements temporarily restricted.
Commentary
1. Paragraph (a) of this Rule is based on Article 71(2) of AP/I and customary LOAC,
as expressed in Article 8(2)(b)(iii) and Article 8(2)(e)(iii) of the Rome Statute.14
Paragraph (b) of this Rule is based on Article 71(3) of AP/I.
2. Although AP/I provides that the protection of humanitarian relief personnel
applies only to “approved”, i.e. authorized, humanitarian personnel as such, the
overwhelming majority of practice does not specify this condition.15 The notion
of authorization refers to the consent received from the party to the conflict
concerned to work in areas under its control.16 However, as Article 71(3) pro-
vides, “Each Party in receipt of relief consignments shall, to the fullest extent
practicable, assist the relief personnel referred to in paragraph 1 in carrying out
their relief mission. Only in case of imperative military necessity may the
activities of the relief personnel be limited or their movements temporarily
restricted.”
3. United Nations personnel delivering humanitarian aid enjoy specific protection
under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel,
as their safety and security shall be ensured and they shall not be made the object
of attack or of any action that prevents them from discharging their mandate.17
4. The word “respect” means “to spare, not to attack”, while “protect” means “to
come to someone's defence, to lend help and support.”18 Thus, it is prohibited to
attack, to kill, to maltreat or injure humanitarian relief personnel in any way, and
there is also an obligation to come to their rescue.
5. The obligation to respect and protect relief personnel applies to all the parties
to the conflict, which should instruct their armed forces not to attack such
personnel.
14See as well AMW Manual, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 1, at page 36 ff. and UN
Security Council resolutions 2175 (2014) and 2286 (2016)
15TheUS DoD Law of War Manual, see chapter “Section II: Cyber Operations”, fn. 2, at page 1035,
does not specifically require the humanitarian personnel to be approved or authorized, but notes that
the safety of humanitarian personnel is a legitimate consideration for a Government in consenting to
their operations.
16AP/I, see chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 71(1), and CIHL, see chapter “Section
XI: Destruction of Property”, fn. 1, Rule 31.
17Convention on the Safety of UN and Associated Personnel (1994), UNTS, vol. 2051, page
363, Article 7.
18AP/Commentary, see chapter “Section VIII: Civilians Participating in Unmanned Operations”,
fn. 1, to Article 10, para 446.
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Rule 127
Humanitarian relief personnel, transports, installations, goods and activities
may lose special protection if the relief actions are not:
Commentary
1. Non-compliance with the conditions listed in subparagraph (a) through (d) may
deprive the humanitarian personnel and objects of their special protections but
does not affect their civilian protection unless the personnel are directly partici-
pating in hostilities or, in the case of objects, they are effectively contributing to
the enemy’s military action.
(a) Exclusively humanitarian and impartial in character;
Commentary
1. See Rule 119 (a).
(b) Conducted without any adverse distinction;
Commentary
1. LOAC requires non-discrimination in its application and prohibits adverse dis-
crimination based on sex, race, nationality, religion, political opinions or any
other similar criteria.
2. The prohibition of adverse distinction does not imply that special treatment of
persons with particular needs would be prohibited.19
3. It would not be arbitrary for a State to refuse to give consent to a provision of
humanitarian assistance that would be based on the making of an adverse
distinction among the recipients of that assistance.
(c) Executed in accordance with the terms of their mission; or
Commentary
1. The mission refers to the agreement concluded between the organisation or
neutral State providing the relief action and the concerned State.
(d) In compliance with the technical arrangements issued by the States or
parties concerned.
Commentary
1. For examples of technical arrangements, see Rule 125 (b).
19AP/Commentary, ibid, to Article 70(2), para 2825.
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Rule 128
Whenever circumstances permit, parties to the conflict should suspend
attacks in order to permit passage of humanitarian relief consignments.
Commentary
1. Due to an insufficiency of State practice and opinio juris supporting this Rule, the
Group of Experts decided to avoid the use of mandatory language (such as “must”
or “shall”).
2. The notion of “circumstances permit” is generally understood to reflect consid-
erations of military necessity.
Rule 129
In principle, the Rules relating to the provision of humanitarian assistance
apply to both international and non-international armed conflicts mutatis
mutandis.
Commentary
1. AP/II provides that relief actions in non-international armed conflicts should be
undertaken subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned. As
stipulated in Article 18 (2) of AP/II, such consent is always required, i.e., even in
situations where an area controlled by non-State actors borders on an adjacent
State so that humanitarian access can take place without passing through areas
controlled by the incumbent Government.
2. Although de jure there is no treaty requirement of insurgent consent, de facto—
should the insurgents be in control of the relevant territory—their consent to the
humanitarian operation will become indispensable for the provider of humanitar-
ian assistance. Efforts must, however, also be made to secure the consent of the
incumbent Government.
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Section XV: Cultural Property
Rule 130
“Cultural property” means movable or immovable property, whether secu-
lar or religious and irrespective of origin or ownership, which is of great
importance to the cultural heritage of every people. Examples include build-
ings and other monuments of historic, artistic or architectural significance;
archaeological sites; artworks, antiquities, manuscripts, books, collections
thereof, and collections of reproductions thereof; scientific collections; and
archives. The term “cultural property” extends to buildings whose main and
effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit movable cultural property and to
refuges intended to shelter it, as well as to centres containing a large amount
of movable or immovable cultural property.
Commentary
1. The definition of “cultural property” in this Rule is based on Article 1 of the 1954
Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict.
2. The phrase “of every people” in Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Convention is
capable on its face of two meanings, i.e. “of all peoples jointly” or “of each
respective people”. The practice of States Parties to the Convention varies in
terms of the interpretation of the phrase, and opinions are therefore divided as to
the correct approach. Whether specific property is of sufficient importance is for
all relevant States, including the State on whose territory it is situated, to
determine and is an assessment that must be made in good faith.
3. Where they are not “cultural property” in the technical sense, buildings such as
educational institutions, libraries, archives and places of worship, along with
objects such as artworks and books, are still protected by LOAC as civilian
objects. That said, as is the case with any other object of a civilian nature, the
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items referred to in this paragraph may become military objectives, e.g. by virtue
of use.
4. These Rules can also apply in occupied territory, see Article 5 of the 1954 Hague
Convention.
Rule 131
In an armed conflict, it is prohibited to make any use of cultural property or
of its immediate surroundings for purposes likely to expose the property to
destruction or damage unless this is imperatively required by military
necessity.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Articles 4(1) and (2) as well as Article 19(1) of the 1954
Hague Convention. See also Article 16 of AP/II. The Rule is consistent with
customary LOAC protections of cultural property applicable in both international
and non-international armed conflicts.
2. Subject to waiver for reasons of imperative military necessity, uses of cultural
property or its immediate surroundings that are prohibited by Rule 131 include,
by way of example:
a. Positioning a missile battery or anti-aircraft gun inside or alongside a historic
structure, whether to take tactical advantage of the location or to shield the
battery or gun from attack;
b. Incorporating a historic structure into a defensive line; and
c. Using a historic structure as a field headquarters or armoury.
3. The use of cultural property or that of its immediate surroundings need not expose
it to attack for it to violate the Rule. Rule 131 prohibits, subject to imperative
military necessity, any use of cultural property or of its immediate surroundings
for purposes likely to expose the property to damage resulting in the likelihood of
material harm to cultural property.
4. In all cases, any use of cultural property or of its immediate surroundings for
purposes likely to expose the property to destruction or damage is not prohibited
if imperatively required by military necessity.
5. A party to the conflict’s use of cultural property or of its immediate surroundings
for purposes likely to expose the property to destruction or damage does not
automatically relieve an opposing party of its obligation not to attack the property
(see Rule 132(a)). That is, use contrary to Rule 131 does not of itself make it
lawful to attack cultural property. It is prohibited to attack cultural property unless
it becomes a lawful object of attack (see Rules 9 and 10 with Commentaries) and
unless military necessity imperatively requires waiver of the obligation to refrain
from any act of hostility directed against such property (see Rule 132(a)).
6. Destruction of property that does not qualify as cultural property is dealt with in
chapter “Section XI: Destruction of Property”.
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Rule 132
(a) It is prohibited to make cultural property the object of attack unless it is a
military objective and military necessity imperatively requires waiver of
the obligation to refrain from any act of hostility directed against such
property.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Articles 4(1) and (2) of the 1954 Hague Convention.
However, the concept of military objective is rooted in customary international
law and it has been introduced in Article 6(a)(i) and (ii) of the Second Protocol
(of 1999) to the 1954 Hague Convention. It must be noted, nevertheless, that the
Second Protocol is not as widely ratified as the original Convention.
(b) Where cultural property becomes a military objective and military
necessity imperatively requires waiver of the obligation to refrain from
any act of hostility directed against it, any decision to attack the property
should be taken only by an officer of appropriate seniority.
Commentary
1. This paragraph of Rule 132 is based on the general practice of States. When
parties to the conflict are bound by the Second Protocol (of 1999) to the 1954
Hague Convention, Article 6(c) provides in mandatory terms that any decision to
invoke military necessity to attack cultural property must be taken by an officer
commanding a force equivalent in size to at least a battalion, unless circumstances
do not permit.
(c) Where cultural property becomes a military objective and military
necessity imperatively requires waiver of the obligation to refrain from
any act of hostility directed against it, a party to the conflict should give
advance warning whenever circumstances permit.
Commentary
1. Where parties to the conflict are bound by the Second Protocol (of 1999) to the
1954 Hague Convention, Article 6(d) of the Protocol specifies that, in the event
that cultural property becomes a military objective and there is no feasible
alternative to attacking it, a party must give advance warning before an attack
whenever circumstances permit.
2. Where cultural property is being used in support of military action, advance
warning grants the opposing forces an opportunity to cease such use, with the
consequence that the property will no longer constitute a military objective and
must be spared attack. The warning should demand the termination of the use and
give the opposing forces reasonable time to terminate such use.
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3. Advance warning grants an opposing party an opportunity to take practical
measures to minimize damage to the cultural property or to any movable cultural
property housed in it, including by removing the latter to a place of safety or
providing for adequate in situ protection (see Rule 134(a)).
Rule 133
(a) It is prohibited to launch an attack that may be expected to cause
collateral damage to cultural property that would be excessive in relation
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on the principle of proportionality, which is commented upon
in general in paragraphs 1 and 6 of the Commentary to Rule 11 and in paragraph
1 of the Commentary to Rule 14. In the specific context of cultural property, the
same substantive rule is codified in Article 7(c) of the Second Protocol to the
1954 Hague Convention. It is applicable in both international and
non-international armed conflicts, in accordance with Articles 3 and 22(1) of
the Second Protocol.
2. As applied to cultural property, the proportionality calculus involves qualitative
as much as quantitative considerations. The measure of collateral damage to
cultural property is a question not just of cubic metres but also of the cultural
value of the property likely to be harmed. In this light, it is significant that
movable or immovable property qualifying as cultural property is, by definition,
of great importance to the cultural heritage of peoples (see Rule 130).
(b) Parties to the conflict must take feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event
minimizing, collateral damage to cultural property.
Commentary
1. This Rule expresses the LOAC duty to take feasible precautions, which is
commented upon in general in paragraphs 1 and 6 the Commentary to Rule
11 and in paragraph 1 of the Commentary to Rule 14. The corresponding duty is
expressed in Article 7(b) of the Second Protocol (of 1999) to the 1954 Hague
Convention for States Parties and is applicable in both international and
non-international armed conflicts for such States, in accordance with Articles
3 and 22(1) of the Second Protocol.
Rule 134
Parties to the conflict liable to be attacked should, to the maximum extent
feasible:
Commentary
1. Subparagraph (a) is derived from Article 8(a) of the Second Protocol (of 1999) to
the 1954 Hague Convention, as well as Article 58(a) of AP/I and customary
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LOAC. For parties to the conflict bound by the Second Protocol to the 1954
Hague Convention, the obligation in (a) is binding in both international and
non-international armed conflict, by virtue of Articles 8(a) and 22(1) of the
Second Protocol.
2. Subparagraph (b) is derived from Article 8(b) of the Second Protocol to the 1954
Hague Convention. For parties to the conflict bound by the Second Protocol to the
1954 Hague Convention, the obligation in (b) is binding in non-international
armed conflict as well by virtue of Articles 8 (b) and 22(1) of the Second Protocol.
(a) Remove movable cultural property from the vicinity of military objec-
tives or provide for adequate in situ protection; and
Commentary
1. The fact that the party subject to attack has not taken the precautions specified in
Rule 134(a) does not relieve the attacking party of its obligations in attack under
Rules 132 and 133.
2. The related rule in Article 3 of the 1954 Hague Convention stipulates that States
Parties must take such measures as they consider appropriate to prepare in time of
peace for the safeguarding of cultural property situated within their own territory
against the foreseeable effects of armed conflict.
(b) Avoid locating military objectives near cultural property.
Commentary
1. Rule 134(b) requires, to the extent that the military situation and other relevant
factors admit, that a party refrain from positioning in the vicinity of cultural
property any likely military target. What is to be considered “near” cultural
property depends on the circumstances of each case.
2. The fact that the party subject to attack has not taken the precautions specified in
Rule 134(b) does not relieve the attacking party of its obligations in attack under
Rules 132 and 133.
Rule 135
(a) Personnel exclusively engaged on behalf of a party to the conflict in the
protection of cultural property should not be made the object of attack so
far as is consistent with the security interests of the opposing party.
Commentary
1. Article 15 of the 1954 Hague Convention provides that, as far as is consistent
with the security of the opposing party, personnel engaged in the protection of
cultural property must, in the interest of such property, be respected. Cross-
reference to Article 17(2)(b) and (c) of the Convention indicates that the
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personnel in question are those engaged on behalf of a party to the conflict. One
consequence of Article 15 is that such personnel must not be made the object of
attack. This obligation is reflected in the present Rule.
2. The protection accorded by Rule 133(a) is available only if the relevant personnel
are engaged exclusively in the protection of cultural property and not also, for
example, in the protection of military objectives.
3. A party to the conflict may, in fulfilment of Article 3 of the 1954 Hague
Convention and as expressly envisaged in Article 5 of the Second Protocol
(of 1999), designate competent authorities responsible for the safeguarding of
cultural property against the foreseeable effects of armed conflict. A party to the
conflict may also, as implied by Article 8(4) of the Convention, specially
empower “armed custodians” to guard cultural property. The Group of Experts
were divided as to whether members of the armed forces may be engaged in the
protection of cultural property and whether they would then be protected against
attack.
4. It is unclear whether Article 15 of the 1954 Hague Convention extends to any
members of a party’s armed forces acting as “armed custodians” of cultural
property within the meaning of Article 8(4) or to the “services or specialist
personnel” established within a party’s armed forces pursuant to Article 7(2).
5. In accordance with Article 21 of the Regulations for the Execution of the 1954
Hague Convention annexed to the Convention, personnel engaged in the protec-
tion of cultural property may wear an armlet bearing the distinctive emblem of
cultural property (see Rule 136(a)), issued and stamped by the competent author-
ities of the State on whose behalf they are engaged, and must carry a special
identity card bearing the emblem and the embossed stamp of the competent
authorities. The precise appearance of the card is a matter for each State, although
the information it contains is specified in Article 21 of the Regulations.
(b) Such personnel lose their protection if and for such time as they are
directly participating in hostilities.
Commentary
1. The notion of DPH is addressed in general in chapter “Section VII: Civilians
Directly Participating in Hostilities”.
Rule 136
(a) Parties to the conflict may mark cultural property with a distinctive
emblem.
Commentary
1. A distinctive emblem is created in Article 16(1) of the 1954 Hague Convention.
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2. As provided for in Article 6 of the 1954 Hague Convention, States Parties to the
Convention are expressly permitted to affix the emblem to or otherwise depict it
on cultural property to facilitate the property’s recognition as cultural property.
This is reflected in Rule 136(a).
3. Article 17(4) of the Convention stipulates that the distinctive emblem may not be
placed on any immovable cultural property unless at the same time there is
displayed an authorization duly dated and signed by the competent authority of
the State Party in question.
4. Distinctive marking of cultural property is not obligatory, either under Article 6 of
the 1954 Hague Convention or under Rule 136(a). Consequently, the fact that
property does not bear the emblem does not mean that it is not cultural property
protected by the 1954 Hague Convention. Nor does it mean that it is not protected
as cultural property under customary international law. In practice, the marking of
cultural property with the distinctive emblem is rare.
5. It is not unlawful for a party to the conflict that is not a State Party to the 1954
Hague Convention to mark cultural property with the emblem.
(b) The deliberate misuse of the distinctive emblem in an armed conflict is
prohibited.
Commentary
1. In accordance with both Article 17(3) of the 1954 Hague Convention and Article
38(1) of AP/I, and as restated in this Rule, the deliberate misuse during armed
conflict of the distinctive emblem of cultural property is prohibited.
Rule 137
The foregoing rules are without prejudice to any ‘special’ or ‘enhanced’
protection in accordance with applicable treaties.
Commentary
1. This Rule preserves the prohibitions reflected in Article 8 of the 1954 Hague
Convention (“special protection”) and in Article 10 ff. of the Second Protocol
(of 1999) to the 1954 Hague Convention (“enhanced protection”).
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Section XVI: Natural Environment
Rule 138
When planning and conducting military operations during an armed con-
flict, due regard should be given to the natural environment.
Commentary
1. According to Article 55(1), 1st sentence of AP/I, “care shall be taken in warfare
to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe
damage”. However, several States have repeatedly declared that Article 55 does
not reflect customary international law.1
2. Rule 44 of the Customary International Humanitarian Law Study (CIHL),
applicable in international and arguably also in non-international armed conflicts,
states that “methods and means of warfare must be employed with due regard
to the protection and preservation of the natural environment”.2 The Group
of Experts were of the view that the practice and opinio juris provided in
support of Rule 44 CIHL were insufficient to establish a mandatory requirement
of customary international law and that the word “should” was more appropriate.
3. Further objections have been made to the use of the phrase “due regard”. It has
been argued that the due regard standard is too broad to be of a customary nature
in relation to care given to the natural environment during armed conflict.
1U.S Response to ICRC CIHL Study 521 (“France and the United States repeatedly have declared
that Articles 35 (3) and 55 of AP/I, from which the Study derives the first sentence of rule 45, do not
reflect customary international law. In their instrument of ratification of the 1980 CCW, both France
and the United States asserted that the preambular paragraph in the CCW treaty, which refers to the
substance of Articles 35 (3) and 55, applied only to states that have accepted those articles.
2CIHL, see chapter “Section XI: Destruction of Property”, fn. 1, Rule 44 (1st sentence).
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Rule 138 applies to the natural environment of:
(a) The Belligerent States,
(b) Neutral States,
(c) International sea areas, and
(d) Outer Space, the Moon and other Celestial Bodies (chapter “Section I:
Outer Space”).
Commentary
1. Since damage to the natural environment may easily transcend borders, the scope
of Rule 138 is not limited to the territory of the Belligerent States and applies to
all domains of warfare.
2. Outer Space, the Moon and other Celestial Bodies are defined in Rule 1.
3. It must be noted that it is controversial whether and to what extent Outer Space,
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies are considered to be parts of the natural
environment for the purposes of LOAC.
Rule 140
In international armed conflict—subject to Rules 142 and 143—States
should not use means and methods of warfare which are intended or may
be expected to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment.
Commentary
1. Under AP/I, it is prohibited for States Parties to employ methods or means of
warfare that are intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term
and severe damage to the natural environment (Article 35(3)). In Article 55(1) of
AP/I, a similar prohibition is stipulated. The latter provision identifies “the
prohibition of the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended or
may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to
prejudice the health or survival of the population” as one of the manifestations of
the duty of care in warfare to protect the natural environment.
2. Although protecting the environment during an international armed conflict—and
taking into consideration the possible environmental implications of an attack—
are incontrovertibly desirable as a matter of policy, some States have expressed
the view that the AP/I prohibition does not constitute customary international law,
with regard to either conventional or nuclear weapons.3 That said, it is clear under
the principle of distinction that parts of the natural environment cannot be made
the object of attack unless they constitute military objectives. Further criticism of
3U.S Response to ICRC CIHL Study, see fn. 1.
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AP/I is that it fails to acknowledge that, after a determination of military necessity
and application of the distinction principle, the use of weapons causing damage to
the natural environment is prohibited when it is expected to be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.4
3. The interpretation of the terms “widespread”, “long-term” and “severe” (which
appear both in AP/I and in the ENMOD Convention5) is controversial. Moreover,
it is agreed that the meaning of the words in one context (AP/I) is not the same as
in other contexts (in particular the ENMOD Convention).
4. Although, in the view of the ICRC, the prohibition stipulated in Article 35(3) of
AP/I is of customary nature, the assertion is not borne out by the available State
practice and opinio juris. At the same time, there can hardly be any doubt that the
issue of the protection of the environment in armed conflict has emerged as a
particular international concern and that such a concern also manifests itself in the
desirability of avoiding widespread, long-term and severe environmental damage.
The practice and statements of several States, including those of States that are
not Parties to AP/I, substantiate this concern.
5. Some States take the position that the application of this Rule is also subject to the
principle of proportionality. These States rely, inter alia, on the terms of Article 8
(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998.
Rule 141
Under the ENMOD Convention, State Parties undertake not to engage in
military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques
having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction,
damage or injury to any other State Party.
Commentary
1. Under Articles 1 and 2 of the ENMOD Convention, States Parties undertake not
to engage in “military or any other hostile use of environmental modification
techniques [defined as any technique for changing—through the deliberate
manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure
of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of
Outer Space] having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party”. This means that States
will refrain from using the environment itself as a weapon when fighting another
State Party to the ENMOD Convention.
4Ibid
5See chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 19.
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2. Rule 45 of the CIHL, which stipulates a prohibition of the use of the “destruction
of the natural environment [. . .] as a weapon”, is based, inter alia, on the
ENMOD Convention. However, the CIHL itself describes the customary status
of the ENMOD Convention as “unclear”.6
Rule 142
Intentional destruction of any part of the natural environment qualifying as
a civilian object is prohibited, unless required by imperative military
necessity.
Commentary
1. Destruction of property when required by imperative military necessity is dealt
with in general in chapter “Section XI: Destruction of Property” with accompa-
nying Commentary.
2. The present Rule reflects the widely accepted view that the prohibition against the
destruction or seizure of enemy property, unless required by military necessity,
can be extended to apply to those parts of the natural environment that constitute
civilian objects.
3. It must be borne in mind that the prohibition of the intentional destruction of the
natural environment is contingent on consideration of military necessity. Absent
military necessity, such destruction cannot be justified.
4. On the other hand, it has been argued that no sufficient State practice or opinio
juris in support of this position (which extends the customary prohibition against
destruction of enemy property as set out in chapter “Section XI: Destruction of
Property”) exists.
5. Although the wording of the present Rule 142 is broad, it is agreed that de
minimis damage, such as the destruction of a single tree, does not constitute a
violation of this Rule. It is unclear at what point destruction is no longer
considered de minimis and comes within the application of the Rule as stated.
Rule 143
Although parts of the natural environment constitute civilian objects other
parts may be regarded as military objectives by location, purpose or use
(e.g., camouflage).
Commentary
1. Many portions of the natural environment may be viewed presumptively as
civilian objects. Still, there are two schools of thought in this matter. One school
of thought regards the natural environment as worthy of protection per se.
Another school of thought, anthropocentric in nature, focuses on those portions
6CIHL, see chapter “Section XI: Destruction of Property”, fn. 1, vol. I, page 155.
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of the natural environment that human beings are dependent on for their survival
or health.
2. However extensively the inherently protected portions of the natural environment
are viewed, it cannot be denied that—due to purpose, location or use—parts of
the environment can qualify as military objectives. This is expressly recognized
in Protocol III of the CCW Convention, which lays down in Article 2(4): “It is
prohibited to make forests or other kinds of plant cover the object of attack by
incendiary weapons except when such natural elements are used to cover, conceal
or camouflage combatants or other military objectives, or are themselves military
objectives”.
Rule 144
Feasible precautions should be taken to avoid, or in any event to minimize,
incidental damage to parts of the natural environment constituting civilian
objects.
Commentary
1. The general principle for States Parties to AP/I, as stated in Article 57(1), is that
parties to an armed conflict must take constant care to spare civilian objects. This
principle extends to the natural environment, if and when it constitutes a civilian
object.
2. Constant care includes the notion of taking feasible precautions in attack to avoid
or minimize incidental damage to those parts of the environment that constitute
civilian objects.
Rule 145
It is prohibited to launch an attack against a lawful target, which may be
expected to cause incidental damage to those parts of the natural environ-
ment that constitute civilian objects, expected to be excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated.
Commentary
1. This Rule expresses the principle of proportionality, which is commented upon in
general terms in paragraph 1 of the Commentary to Rule 11. Several States,
including some not party to AP/I, have accepted the obligation to include
expected environmental damage in the proportionality assessment of a proposed
attack. In a similar vein, the ICJ had earlier observed that “States must take
environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives. Respect for the
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environment is one of the elements that go to assessing whether an action is in
conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality.”7
2. However, the Rule applies only to parts of the natural environment constituting
civilian objects. For example, where the natural environment is used for camou-
flage or as a shield for armed forces (see Rule 143), that part of the natural
environment may be considered a military objective by use or location. With
regard to destruction of parts of the natural environment as a consequence of
movement of military forces, see chapter “Section XI: Destruction of Property”
with Commentary.
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Section XVII: International Criminal Law
Rule 146
Those who decide upon, plan, order or execute military operations during an
armed conflict bear individual criminal responsibility for war crimes they
have committed.
Commentary
1. Under International Criminal Law (ICL), persons may be individually account-
able for international crimes (e.g., war crimes, crimes against humanity and
genocide) provided, inter alia, that the following basic conditions are satisfied:
a. That the conduct, at the time it took place, constituted a crime according to
law, referred to as the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.1
b. That punishment can only be imposed following a conviction in accordance
with the principle of nulla poena sine lege.2
c. That they are not to be tried twice for the same conduct that formed the basis
for the crime, referred to as the principle of ne bis in idem.3
d. That they acted with the mental element(s) required for the specific crime and
that no situation existed to negate the element(s).4
e. That there are no reasons to exclude criminal responsibility (e.g., self-defence
or mental disease).5
1Expressed in the Rome Statute, see chapter “Section XI: Destruction of Property”, fn. 1, Article 22.
2Expressed in the Rome Statute, ibid, Article 23.
3Expressed in the Rome Statute, ibid, Article 20.
4Expressed in the Rome Statute, ibid, Articles 30 and 32.
5Expressed in the Rome Statute, ibid, Article 31.
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2. This chapter deals only with war crimes. However, it must be borne in mind that a
war crime may also constitute a crime against humanity or genocide.
3. The construct of “war crimes” is well embedded in customary international law as
confirmed by the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg.
War crimes have been defined by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court for the purposes of that treaty. However, Article 10 of the Rome
Statute provides that the definition of war crimes in that treaty shall not be
interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of
international law. Some States apply different definitions of war crimes under
customary international law.
4. The reference to “decide upon, plan, order or execute” is understood to encom-
pass, in principle, the whole spectrum of involvement in military operations. This
includes individuals who assist in the commission of conduct constituting a crime
and who may, depending on the circumstances, be guilty of aiding and abetting a
crime.6 The mere presence in a place where an international crime occurs does not
in itself amount to a commission of that crime. See, in this regard, Rule 147 on the
notion of command responsibility.
5. The text of the Rome Statute binds only States Parties. Irrespective of the Statute,
war crimes are incorporated in the domestic criminal law of many States. In many
instances, States punish war criminals through the ordinary application of their
criminal law by using common domestic offences such as murder or assault.
Although a war crime can only be committed within the context of an armed
conflict (whether international or non-international), a crime against humanity or
genocide can be committed outside situations of armed conflict.
Rule 147
Military commanders bear individual criminal responsibility if they knew
or, owing to the circumstances at the time, had reason to know that their
subordinates were committing, were about to commit, or had committed any
war crime, and failed to take necessary and reasonable measures to prevent
their commission or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
Commentary
1. This Rule addresses command responsibility, i.e. the responsibility of superiors
for acts committed by their subordinates. However, all commanders obviously
also bear direct responsibility for their own actions under Rule 146.
2. This Rule is derived from case law after WWII (in particular, the “Subsequent
Proceedings” at Nuremburg and the judgment of the International Military
Tribunal for the Far East at Tokyo). The construct of command responsibility
has been codified in Article 7(3) of the Statute of the ICTY, Article 6(3) of the
6See Rome Statute, ibid, Article 25.
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Statute of the ICTR, as well as Article 28 of the Rome Statute. Although this
construct is embedded in customary international law, the Rome Statute articu-
lation of command responsibility is binding only in the application of the Rome
Statute itself.
3. Command responsibility is applicable in both international and non-international
armed conflict.
4. Command responsibility relies on three cumulative criteria: (a) the superior-
subordinate relationship between the commander and the forces under his or
her effective control; (b) the fact that the commander or superior knew or had
reason to know about the crimes or potential crimes in the circumstances at the
time; and (c) the commander or superior’s failure to take necessary and reason-
able measures to prevent or punish the crimes.
5. Article 28(b) of the Rome Statute applies a similar rule to civilian superiors
provided that a clear link is established between the crimes committed by sub-
ordinates and the effective authority and control of the civilian superiors. Simi-
larly, with respect to the attribution of knowledge to the civilian superior, there is
a strict requirement of conscious disregard of the information available.
6. Commanders may be punished directly for their failure to take necessary and
reasonable measures to ensure that their subordinates do not commit violations
of LOAC.
7. Command responsibility is not a form of strict liability. The commander’s
personal dereliction of duty must have contributed to or failed to prevent the
offence committed by his subordinates. There must be a personal neglect
amounting to a wanton, disregard of the action of his or her subordinates
amounting to a crime per se.
Rule 148
The fact that a war crime has been committed by a person pursuant to an
order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, does
not, as such, relieve that person of criminal responsibility.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Nuremberg Principle IV,7 which reflects customary ICL, as
distinct from the rule in Article 33 of the Rome Statute which provides for an
exclusion of criminal responsibility if specified circumstances apply.
2. The fact that a war crime has been committed under superior orders may be
considered in mitigation of punishment. Mitigation of punishment may also depend
on a variety of other circumstances the accused was acting under, e.g., the gravity of
the crime, his/her rank, and knowledge of the overall military operation that the
7Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the
Judgment of the Tribunal, Adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations
(Nuremberg Principles) (1950), The Laws of Armed Conflicts, page 1265.
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conduct was a part of, as well as military experience and what could reasonably have
been expected from a soldier in a similar situation.
3. The phrase “as such” was added in order to emphasize that other circumstances
may preclude criminal responsibility, as referred to in paragraph 1 of the Com-
mentary to Rule 146.
Rule 149
A person’s official position does not relieve that person of criminal respon-
sibility for a war crime.
Commentary
1. This Rule is based on Nuremberg Principle III, later repeated in Article 27 of the
Rome Statute, as well as Article 7(2) of the Statute of the ICTY and Article 6
(2) of the Statute of the ICTR. “Official position” includes that of both Heads of
State as well as other governmental officials.
Rule 150
No statutory limitation applies to certain war crimes, irrespective of the date
of their commission.
Commentary
1. The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as well as the European Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes against Humanity and War
Crimes, prohibit statutory limitations with regard to certain international crimes.8
The same prohibition is repeated in Article 29 of the Rome Statute.
2. The non-application of statutory limitation applies to traditional war crimes, as
defined in Article 1(a) of the 1968 Convention. There is no sufficient State
practice indicating that it can be extended to other war crimes.
Rule 151
Any person charged with a war crime has the right to be tried by an
impartial and regularly constituted court respecting the generally recog-
nized principles of regular judicial procedure.
Commentary
1. This wording expresses customary law minimum fair trial guarantees and is based
on the wording of Article 75 of AP/I. Minimum fair trial guarantees must be
8Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against
Humanity (1968), Laws of Armed Conflict, page 1267, Article 1. European Convention on the
Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes (1974),
Laws of Armed Conflicts, page 1281, Article 1.
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enforced in any prosecution of any crime, including war crimes, crimes against
humanity or genocide.
2. The phrase “regularly constituted court” appears in Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and is repeated in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court.
3. The generally recognized principles of regular judicial procedure include,
inter alia:9
a. The right to be informed without delay, in an understandable language, of the
particulars of the offence alleged against him/her.
b. The right not to be convicted by a tribunal or a court that does not satisfy the
basic conditions mentioned in paragraph 1 of the Commentary to Rule 146.
c. The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.
d. The right to be tried in his/her own presence with the necessary rights and
means of defence.
e. The right not to be compelled to testify against himself/herself or to confess
guilt.
Rule 152
Individual criminal responsibility for war crimes may lead to penal pro-
ceedings before competent international, domestic or hybrid courts.
Commentary
1. Many States are currently bound by the 1998 Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. However, many States are not Contracting Parties to the Rome
Statute, and have not accepted its jurisdiction in respect of their personnel. For
example, the United States has rejected any assertion of ICC jurisdiction over
nationals that are not parties to the Rome Statute, absent a UN Security Council
referral or the consent of that State.10
2. Hybrid courts are characterized by both international and domestic elements and
have been established, inter alia, in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
3. Proceedings before an international court or tribunal or a hybrid court are subject
to the respective statute establishing the forum.
4. War crimes proceedings before international and domestic courts are subject to
jurisdictional limitations and immunities imposed by international law.
5. A crucial issue in trials before international and domestic courts is whether there
exists universal jurisdiction over war crimes. The issue is controversial, and the
Group of Experts decided not to address it.
6. Domestic and international courts must observe applicable jurisdictional immu-
nities found in international law. In this regard, it should be pointed out that the
9See for example AP/I, chapter “Section I: Outer Space”, fn. 13, Article 75(3) and (4).
10U.S Statement to the 16th Sessions of the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute.
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International Court of Justice, in the Arrest Warrant case, recognized immunities
from foreign jurisdictions for high-ranking officials (in that case, a Foreign
Minister).11 Jurisdictional immunity under international law is subject to waiver
by the respective State.
7. The enforcement of international criminal law by international or foreign courts is
subject to the fundamental principles of complementarity and subsidiarity,
respectively. Accordingly, the State with the strongest jurisdictional links to a
particular incident should be given the opportunity to conduct criminal proceed-
ings. Only if it does not do so, or is unwilling or unable to do so, international or
foreign proceeding would be considered a legitimate course of action.
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Section XVIII: Extraterritorial Operations
Against Non-state Armed Groups
Rule 153
The right of self-defence applies in response to an armed attack by non-State
armed groups.
Commentary
1. The exercise of the right of self-defence in response to an armed attack by
non-State armed groups is demonstrated by the general practice and opinio
juris of States in reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. This has been
confirmed, inter alia, by Security Council resolutions (1368 and 1373) and by
international organizations such as NATO.
Rule 154
A State may exercise its right of self-defence against non-State armed groups
in a foreign State in response to an armed attack mounted by them from
outside the victim State’s territory, subject to the Charter of the United
Nations.
Commentary
1. This Rule does not address the issue of domestic terrorism.
2. It might not be possible or necessary to distinguish between armed attacks
launched by another State as such (whether it is carried out by de jure or de
facto organs), on the one hand, and armed attacks carried out by non-State armed
groups, on the other. The inherent right of self-defence, enshrined in Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, is not contingent on armed attack being
attributable to another State.
3. If the foreign State knowingly provides shelter to the armed group, or otherwise
connives with it, an armed attack carried out by the armed group it may bear
responsibility for such actions.
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4. An armed attack by non-State armed groups may be launched from foreign
territory, where there is no connivance by the territorial State notwithstanding
the fact that the armed group has its base of operations within that territory. If
the victim State exercises its right of self-defence, it will likely do so within the
territory of the State in which such base of operation is situated. Nevertheless, the
exercise of self-defence will be directed against the non-state armed groups and
not against the foreign State itself.
Rule 155
Self-defence may be exercised in the circumstances referred to in Rule
154 without the consent of the incumbent territorial Government if the latter
is unable or unwilling to take the action necessary to suppress armed attacks
by a non-State armed group against the victim State.
Commentary
1. This mode of non-consensual self-defence is in conformity with the general
practice of States and the Charter of the United Nations. It is sometimes called
“extra-territorial law enforcement”, which is permissible when a local Govern-
ment is unable or unwilling to suppress armed attacks carried out by non-State
armed groups against foreign States.
2. Admittedly, the scale of the use of force in self-defence against the “Islamic
State” within Syria—by the U.S-led coalition, operating without the consent or
invitation of the Syrian Government—is extraordinary.
3. As in all other instances of self-defence, the exercise of the right has to be carried
out in accordance with the customary conditions of necessity, proportionality and
immediacy.
Rule 156
The right of self-defence against non-State armed groups in the circum-
stances referred to in Rule 154 may be exercised either individually or
collectively.
Commentary
1. The United States and other members of the international coalition have justified
their military operations in Syria against the “Islamic State” on the ground of
collective self-defence in response to an armed attack against Iraq.
2. In the meantime, the “Islamic State” has carried out numerous armed attacks
against other countries. Most of the members of the large coalition that has been
operating against the “Islamic State” have been acting in collective self-defence.
3. Some other members of the coalition fighting the “Islamic State” may have
different rationales for their operations in Syria.
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Rule 157
The extra-territorial exercise of the right of self-defence against non-State
armed groups does not per se bring into existence an international armed
conflict.
Commentary
1. Broadly speaking, the armed conflict in Syria (beginning in 2011) constitutes a
clear illustration of the application of this Rule.
2. The rationale is that the States conducting operations in Syria are engaged in
fighting there either by invitation of the Syrian Government or—if operating
without such invitation—they are confronting non-State armed groups in an
exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence against an armed
attack.
3. The crux of the matter is that (broadly speaking) there have been no hostilities
between States in Syria (in other words, the States belonging to the anti-“Islamic
State” coalition and the Syrian Government have largely chosen not to engage
one another with military force).
4. Despite the allegations of some, it should be stressed that the Syrian hostilities
have not generated a new LOAC matrix by adding a third category to the existing
dichotomy of international armed conflicts and non-international armed conflicts.
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